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1 Introduction
In Germany, there is an ongoing conversion of agricultural land into residential and
commercial areas. Negative ecological and economic consequences related to this trend
compromise the ecological function of space as a resource for humans, animals, and
plants.
One of the reasons for the ongoing consumption of land is the tight ﬁnancial situation
of many municipalities (Jo¨rissen and Coenen, 2007). At a ﬁrst glance, the development
of new areas in the outer zones of municipalities appears to be attractive because, often,
it is cost neutral or even linked to proceeds from selling land. Moreover, a larger estate
per capita ratio is expected by the settlement of young families which will have a positive
impact on the redistribution of income taxes. However, recent studies have shown that
urban sprawl can also increase the long term costs of the public infrastructure and, thus,
amplify the ﬁnancial burden in the long run (e.g. Gutsche, 2006; Preuß and Floating,
2009; Siedentop, 2007).
A further challenge for the federal government within this context is the large number
of protagonists, who are involved in the process of land utilization, and the reconciliation
of their interests, which may counteract with a sustainable land usage. The federal gov-
ernment and the federal states provide the legal framework but cannot directly control
the land consumption caused by these actors. The municipalities are responsible for
spatial planning and are empowered to draw up the relevant local development plans.
Thereby, the municipalities have practically full planning sovereignty within their ter-
ritory. Still, their decisions result from a complex interaction between planning and
political bodies within the municipal administration as well as investors and conserva-
tionists.
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1.1 Background
In this context, the Strategy for Sustainability of the federal government expresses the
intention to develop a practical program for housing and transport-related land uti-
lization while considering ecological, social, and economic objectives (Bundesregierung,
2002, 2004). Furthermore, the federal government has set the ambitious goal in its 2002
Strategy for Sustainability to reduce the new land development to 30 ha per day by
2020. In this program, land-related ﬁnancial, ﬁscal and development policy instruments
will be examined to minimize the urban sprawl, the fragmentation of the countryside
and the loss of natural habitat.
Since the passage of the Strategy for Sustainability, the development of new areas
has only slightly declined. Today, there is still a huge gap between the current develop-
ment of 95 ha per day and the national target of 30 ha per day in 2020 (Figure 1.1).1
Von Haaren and Michaelis (2005), therefore, argue that the actual German planning
policies are not suﬃcient to assure a sustainable development. The government’s own
assessment of its above mentioned Sustainability Strategy identiﬁes a particular chal-
lenge in addressing the consumption of land in the large number of protagonists and
the reconciliation of their interests (Bundesregierung, 2004, p. 193f). To overcome these
issues, the 2004 assessment discusses several ﬁnancial instruments and highlights the
importance of economic incentives.
The situation in Germany has given rise to a discussion about innovative planning
approaches and new policy instruments. The present land use planning policy has only
been partially successful in limiting land consumption and urban sprawl. It seems to
be necessary that the federal government implements an eﬀective medium- and long-
term policy for a sustainable development on the basis of new economic instruments,
as legal instruments alone are apparently not suﬃcient to reduce land consumption
(Bundesregierung, 2004, p. 19):
“Subsidies, taxes, duties and development programs need to be examined with
respect to their potential contribution to land consumption reduction. To that
end, social, economic and ﬁnancial eﬀects must also be considered.”
1Source: http://www.umweltbundesamt-daten-zur-umwelt.de/umweltdaten/public/theme.do?node
Ident=2898 (27.11.2010).
2
1 Introduction
40ha
60ha
80ha
100ha
120ha
140ha
De
ve
lo
pm
en
tp
er
D
ay
National
Goal
0ha
20ha
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
20
La
nd
D
Year
Figure 1.1: New Land Development in Germany
A promising economic instrument to cope with the 30 ha/d target would be a system
with tradable development certiﬁcates (TDCs).2 Such a system has been suggested by
the parliament’s expert advisory board with the constraint that several design questions
must be solved prior to an actual implementation (Sachversta¨ndigenrat fu¨r Umwelt-
fragen, 2002, 2004). The government, however, has several legal concerns regarding a
TDC system. Moreover, a TDCs system is a merely quantitative instrument and does
not diﬀerentiate qualitative aspects. Therefore, the Government envisions a system of
TDCs in combination with other planning guidelines and concludes: “Before any fun-
damental decision is taken on the continued pursuance of such approaches, the results
of pilot projects [. . . ] must be ascertained, carefully evaluated and discussed with the
participants, particularly those in the municipalities” (Bundesregierung, 2004, p. 208).
In addition to the examination of new land-related ﬁnancial, ﬁscal and development
policy instruments, the Strategy for Sustainability of the federal government focuses on
inter-disciplinary methods to achieve a stronger link between the existing ecological and
planning approaches. To achieve these more ambitious targets, the coalition agreement
of the recently elected federal government also foresees trade systems in pilot studies:3
2Synonyms for the term development certiﬁcate are the terms development allowance, development
right, or development permit. The term development certiﬁcate is used to diﬀerentiate the new
instrument from development rights which have been used in the US for many years.
3The coalition agreement between the CDU, CSU and FDP for the 17th legislative period 2008-2013.
GROWTH.EDUCATION.UNITY. Page 41.
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“We intent to initiate a voluntary pilot project that would allow municipalities
to test a supraregional trade system for land use.”
Such a pilot project can provide real life experience for municipalities and city planners
with new policy instruments and can serve as a basis to analyze the strategic behavior
and the decision processes of actual decision makers in local authorities. Furthermore,
the usage of the experimental methodology allows the comparison of actual eﬃciency
gains of the trading scheme with those postulated by theory and the evaluation of
diﬀerent scheme designs with respect to the behavior of the participants and the market
outcome.
1.2 Experimental Methodology
Experience with cap-and-trade systems has led to a rich empirical and experimental
academic literature. Theoretical studies focusing on the market design allow to make
predictions about the market outcomes of diﬀerent designs in particular situations on
the basis of stylized data. Empirical experience with environmental markets gained in
ﬁeld studies gives evidence of how well the theory is in accord with actual results. In
comparison to the results from theoretical studies, ﬁeld studies have a higher external
validity as actual data is being used.
Another way to analyze new cap-and-trade systems is to test and reﬁne environmen-
tal markets in the laboratory—the so-called test bedding method (see Plott and Porter,
1996; Plott and Cook, 2005). For the evaluation of environmental policy instruments,
diﬀerent experimental methods have recently been used. In the classical controlled labo-
ratory experiment, a group of human participants is sitting in front of a set of computers
and is linked with each other by specialized software (Roth, 1988; Smith, 1994). Experi-
ments have less external validity than ﬁeld studies, but provide a speciﬁc level of internal
validity. The participants have to cope with decision tasks, which include carefully con-
trolled incentives, choices, information, and other characteristics. By varying one design
parameter between diﬀerent experimental sessions, while holding all other factors con-
stant, the experimentalists can test how the respective treatment variable aﬀects the
market outcome. Typically, students are recruited for the experiments. They receive a
payment based on their performance in the experiment. These economic experiments
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are increasingly used to investigate public policy, economic theories, and institutions
(Figure 1.2).4
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Figure 1.2: Comparison of Diﬀerent Methodologies
In addition to the classical laboratory experiments, more realistic ﬁeld experiments
with a speciﬁc contribution to economic policy making have been carried out in the
last years (see Cardenas and Carpenter, 2005; Carpenter et al., 2005; Harrison and List,
2004; Shogren, 2005; Sturm and Weimann, 2006). In particular prior to the actual
implementation, some of the national and regional emissions trading systems in the US
were simulated in ﬁeld experiments to test selected properties (e.g. Holt et al., 2007).
The explorative approach can also lead to new ﬁndings which, because of the complexity
of the environment, could not have been derived from theory. The simulation game
SET UP on emissions trading (Ehrhart et al., 2003) combined the advantages of a ﬁeld
experiment and a controlled lab experiment. Companies that participated in the ex-ante
simulation took also part in such a system in reality afterwards. The artiﬁcial testing
environment developed for SET UP allowed the controlled analysis of the participants’
actual decision processes and strategies.
4Source: Presentation ‘Controlled ﬁeld experiments’ by Stefan Seifert at the annual conference of the
Gesellschaft fu¨r experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung, 2008.
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1.3 The Project Spiel.Raum
Against this background, a cap-and-trade scheme in Germany for land development was
investigated with local authorities within the ﬁeld experiment Spiel.Raum which repre-
sents the basis for the analyses in this book. The Spiel.Raum study was funded by the
Federal Ministry of Education and Research program Research for Sustainability within
the initiative Economics for Sustainability and was conducted by the Fraunhofer Insti-
tut fu¨r System- und Innovationsforschung in cooperation with the Karlsruhe Institute
of Technology (KIT), the Bu¨ro Stadt-Land-Fluss (Prof. Dr. Ku¨pfer), the Takon GmbH
and the author of this book as a member of the Graduate School Information Man-
agement and Market Engineering of the KIT. The purpose of this project was to gain
insights into how to design such a system in the real world and how real world actors
might behave in such a system. In addition to a decentralized simulation over the in-
ternet, the design of the new instrument in general was discussed with the participating
municipalities and communal interest groups on several workshops.
The data basis of the ﬁeld study has been used for additional analyses in this book and
will be presented in some sections. The role of the author of this book in the Spiel.Raum
project was to design and implement the software platform, to conduct the simulation
runs of the ﬁeld experiment and to support the data analysis of the experimental results.
Furthermore, the author conducted additional lab experiments with diﬀerent student
groups and also analyzed interdisciplinary aspects of a cap-and-trade scheme for land
development as a member of the Graduate School. Hence, the contents of this book
are interdisciplinary aspects of a cap-and-trade scheme for land development, the design
of the software platform as a decision support tool, as well as additional analyses of
the simulation and survey results that have been not subject of investigation within the
scope of the project. Nevertheless, also the results of the ﬁeld study will be addressed
and presented within this book.
The main results of the ﬁeld study are published in Ehrhart et al. (2008), Ostertag
et al. (2009), Ostertag et al. (2010), and Mu¨ller et al. (2010). Further papers are cur-
rently in preparation. The results of the project will be summarized and presented
in Section 2.2.2 (Design Primary Allocation), in Section 4.5 (Design Decision Support
6
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Tool), as well as in the Sections 5.1 and 5.3 (Results of the Field Experiment).5 While
this book presents results of the project in more detail, it contains – to some extend – also
material which is included in the mentioned publications and working papers. Within
the scope of the ﬁeld study, also laboratory experiments had been conducted to analyze
the decision making within such a system in more detail. Hence, the results of the lab
experiments will be referenced in this book (published by Mu¨ller et al., 2010a,b).
1.4 Research Questions
Complementary to the ﬁeld study Spiel.Raum, this book reports in more detail on the
behavior of the real world actors by regarding the actual design of a cap-and-trade scheme
for land use from diﬀerent disciplines. In addition to economic aspects (e.g. allocation
rules) also the legal and institutional framework will be analyzed for an interdisciplinary
view on the topic. In order to model and support the decision making processes of the
participants in the ﬁeld experiment, also the analysis of the structure of the municipal
decision processes is particularly important in this book. Based on the analysis of the
municipal decision processes, diﬀerent designs of decision support tools will be proposed.
A decision support tool prototype has also been implemented within the ﬁeld experiment.
The design of the decision support tool that will be presented is this book, has been the
main task of the author of this book within the above mentioned project. Furthermore,
the book analyzes to what extent the eﬃciency gains of the new instrument, which
are postulated by theory, are realized under close-to-real conditions by combining the
results of the ﬁeld experiment with survey data. The surveys are conducted to analyze
and evaluate the strategic behavior of actual decision makers of local authorities and
the impact of non-economic criteria during the decision making. Hence, the following
four research questions outline the main subjects of the investigation within the scope
of this book:
• What are the important aspects when designing a cap-and-trade scheme
for land development in Germany while considering market mechanisms, le-
gal framework, and allocation rules simultaneously?
5Furthermore the contents of Table 2.2, Figure 5.4, Figure 5.5, Figure 5.6 have been adapted from
previous publications and working papers.
7
1 Introduction
• Which are the main characteristics of municipal decision processes in local land
development and how could they inﬂuence the market design for a cap-and-trade
scheme in Germany?
• How can a decision support tool be modeled in order to reﬂect a municipal
decision situation and to support the municipal decision making in a cap-and-
trade scheme for land use in Germany?
• What are the characteristics of the strategic behavior of actual decision mak-
ers in the ﬁeld experiment and which eﬃciency gains of the trading scheme
can be observed in the experiment compared to those postulated by theory?
To answer these research questions, concepts and methods from economics are bor-
rowed, particularly from game theory and experimental economics, and combined with
institutional aspects. In the next section, an overview of the chapters will be given.
1.5 Structure of the Book
In line with the research questions, the book is divided into six chapters: An introductory
chapter, four main parts following the research questions and a ﬁnal chapter (Figure 1.3).
After a short introduction, each chapter emphasizes the research focus and the applied
methodology. In each chapter, the results from the theoretical or empirical analyses are
presented in the main part, before being reﬂected in a short summary. The ﬁnal chapter
sums up all results and gives an outlook for future work on the research topic.
After the introductory chapter, Chapter 2 presents the design of a cap-and-trade
scheme in Germany. The chapter starts with the comparison of economic instruments
and regulatory approaches, and summarizes the main characteristics of the instruments.
Afterwards, the design of a cap-and-trade scheme for land usage in Germany will be in-
troduced, including the market diﬀerentiation and the design of the new environmental
good. Furthermore, the chapter discusses legal aspects and the regulatory choice prob-
lem, which have to be considered when designing an appropriate cap-and-trade scheme.
In this context, the design of the primary allocation and the suitability of diﬀerent allo-
cation criteria will also be presented. The chapter concludes with a discussion wherein
an allocation process for the new certiﬁcates is presented that emphasizes the need to
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Figure 1.3: Structure of the Book and Applied Methods
analyze the decision making of the involved actors, e.g. land development decisions of
local representatives, in more detail.
For the further analysis of diﬀerent aspects of land development decisions, an enhanced
view on the complex decision making is necessary. In Chapter 3, a comprehensive frame-
work is elaborated, which closes the gap between the interdisciplinary studies and the
experimental analysis for a transdisciplinary view on decision processes in land devel-
opment. The framework describes diﬀerent dimensions that can inﬂuence local land
development decisions based on recent insights from literature. The chapter presents a
comprehensive analysis of the decision making processes by introducing a framework for
the description of the land development context, and for the description of the decision
making chain within this framework. By means of the framework, the potentially aris-
ing cost paradox and the development dilemma, caused by a collective action of decision
makers, is discussed. The results give an insight into how the behavior of local decision
makers in particular decision situations leads to ineﬃcient regional structures regard-
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ing the infrastructure costs. Based on the framework, the chapter motivates further
transdisciplinary research areas in this domain and highlights the need to structure the
municipal decision making in order to implement decision support tools.
Chapter 4 starts with a short overview of recent decision support tools in land usage.
Afterwards, the modeling of the own decision support tool implemented within the
Spiel.Raum ﬁeld study is introduced. This tool supports the strategic planning within
the context of policy making and spatial planning. In order to implement a cap-and-trade
system for land usage, the tool can be extended and adjusted by modular components.
Furthermore, the implementation of the decision support tool into a realistic use case
is presented. During the practical implementation, further requirements to design new,
more appropriate tools or to redesign existing systems for land use can be identiﬁed. The
chapter concludes with a distinction between the new decision support tool and other
decision support tools and stresses the importance of the tool for the ﬁeld experiment.
In Chapter 5, the design and the results of the Spiel.Raum ﬁeld experiment, which
was conducted to test a trading scheme in Germany, are presented. The simulation has
been conducted with spatial planners of 14 German cities and municipal syndicates, and
used the actual data of the participating municipalities. Based on their current data,
the participating municipalities simulated the period from 2008 to 2022 under the rules
of a cap-and-trade system. In order to have an empirical benchmark for the results, the
simulation game was repeated in the lab with a student control group using the same
municipal data. To analyze the eﬃciency gains of the trading scheme, the observed
outcomes in the ﬁeld experiment will be compared to those postulated by theory. In
order to get deeper insights into the decision making processes of the local representatives
and to analyze the strategic behavior of actual decision makers, the results of the ﬁeld
experiment will be combined with the results of surveys. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes
the results from the main parts and gives an outlook for future research.
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of Tradable Development
Certiﬁcates
In the recent years, there have been many discussions regarding adaptations of the
current planning law and whether this adaptations would be suﬃcient to reduce the
high new land development in Germany. It is questionable if strict regulations, e.g. by
adaptations of the planning law for municipalities (see Ko¨ck et al., 2007), are appropriate
instruments to reduce the land development in Germany. Other instruments that could
be implemented to reduce the land usage are economic instruments such as taxes, levies,
and cap-and-trade systems. Especially, cap-and-trade systems have gained more and
more attention and have been implemented with respect to diﬀerent environmental issues
(e.g. EU ETS), and are also promising instruments to reduce the land development in
Germany.
The success of new policy instruments, such as cap-and-trade schemes for land devel-
opment, depends on its speciﬁc design, e.g. the design of the market. Various factors have
to be considered in theoretical analyses, results from laboratory or ﬁeld experiments, or
experiences from real world markets, to be able to choose a proper market design (see
Stavins, 2003; Weinhardt et al., 2003). In this chapter, diﬀerent policy instruments will
be compared, the main design aspects of a cap-and-trade scheme for land development
in Germany will be discussed and similarities and diﬀerences of the design to an emission
trading scheme will be shown. The chapter focuses on the research of the last years from
the institutional and economic perspective and concludes with a recommendation of a
speciﬁc market design in Germany.
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2.1 Market-based Instruments
Market-based Instruments (MBIs) are economic instruments that intend to tackle ex-
ternal eﬀects on the environment by introducing a price for the use of natural resources
(Stavins, 2003; Whitten et al., 2004). As mentioned above, examples are taxes, levies, or
cap-and-trade systems. Especially, cap-and-trade systems such as environmental certiﬁ-
cate systems have been used in many applications to manage the usage of environmental
resources (for an overview see Tietenberg, 2003). An environmental certiﬁcate represents
the right of his owner to use a speciﬁc environmental resource within a certain period
of time. By providing only a limited amount of certiﬁcates, the usage of the natural
resource can be regulated by a supervisory authority. The owner of a certiﬁcate is al-
lowed to use or sell it to other actors; therefore these rights are called tradable. To
facilitate trading, environmental markets have been established. Participants can oﬀer
certiﬁcates on the market for sale, or they can ask for certiﬁcates to purchase. The actors
decide whether to buy or sell certiﬁcates by comparing the costs caused by avoiding the
use of the resource, with the price of the certiﬁcates at the market. In theory, market
participants with high marginal abatement costs will not reduce the usage of the envi-
ronmental resource and buy certiﬁcates, while market participants with low abatement
costs will sell certiﬁcates. Furthermore, if the market works the usage of the resource
can be reduced at low overall costs. Further administration activities of the government
or the supervisory authority related with the instruments comprise the setting of an ap-
propriate global cap, the monitoring of the market, and the sanctioning of not legalized
resource usages (see Section 2.2).
2.1.1 Cap-and-trade Schemes for Environmental Resource
Protection
The idea of using certiﬁcate systems to protect environmental resources emerged in the
1960s. Dales (1968) developed the idea of tradable allowances based on the classical
approaches of Coase (1960) and Crocker (1966). However, in the 1960s and 1970s, most
economists were critical toward these new instruments, which hindered the application
of certiﬁcate systems for environmental protection. It lasted quite long until the idea of
market-based approaches and tradable allowances had been accepted in environmental
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policy, which long had preferred regulatory approaches (a comprehensive review is given
by Stavins, 2003).
Generally, two fundamental types of certiﬁcate systems exist: Credit-based systems
and cap-and-trade systems (Ellerman, 2003; Tietenberg, 2003). In credit-based systems,
the certiﬁcates can only be traded when they exceed a speciﬁc standard. Thereby, each
transfer of a certiﬁcate has to be granted by a regulatory authority, whereas in a cap-
and-trade system, the certiﬁcates can be traded without a grant. Due to the limited
transferability, credit-based systems still count as a regulatory system even though they
are a more ﬂexible approach than classical regulatory approaches.
The introduction of certiﬁcate systems has taken place step by step. Initially, credit-
based regulatory approaches for emissions regulation started in the United States in the
1970s (US Emissions Trading Program) followed by an adoption of the approach to other
applications (for an overview see Ellerman, 2003). The turning point, and thereby the
origin of modern cap-and-trade systems, was the introduction of a certiﬁcate system in
the US Clean Air Act in 1990. By introducing the allowance market in 1995, the United
States Environmental Protection Agency limited the overall atmospheric levels of sulfur
dioxide and nitrogen oxides, which cause acid rain (Tietenberg, 1995; Ellerman et al.,
2005; Tietenberg, 2006). Based on this trading system, other emission schemes, such as
the Regional Clean Air Incentive Market (RECLAIM) for SOX and NOX reductions or
the NOX Budget Trading Program, were implemented in the following years.
While certiﬁcate systems became more and more important in the US, Europe still
preferred the usage of price based instruments, for example taxes or levies. Finally, the
Kyoto Protocol initiated many programs and pilot projects that analyzed the usage of
certiﬁcate systems in Europe. After the proposal of the European Commission in 2003
(European Union, 2003), the new emissions trading scheme (EU-ETS) with more than
10,000 technical installations started in 2005. Today, the program is the most important
trading scheme next to the Acid Rain Program in the United States. In the 1980s,
ﬁrst analyses have shown that the savings from using economic instruments instead
of regulatory instruments can amount to up to 90% (Tietenberg, 1985). In the Acid
Rain Program, one of the most important allowance markets, the savings estimates are
about 50% (Ellerman et al., 1999). In the EU-ETS, the cost savings add up to 30%
compared to a common regulatory system (Ellerman et al., 2005).
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Certiﬁcate systems have been used for the management of diﬀerent kinds of envi-
ronmental resources, e.g. water resources (Kraemer et al., 2003). The tradable permit
systems regulate the pollution of water, the usage of the water itself, or the usage of
associated resources such as ﬁshing grounds. The ﬁrst programs that limited the pollu-
tion of water started in the 1980s (e.g. David et al., 1980). Despite the fact that most
water markets are quite illiquid, even few transactions of the permits can enable an
eﬃcient reduction of water pollution (Woodward, 2003). Moreover, the application of
certiﬁcate-based systems to manage the settlement development or the urban planning
of municipalities by introducing the so called tradable development rights also started in
the 1980s. In addition to the numerous programs introduced in the United States, few
tradable development rights systems have been realized in Italy and France (Renard,
2000; Micelli, 2002). The next section discusses the main characteristics of certiﬁcate
systems and compares the market-based systems with regulatory approaches.
2.1.2 Comparison of Policy Instruments
An alternative approach to the described market-based systems is the adaptation of
the legal and regulatory framework to reduce the usage of environmental resources.1 In
order to achieve a reduction of the resource usage in a command-and-control system with
equivalent abatement costs, it is necessary to set performance-based standards (uniform
control targets or reduction goals) for each actor depending on his individual abatement
costs. However, the unequal treatment of the actors entails political debates especially
if actors compete directly for these resources and have diﬀerent yields. The setting of
appropriate individual standards by the regulatory authority requires precise information
about the abatement costs of the actors, and high transaction costs are possible. Thus,
only if the regulatory authority or a responsible local supervisory authority has all
individual information and all associated costs and yields at its disposal, an accurate
setting of the standard is possible, which guarantees a cost eﬃcient reduction of the
resource usage in a speciﬁc time horizon.
Due to the ﬂexibility of the trading mechanism, a cap-and-trade system can reduce the
usage of the resource with lower abatement costs. The transaction costs in a cap-and-
trade scheme (e.g. search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, costs for
1Regulatory approaches are also called command-and-control systems.
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monitoring and enforcement) are normally supposed to be lower than in a command-and-
control scheme (Stavins, 1995). However, Stavins emphasizes that systems of pollution
taxes or cap-and-trade schemes can also involve high administration costs in some in-
dividual cases. Hence, for a more detailed comparison of the instruments, especially
regarding the transaction costs, a case-by-case analysis is necessary and the transaction
costs can be diﬀerent.
In contrast to command-and-control approaches, MBIs can internalize the external
eﬀect eﬃciently by making the use of natural resource costly while giving a maximum of
ﬂexibility to the economic agents. Only the market price of the certiﬁcates is variable.
Within the scope of the cap-and-trade approach, the regulatory or supervisory author-
ity has no need to gather all individual information. If the market works, it gathers
individual information, distributes the information by giving price signals, and enables
cost optimal decisions regarding the reduction of the overall resource usage. Given any
reduction of the pollutant caused by the instrument, this reduction is reached at the
lowest overall costs. Similarly, given any environment-related ﬁnancial burden taken on
by the society, the pollution reduction achieved by a MBI is the maximum improvement
that is possible within the limits of this budget.
From a theoretical perspective, a cap-and-trade system is also eﬀective with respect
to the protection of the environment. Eﬀectiveness means that the environmental im-
provement (or the maximum damage to the environment) can be precisely speciﬁed in
advance by limiting the total amount of available certiﬁcates. The quantity control of
the resource usage is realized by issuing a limited amount of certiﬁcates. Hence, similar
to command-and-control systems the achievement of the reduction goal is guaranteed in
cap-and-trade schemes.
Other economic instruments, such as environmental taxes, manage the usage of the
resource by setting a ﬁxed price for the usage. The taxation of a pollutant will induce
agents to pollute as long as the economic beneﬁt is higher than costs caused by the tax,
but avoid pollution when it is lower than the tax. Nevertheless, taxes and cap-and-trade
schemes work quite similar. When developing new areas, municipalities or the private
developers have to pay taxes to the federal states. In case of a cap-and-trade system,
the municipalities have to buy certiﬁcates. For both, taxes and cap-and-trade schemes,
the municipalities can calculate whether it is more proﬁtable to pay taxes or to buy a
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certiﬁcate to develop new areas. Those municipalities that plan to develop new areas
have to pay a price and the other municipalities or institutions receive this payment.
In contrast to cap-and-trade schemes, price based instruments such as taxes, do not
guarantee the attainment of the environmental goal and municipalities can develop an
almost unlimited amount of new land.
Compared to the other instruments, a cap-and-trade scheme has a variable price signal
that reﬂects the scarcity of the resource by regarding demand and supply. However, due
to the uncertainty of the price, a lower planning certainty, at least in the short run, can
be expected compared to a ﬁx tax or a command-and-control system that sets speciﬁc
standards. Table 2.1 summarizes the main characteristics of the discussed three policy
instruments and emphasizes the diﬀerences.2
Characteristics Command-
and-control
Taxes / Subsi-
dies
Cap-and-
trade
Reduction Goal guaranteed not guaranteed guaranteed
Price Signal none ﬁx variable (signals
the scarcity of
the certiﬁcates)
Planning Certainty high high low
Transaction Costs high low low
Table 2.1: Main Characteristics of the Discussed Policy Instruments
Due to the given national target of 30 ha/d, a cap-and-trade scheme seems to be a
promising policy instrument for reducing the development of new settlement and com-
mercial areas in Germany. The next section introduces the main design issues for such
a new cap-and-trade scheme by comparing it with similar systems.
2.1.3 A Cap-and-trade Scheme for Land Usage
The idea of introducing a cap-and-trade scheme to reduce the land development in Ger-
many was born in the 1990s (Maier-Rigaud, 1994; Bizer, 1996; Bizer et al., 1998; Weise,
1999). The total amount of new settlement and traﬃc areas could be reduced accurately
2The table gives only a rough, general overview of the instruments and the valuation can certainly
vary case-by-case.
16
2 Institutional and Economic Aspects of Tradable Development Certiﬁcates
and eﬃciently by introducing certiﬁcates for land development. New settlement devel-
opments would be only permitted if municipalities are able to hand in the corresponding
certiﬁcates. The cap-and-trade scheme would be utilized for the municipal land use
planning and, particularly, the development plans of the municipalities.
In such a system, the right of local planning authorities to re-declare the type of use of
land, determined in the land development plan, is linked to the obligation to submit the
respective amount of development certiﬁcates for cancellation. Municipalities act as the
authoritative decision makers in land development and have planning sovereignty in their
territory. The development of the new local land will be reduced by emitting a limited
total amount of certiﬁcates to municipalities in a speciﬁc region. By restricting the total
number of certiﬁcates, the German government can limit the total new land development.
Instead, municipalities might be forced to restructure inner areas (e.g. closing gaps and
brownﬁelds). Since certiﬁcates can be freely traded between municipalities, areas are
developed in those places where they are most valuable or least costly.
Example: Instead of developing a new area with 5 ha associated ﬂoor space,
a city could develop an appropriate area in the inner zone by converting a
brownﬁeld. In the former case, the proceeds of selling the real estate might
cover all costs of the development, but the city would have to submit corre-
sponding development certiﬁcates for cancellation. In the latter case, the city
might face higher costs for the inﬁll development but could sell (or would not
have to buy) development certiﬁcates on the market.
A system with Tradable Development Certiﬁcates (TDCs)3 is quite similar to an ETS
(cf. Table 2.2). Under an ETS, the total amount of emissions is limited and respective
permits can be traded among emitting companies (and possibly intermediaries). The
price of the permits constitutes a benchmark for the costs of emissions reduction mea-
sures, such as fuel switches or eﬃciency improvements. In contrast, under a system with
TDCs, municipalities, as the sovereigns over the land development plans, are limited in
how much land they can convert from open space to settlement and traﬃc areas.
3 Synonyms for the term development certiﬁcates are the terms development allowances, development
rights, or development permits. The term development certiﬁcates is used to underpin the diﬀerent
mechanism of the new instrument in comparison to development rights, which have been used in
the US for many years.
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Characteristics Emission Rights Trad-
ing
Development Certiﬁ-
cates Trading
Obliged Actors CO2-emitting companies Municipalities / Local au-
thorities
Goal Reduction of total green-
house gas emissions
Reduction of total addi-
tional land use
Certiﬁcates Emission permit (1 ton
CO2)
TDC (development of 1
hectare settlement area)
Objective Realizing total cap (CO2
emissions) at minimal cost
Realizing total cap (devel-
opment of new land) while
providing maximum value
of settlement area
Reduction Potential Fuel switches, eﬃciency im-
provements of installations
Closing gaps, conversion of
brownﬁelds, smaller/denser
development areas
Table 2.2: Emissions Trading vs. Trading Development Certiﬁcates
The development certiﬁcates are necessary for the planning act of re-declaring the type
of land use independent of who owns this land or invests in the development. Thus, TDCs
are traded among municipalities and not among land owners or investors.4 The munic-
ipalities’ mitigation measures consist in the restructuring of inner areas (e.g. closing
gaps).
A similar basic approach has been investigated in Switzerland (Zollinger, 2005). How-
ever, the main goal of this approach is to ensure a constant settlement area per capita.
Depending on the owner of the certiﬁcate and the subject of matter, four diﬀerent types
of policy instruments are deﬁned within this book (Table 2.3). In contrast to a TDC
system, a system with Land Usage Certiﬁcates (LUC) comprises quota limitations for
the usage of total settlement areas in a region. When the land usage reaches the upper
limit, the development of new land is only allowed under the condition that a munici-
pality renaturates existing settlement areas. The mechanism is quite similar to a system
of TDCs in which the renaturation of areas can create additional certiﬁcates. Whereas
the addressees in a TDC system are only the municipal planning authority, the property
owners are the suppliers and customers in a system with LUCs.
4 Similarly, under an ETS, it is the emitter and not the consumer of electricity who is required to
provide suﬃcient emission permits.
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Instrument Actors addressed by the
regulations
Subject matter
Tradable Development
Certiﬁcate (TDC)
Municipalities Reduction of the new settle-
ments
Tradable Land Usage
Certiﬁcates (LUC)
Federation / Federation
States / Municipalities
Limit the total amount of
usage settlement areas
Tradable Development
Rights, Compensation
Certiﬁcates (TDR)
Builder / Property owner Restrictions of speciﬁc land-
use types of properties
Tradable Land Usage
Rights, Sealing Rights
(LUR)
Builder / Property owner Restrictions of speciﬁc land-
uses of properties
Table 2.3: Delimitation of Certiﬁcate Types
The design of a policy instrument, the specialties of the policy area, the resource and
the institutional framework, aﬀect the success of the instrument in practical applications.
Regardless of whether the states or the federal government set the objectives in land
use, an analysis of the economic and institutional requirements is necessary. Although a
system with tradable development certiﬁcates is a typical cap-and-trade scheme in which
transactions can be carried out with low regulatory restrictions, the system can only be
a supplement to existing regulatory restrictions, which must be still considered when
using the certiﬁcates. The main challenge is to design an appropriate certiﬁcate system
as a policy mix that ﬁts into the regulatory framework in Germany (see Section 2.3).
Due to the interdependencies between the institutional aspects and the design of an
appropriate market, such an analysis is not trivial. In the following sections, further
institutional and economic requirements of the new policy instrument in Germany are
discussed.
2.2 Economic Aspects of a Cap-and-trade Scheme
The design of the initial allocation and the secondary market is a determining factor
for the functionality of the trading system and the resulting market outcome. When
designing a market system, it is important to choose an appropriate market mechanism
that allows an eﬃcient price discovery process. It is necessary to consider these factors
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along with the institutional and legal requirements (Section 2.3) when choosing a market
design for tradable development certiﬁcates. In this section, the speciﬁcation of the
environmental certiﬁcate, the design of the trading mechanisms and the allocation rules
for a practical implementation of the cap-and-trade scheme are presented. Furthermore,
design issues arising from the requirements of the market participants are discussed.
2.2.1 Tradable Development Certiﬁcates
Land consumption is typically measured by the growth of settlement and traﬃc area
(for a more detailed description see Chapter 4). This area includes all areas that can be
used for living or traﬃc and serves as a central indicator for the new land development
in Germany. About 50% of the settlement and traﬃc area consists of already sealed
surfaces (Deggau, 2006).5 The usage of settlement and traﬃc areas is legally permissible
by a passed land development plan (§§34, 35 BauGB) that is based on a preparatory
land use plan (§1 Abs. 2 BauGB). Ko¨ck and Bovet (2008a, p. 97) argue that the indicator
‘settlement and traﬃc area’ is more appropriate than the sealed surfaces as reference
value for TDCs because it reﬂects the diﬀerence between natural spaces and used areas.
Furthermore, the Federal Statistical Oﬃce provides a comprehensive data basis, collects
data and compiles statistics of the settlement and traﬃc areas. The oﬃce publishes the
actual settlement and traﬃc areas (§4 Abs. 1 und 2 AgrStatG) each year, and a more
detailed statistics on the usage of areas every four years. The data collection allows the
observation of the land development in Germany, which is another beneﬁt of settlement
and traﬃc areas as a central indicator for measuring land consumption and as a reference
value for TDCs.
The basis for all cap-and-trade systems is the deﬁnition of the tradable certiﬁcates and
of the reference value. Within the scope of this book, the term tradable development
certiﬁcate is deﬁned as a good that legitimates a municipality to develop new residential
and traﬃc areas in the outer area of a city. The period of validity of the certiﬁcates
depends on the duration of a land utilization plan. Furthermore, an area is measured in
hectares or 10,000 square meters. A cap-and-trade system, as described in Section 2.1.3,
assumes that the areas are perfect substitutes in all municipalities with regard to the
5Green spaces and parks belong to recreation areas and are deﬁned as sealed surfaces (see Statistisches
Bundesamt, 2008).
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national reduction goal. Due to the fact, that in practice, all areas diﬀer strongly from
each other, quality aspects of an area and the legal framework will be important. Only
if all restrictions of the planning law are considered, the suﬃcient conditions of trading a
homogeneous good will be fulﬁlled. Hence, having enough certiﬁcates is only a necessary
condition when planning to develop new areas in a municipality.
The introduction of a TDC system makes further additions to §1 Abs. 3 BauGB of the
German urban land-use planning law necessary (Ko¨ck and Bovet, 2008a, p. 108). Munic-
ipalities have to submit certiﬁcates for a local land development plan to become eﬀective.
Furthermore, the availability of certiﬁcates has to be ensured during the design of land
utilization plans (§33 BauGB). For the development of new recreation areas, development
certiﬁcates are necessary, whereas no certiﬁcates are necessary for the transformation
of recreation areas into areas for settlement or commercial purposes. Therefore, Bo¨hm
et al. (2002) suggest to exclude these areas from the obligation to submit certiﬁcates.
For the development of inner areas, no certiﬁcates are necessary. A building plan
already exists or a new development plan is not necessary according to §34 BauGB.
Furthermore, Ko¨ck (2005) argues that with the cancellation of a development plan,
additional certiﬁcates can be credited to the municipalities. Shrinking municipalities,
which had oﬀered too many new areas in the past that have remained unused, could
cancel their development plans and sell the certiﬁcates at the market. The main pre-
requisite in the course of this process is that the respective settlement and development
areas are unsealed or become unsealed again. Further exceptions could be made for
regional facilities (e.g. universities, hospitals) that have to be developed by local author-
ities for subordinate purposes. Either would municipalities get additional certiﬁcates,
or no certiﬁcates were required for the development of those facilities. Because these
areas are only a very small proportion of the total development, Bo¨hm et al. (2002) also
suggest to exempt these areas from the obligation to submit certiﬁcates.
Tietenberg (2003) emphasizes that a certiﬁcate system works more eﬃciently when
the environmental resource and the linked certiﬁcate are homogeneous. In the case of
heterogeneous goods and regional diﬀerences among the market participants, regional
speciﬁcs have to be taken into account when designing the new environmental market
(e.g. Harrison and List, 2004; Wossink, 2004). Concerning the land usage, a diﬀerenti-
ation of the market and diﬀerent types of certiﬁcates could be useful if the utilization
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of diﬀerent areas, respectively the environmental resource, is heterogeneous. In con-
trast, universal certiﬁcates legitimate the development of all area types or speciﬁc areas
(e.g. residential, commercial or traﬃc areas). Furthermore, the design scheme can be
adapted to the speciﬁc area type in separated markets. The major drawbacks of these
submarkets, especially small regional submarkets, are eﬃciency losses with regard to the
overall reduction goal in comparison to larger markets. For a well functioning market,
an appropriate number of market participants is necessary. For example, the abuse of
market power can lead to market failure in an illiquid market. Additionally, the more
actors are participating in the market, the more cost savings are possible.
2.2.2 Allocation Rules for the Primary Allocation of TDCs
For the allocation of the certiﬁcates to the market participants diﬀerent types of auctions,
free allocation or hybrid approaches (so called semi-auctions) can be applied regarding
regional characteristics. A free initial allocation of certiﬁcates is more suitable to reduce
the political resistance and to avoid additional costs for the market participants, and is
being preferred in theory and practice (Tietenberg, 2003). Due to the constitutionality
of the German law, most studies propose a free allocation of the certiﬁcates (Schmalholz,
2002; Brandt and Sanden, 2003). Other studies argue from a political point of view,
but also recommend the free allocation of the certiﬁcates (Nachhaltigkeitsbeirat der
Landesregierung Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, 2004; Walz et al., 2006, 2009). These results
make the analysis of a suitable allotment formula necessary.
The distribution of the certiﬁcates is based on certain reference values that might
change over time. An allotment formula is used for the initial allocation of the certiﬁcates
and determines the potential winners and losers in a market for tradable development
certiﬁcates. It is essential for the acceptance of the new policy instrument that the
involved parties perceive the primary allocation as well as the trading rules as fair.
Many studies deal with questions of how to design an appropriate and fair primary
allocation and how to allocate the certiﬁcate between the federal and federal states levels
(Henger and Schro¨ter-Schlaack, 2008; Henger et al., 2010; Walz et al., 2009; Ostertag
et al., 2009). Bizer et al. (2008) emphasize that the allotment formula of the primary
allocation should be easy to determine and monitor in order to support a practical
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application by the administration. Additionally, it should comprise the main factors
that reﬂect the prospective ﬂoor space of the municipalities. However, the unanimous
opinion amongst all studies is that the actual or predicted demand for ﬂoor space should
not be included in the formula in order to bypass the recompense of a profuse land
usage and to avoid counterproductive incentives. Ko¨ck et al. (2008) emphasize that
the criteria should reﬂect the demand for new areas to be in conformity with the legal
framework of the urban land-use planning (for the municipal process of land-use planning
see BVerwGE 64, 33, 35).
Furthermore, a combination of diﬀerent criteria for the primary allocation is possi-
ble (see Krumm, 2001 and Michaelis, 2002). The allotment formula should be easy to
calculate and the collection of data must be feasible for practical usage. For the al-
lotment formula, diﬀerent indicators have been discussed in the literature. Jakubowski
and Zarth (2003) propose the combination of the two criteria local subdistrict area for
the determination of a basic endowment and population as a criterion for the demand.
Municipalities with an increasing population should receive more certiﬁcates in order to
cover the demand. Due to the fact that the proportion of settlement and traﬃc areas
on the subdistrict area is lower in urban regions, the criterion local subdistrict area can
be seen as a more ecological criterion. A problem of this approach is that the prognos-
ticated population growth is diﬃcult to verify and could be easily overestimated by the
municipal representatives in order to beneﬁt during the allocation process.
Henger et al. (2010) consider population and district area of a municipality as suitable
criteria for the allocation of certiﬁcates. The higher the population and the district area
of a municipality are, the more certiﬁcates it would receive. In contrast, surveys with
ﬁeld experts have shown that the district area is not perceived as a fair criterion for
the primary allocation (Ostertag et al., 2009). Rather, the authors suggest to include
the criterion guidelines and targets of the regional planning instead of district area into
the allotment formula because it was considered as being more important by the ﬁeld
experts.
One problem connected with the distribution criteria can be the existence of early
actions that describe initiatives of states or local authorities, which have already reduced
the development of new settlement and traﬃc areas. In the emission trading scheme,
an additional number of certiﬁcates is allocated to compensate actors in such situations
23
2 Institutional and Economic Aspects of Tradable Development Certiﬁcates
(National Allocation Plan, p. 43). Based on the equal treatment principle postulated
by Art. 3 GG, a similar procedure in a system with TDCs is conceivable. Municipalities
that initiated the recycling of inner areas, the implementation of systems for land use
management (e.g. fallow land register) or participated in environmental programs would
get additional certiﬁcates. However, the evaluation of early actions is complex in the
context of land development and diﬃcult to realize (Ko¨ck et al., 2008, p. 10).
The discussion emphasizes that the allocation rule should combine economical, eco-
logical and social aspects. A measure that addresses economic aspects could also be
the fraction of population over settlement and traﬃc areas as this measure gives an in-
centive to build denser areas. In addition, a positive eﬀect on the infrastructure costs
is likely when improving the ﬂoor space per capita (see Section 3.1). The proportion
nature protection area of the open space provides an ecological measure that gives incen-
tives to protect open space. By means of this proportion, the ecological sustainability
of a municipality is evaluated. In the extreme case, the total open space consists of
nature protection areas and no further development of new settlement and traﬃc areas
is possible. In order to measure population dynamics, historical population growth could
be used. By considering this social measure, the allocation of additional certiﬁcates to
hotspots, in which the population has increased in the recent years, can be realized. A
combination of these three criteria can address economical, ecological and social aspects
when allocating certiﬁcates.
2.2.3 Secondary Market
The trading rules also deﬁne the secondary market. In a secondary market, the market
participants can trade certiﬁcates on an exchange during a speciﬁc time period. In
environmental markets, the double auction is used as an auction procedure (e.g. EPA’s
emission trading auction; Stavins, 2003). Usually, the pricing in this secondary market
takes place continuously, which can induce price ﬂuctuations. According to economic
theory, the design of the primary market should not aﬀect the eﬃciency of the trading
system in the secondary market. If the initial allocation results in a misallocation,
the secondary market should correct this situation and reallocate the certiﬁcates to the
‘right’ municipalities. The design and the trading rules of the secondary market can
inﬂuence how fast the market can achieve a market equilibrium, in which no additional
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transactions can enhance the eﬃciency. To facilitate trading of development certiﬁcates,
the federal states or the federation could implement such a secondary market in form of
a stock exchange for the new certiﬁcates. The municipalities could receive information
about the current certiﬁcate price and could enter buy and sell orders on this central
market place.
It is likely that few submarkets with many participants are more liquid than few
submarkets with only few participants (Section 2.3.1). The liquidity of this market is
also inﬂuenced by the number of the participants trading on the market and the validity
of the certiﬁcates (Bizer et al., 2008): For instance in a ﬁve year time period, if the
validity of certiﬁcates is only one year, the municipalities will tend to trade in ﬁve years
more often than in a scenario in which the certiﬁcates’ validity is ﬁve years and wherein
the available certiﬁcates can be used to legitimate the land development in the total
time horizon. However, this fact implies that saving certiﬁcates for later use (Banking)
or the usage beforehand (Borrowing) should be not allowed. Banking and borrowing
of certiﬁcates enhances the ﬂexibility of the trading schemes and can have a signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on the liquidity. In order to achieve the environmental targets at minimal
costs, the market participants could use the ﬂexibility of banking or borrowing to realize
their abatement options in the appropriate planning periods. Furthermore, allowing the
banking of certiﬁcates can reduce price ﬂuctuations and can lead to earlier reductions
of the resource usage (Ellerman, 2005).
As an additional mechanism to the continuous double auction, Bizer et al. (2008) dis-
cuss a bilateral exchange of certiﬁcates. In this model, municipalities have the possibility
to choose how to transfer the certiﬁcates among each other. If the transactions costs
of the bilateral exchange are higher, the market participants will prefer to transfer the
certiﬁcates on the exchange instead of conducting bilateral trades.
The drawback of a free certiﬁcate allocation is the subsequent lack of price infor-
mation in the secondary market. When the municipalities trade few certiﬁcates in that
secondary spot market, the price is susceptible for any kind of external eﬀect. Therefore,
Bizer et al. (2008) propose a hybrid model in which only a limited proportion of the cer-
tiﬁcates is allocated for free (Figure 2.1). The remaining certiﬁcates are auctioned which
generates price signals for the secondary market. In an auction the government would
oﬀer an amount of certiﬁcates in a region and the local municipalities would be able to
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Figure 2.1: Hybrid Allocation Model (Bizer et al., 2008)
purchase the certiﬁcates. An advantage of this hybrid auction system is that munici-
palities which suﬀer from speciﬁc allocation rules still have the possibility to purchase
certiﬁcates through the auction. Therefore, the hybrid model could cushion the distri-
bution eﬀects caused by a speciﬁc allotment formula of the free allocation. However, the
auctioning requires additional ﬁnancial resources from the municipalities.
2.2.4 Market Participants
From an economic perspective, it is desirable to establish a liquid market with many
participants. Independent of the type of market diﬀerentiation, it is important to ensure
a minimum number of market participants in order to achieve a cost-eﬃcient solution
of the overall reduction goal. In a market with many participants, market power and
ineﬃcient market prices arising out of monopoly situations are less likely. Therefore,
the size of the market is an important aspect of the design. The smallest entities, which
can decide to develop new areas, are the local municipalities. They are entitled to
use new areas by realizing building plans. If the abatement costs diﬀer between the
market participants, eﬃciency gains by introducing a market-based system are possible.
Furthermore, wrong price signals might cause some municipalities to sell certiﬁcates,
even though the usage of the certiﬁcates for new areas would be more beneﬁcial from
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the overall perspective. In a market wherein the market price reﬂects the marginal
abatement costs, these negative eﬀects will be excluded or at least reduced.
In addition to the municipalities, other actors or persons (e.g. broker or investors)
could be given access to the market in order to increase the market liquidity. However,
opening the market to other interest groups will bear the risk of the emergence of market
participants who are guided by other goals (e.g. speculative trading that cause ﬂuctu-
ating market prices) than initially intended. Discussions at the Spiel.Raum workshops
(see Chapter 5) strenghten the concerns of local representatives about a ﬂuctuating
certiﬁcate price that may inﬂuence their certainty for planning. To provide access to
more market participants, a so-called opt-in regulation could also be applied. Thereby,
possible inﬂuences of private investors that could enter such a system in the course of
time have to be considered. The expectation of rising certiﬁcate prices, fostered by the
shortage of certiﬁcates, can lead to speculative trade by private investors on the market.
Individual decisions at the market place need to be weighted by the market partici-
pants depending on the actual market situation. In order to make appropriate decisions,
for example to buy or sell certiﬁcates at the right time, it is necessary to observe the
market over a long time period. Even without the existence of a market for land usage,
municipalities face many decision problems, for instance choosing a proper development
plan. However, the number of tools to support development decisions and data man-
agement of municipalities in Germany is limited. Moreover, in most municipalities the
personnel has no economic background to be able to deal with planning tools or ex-
tensive economic decision support systems (see Chapter 4). Therefore, it needs to be
analyzed whether private brokers can assist municipalities when a market for develop-
ment certiﬁcates exists. Nevertheless, both, assisted and unassisted municipalities, have
to integrate the new instrument into their decision processes and the regional land usage
plans (see Chapter 3).
2.3 Institutional Aspects of a Cap-and-trade Scheme
In this section, the main institutional requirements for a system of tradable development
certiﬁcates in Germany and the consequences for the market design are presented. In
the last years, several studies have analyzed diﬀerent design aspects of a cap-and-trade
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program for land-use control in Germany (Hansju¨rgens and Schro¨ter, 2004; Walz et al.,
2006; Ko¨ck et al., 2008; Walz et al., 2009; Henger et al., 2010). Some of the basic
design questions that arise during the implementation of such a system from diﬀerent
perspectives are discussed. This includes a possible diﬀerentiation of the market, deﬁn-
ing the reduction goal and other aspects of the constitutional framework, which arise
when introducing such a scheme in Germany. The constitutional framework requires the
scrutinizing of legislative competences, the municipal right of self-administration and the
constitutional property guarantee of property owners.
2.3.1 Market Diﬀerentiation
The most widely debated issue in the discussion of the new instrument is the deﬁni-
tion of the market and on which institutional level a cap-and-trade system should be
implemented (see Walz et al., 2006; Henger and Bizer, 2008; Walz et al., 2009). In a na-
tion wide system, the market in Germany would include all 11,448 municipalities, which
seems to be a suﬃcient number of participants. The design of tailor-made submarkets
with municipalities and their region-speciﬁc characteristics, for instance a diﬀerent ge-
ographic situation or population growth, is possible. In a nation wide system these
possibilities for diﬀerentiation are missing. However, the more submarkets there are, the
fewer participants will trade in the single submarkets. Within each market, the goods
are homogeneous, so that the municipalities can trade any desired certiﬁcate between
each other within a submarket.
Bizer (1996) proposes a diﬀerentiation of the TDC market by federal, spatial or land-
use criteria. A market diﬀerentiation that is based on the federal structure would refer
to the political structure in Germany and establish separate markets for the individual
states or administrative districts. Henger and Bizer (2008) argue that such a model
is only appropriate when a low liquidity within the market is expected, and propose a
zonal permit system with diﬀerent markets depending on spatial or land-use criteria.
Splitting the market based on spatial planning aspects (spatial diﬀerentiation) is an-
other possibility for a diﬀerentiation of the market. Based on spatial criteria (e.g. pop-
ulation density, size of the municipality or soil parameters), separate markets can be
implemented for diﬀerent geographic areas. By a TDC system, individual qualitative
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land use targets can be speciﬁed for diﬀerent regions, so that a land development in
environmental hot spots and speciﬁc regions can be addressed. Similar to the municipal
ﬁnancial compensation system already implemented in Germany, a cap-and-trade sys-
tem diﬀerentiated by spatial criteria could balance the land use of growing and shrinking
regions. Shrinking municipalities could proﬁt from the system by selling their surplus
certiﬁcates on the market. It is conceivable that more certiﬁcates will be emitted in
congested urban areas with a high land growth because a higher land development in
the future can be expected.
A diﬀerentiation of the market by land-use criteria distinguishes between the diﬀerent
area types. An example is the diﬀerentiation between certiﬁcates for commercial and
residential purposes, or a diﬀerentiation of the certiﬁcates related to the development of
settlement and traﬃc areas. However, the diﬃculties with such a zonal diﬀerentiation
are high transaction costs for the regulator and the deﬁnition of appropriate individual
reduction goals (Henger and Bizer, 2008).
Another division of the market can be achieved by time diﬀerentiation. On the one
hand, the time horizon of a planning period should be long enough to cover the spatial
planning processes, which normally last about ﬁve years. On the other hand, the time
horizon should not be too long (max. 15 years) to signal a shortage of certiﬁcates. Further
critical design parameters within this context are the durability of the certiﬁcates and the
transferability into other planning periods, which have been discussed in Section 2.2.3.
2.3.2 Legal Aspects
A cap-and-trade system includes the setting of a reduction goal and the implementation
of a trading system. An analysis how such a system might ﬁt into the legal framework
and federal structure in Germany has been done in many studies over the last years (see
Bovet, 2006; Senftleben, 2008; Ko¨ck and Bovet, 2008a). Figure 2.2 shows the adminis-
trative structure in Germany that consists of 16 federal states. The 11,448 municipalities
are assigned to 413 administrative districts. The implementation of the new cap-and-
trade system requires the breakdown of the national reduction goal to regional levels
and the integration of the trading scheme into regional planning laws. For each compo-
nent, a competence in the constitutional law has to be identiﬁed. Moreover, the regional
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planning is coordinated by regional associations that are organized very diﬀerently in
the federal states.
Figure 2.2: Administrative Structure
The German constitution confers legislative powers on the federal states (Art. 70
Abs. 1 GG). Furthermore, the constitutional rights of the federal states were amended
through the federalism reform of the German Basic Law in 2006. As a result, the leg-
islative power of the federation is further limited and divided into exclusive competence
and concurrent competence (Art. 71 and 72 GG). The scopes of exclusive competence
and concurrent competence are listed in Art. 73 and 74 GG. The federation would need
exclusive competence to introduce the new instrument. However, in the legislative pro-
gram of the exclusive competence, there is no statue for the implementation of a national
cap-and-trade system for land development.
The jurisdiction land use planning could be used to legitimize the implementation of
the cap-and-trade system and refers to the “aggregated superior planning and organiza-
tion of space” (BVerfGE 3, pp. 407, 425; see Bovet, 2006, p. 477). However, jurisdiction
was amended through the federalism reform and belongs to the concurrent competences
of the federal states (Art. 74 Abs. 1 Nr. 31 GG). Whether or not other extraordinary
legislative programs can be used is discussed very controversially (Ritter, 2006; Kment,
2006; Schmitz and Mu¨ller, 2007; Durner, 2009). Due to the fact that a national cap-
and-trade system sets superior binding reduction goals to guarantee a sustainable land
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development, the jurisdiction land use planning can be used to legitimize the new policy
instrument (Brandt and Sanden, 2003; Bovet, 2006, p. 477; Senftleben, 2008, p. 66).
In the interest of a sustainable federal land development and planning, the federation
can set binding reduction goals as a guiding principle for the planning in subordinated
local authorities. A cap-and-trade system limits the development of new settlement and
traﬃc areas initiated by local authorities and the municipal planning competence, but
would not further restrict the building law §34 and §35 BauGB.
If the federation bases the system on this jurisdiction, the federal states are autho-
rized by concurrent competences to implement deviating regulations (Art. 72 Abs. 3
Nr. 4 GG). The federal states can diﬀer in their constitutional law for nature protection
and spatial planning based on concurrent competences (Art. 72 Abs. 3 GG). Thus, the
federation has to negotiate the guiding principle with the federal states to prevent devi-
ations. Due to the fact that the negotiation process with all federal states for a Federal
Law seems rather diﬃcult, Ko¨ck and Bovet (2008a) consider the implementation of a
Federal States Model, wherein the federal states set individual reduction goals, compared
to a Federal Model as more likely. Therefore, the deﬁnition of national or regional re-
duction goals for land consumption and the implementation of a trading system will
only be feasible if the federal states facilitate the introduction of the certiﬁcate system.
An exclusive competence for the federation does not exist and the legal certainty of the
trading system can only be guaranteed by a constitutional court decision (Ko¨ck and
Bovet, 2008b).
The German constitution assures municipalities the own administration and regu-
lation of local concerns (Art. 28 Abs. 2 Satz 1 GG). According to the constitution,
municipalities have the planning competence for their area and can manage the munic-
ipal development as well as the intensity of the land usage in the long run. For this
purpose, municipalities are authorized to specify the procedures and details of planning
new buildings, as well as to set standards for the development of new areas (BVerfGE 56,
298 (310)). However, the planning competence is not unlimited and can be restricted
by federal or state laws (BVerfGE 79, 127 (146)). For instance, the urban land-use
planning has to correspond to the regional and land use planning (§1 Abs. 4 BauGB).
By allocating an amount of certiﬁcates, the development of new settlement and traﬃc
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areas would be limited. Thus, a cap-and-trade scheme for land usage deﬁnes a cap for
new land development and trenches on the planning competence of the municipalities.
Nevertheless, many studies argue that the TDC system is compatible with the basic
planning competence of local authorities (Brandt and Sanden, 2003, p. 95; Unnerstall,
2004, p. 256). A cap-and-trade scheme for land usage only limits the total amount of
new settlement and traﬃc areas and not the design of land development areas or the
main scope of local land-use decisions (the scope of land-use decisions will be described in
Chapter 3). Although the trading system increases the price of new land development, it
ensures the planning ﬂexibility of local authorities and does not directly intervene in the
planning competence. The individual endowment is not a ﬁxed cap for the individual
development of new settlement and traﬃc areas. Rather, municipalities can use the
ﬂexibility of the trading system and buy additional certiﬁcates or sell surplus certiﬁcates
on the market. Furthermore, based on public interest orientation, the need to protect the
natural resource soil, or open space, justiﬁes the restriction of the communal planning
scope and activities in the interest of future generations (Unnerstall, 2004, p. 257).
An implementation of the cap-and-trade system is also justiﬁed on the basis of the
proportionality principle, due to the fact that more moderate instruments, for example
the protective clause for open space (§1a Abs. 2 BauGB), are less appropriate for the
achievement of objectives and have proven to be ineﬀective in practical use.
The German constitution includes a constitutional property guarantee to protect prop-
erty owners and the possibilities of their property use (Art. 14 Abs. 1 Nr. 1 GG). In
a TDC system, the provision of new building land is connected with the availability
of certiﬁcates and also inﬂuences the rights of the property owner (Senftleben, 2008,
pp. 69–70). In order to protect the natural resource basis (Art. 20a GG) and to sup-
port a sustainable land usage, Senftleben considers the quantitative restrictions on land
development as proportionate.
When the certiﬁcates are allocated freely, a high ﬁnancial burden for the municipalities
can be avoided, and each municipality is able to realize a basic development without
additional costs (Sachversta¨ndigenrat fu¨r Umweltfragen, 2002; Unnerstall, 2004). In this
respect, a cap-and-trade solution is more favorable for local authorities than a solution
with duties, levies or taxes wherein the local municipalities have to make additional
payments. Ko¨ck and Bovet (2008a) emphasize that the allocation must take into account
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the additional demand of some municipalities. In this context, the identiﬁcation of
appropriate distribution criteria and the implementation of exemptions are necessary
(see Section 2.2.2).
2.3.3 Regulatory Choice Problem
Bizer et al. (2008) discuss the regulatory choice problem, which consists in determining
regional objectives according to the national objective. The main challenges are the
decomposition of the national objective in land use and the analysis of regional diﬀer-
ences and congruencies on the basis of the regional policy network. The realization of
the targets set by the federation and the federal states is the subject of investigation
in many studies (Hansju¨rgens and Schro¨ter, 2004; Walz and Ku¨pfer, 2005; Henger and
Schro¨ter-Schlaack, 2008). Due to regional diﬀerences, certain implementation problems
arise when choosing the institutional arrangement. It is important to determine which
political subdivision (federation, federal states, regions/administrative districts, munic-
ipalities) determines a speciﬁc land use restriction. Although the federal republic sets
a national objective, the actual implementation of such a system would be the task of
the states and the municipalities. A supervisory authority is responsible for setting the
targets to limit the land use, but the municipalities are responsible to translate this into
action. According to the principle of local self-government in the German constitution,
municipalities have the planning competence for their area (Section 2.3.2).
Therefore, the decomposition of the national objective and the allocation of the TDCs
to the federal states and regions is another challenge. Table 2.4 depicts some models for
the institutional design of the cap-and-trade scheme. The table shows on which level
of the federal structure a speciﬁc target will be set, who the market participants are
and if the trading system is implemented on the national or federal states level. The
models are named after the institution which sets the ﬁnal environmental goal for the
local authorities (e.g. in the States Models the federal states set the binding reduction
goal for municipalities and not the federation).
Walz and Ku¨pfer (2005) discuss the installation of some of these national, federal
states and regional models for TDCs. The Federal Model is a top-down approach, in
which the federation sets a national reduction goal and breaks down the goal to the
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Model Federation Federal
States
Administrative
Districts/
Municipalities
(1148)
TradingSystem
Regions
(301)
Federal ModelI National
Target
Market
Participants
National Level
StatesModelI National
Target
Federal
Target
Market
Participants
National Level
St t M d l II N ti l F d l M k t F d l St ta es o e  a ona
Target
e era
Target
ar e
Participants
e era  a es
Level
StatesModelIII National
Target
Federal
Target
Market
Participants
National Level
StatesModelIV National
Target
Federal
Target
Market
Participants
FederalStates
Level
R i l M d l I N i l F d l F d l M k N i l L leg ona  o e  at ona
Target
e era
Target
e era
Target
ar et
Participants
at ona eve
RegionalModelII National
Target
Federal
Target
Federal
Target
Market
Participants
FederalStates
Level
Table 2.4: Allocation Models
underlying institutions. Certiﬁcate trading takes place within a national trading system
that comprises all local authorities in Germany. The federation sets local reduction
goals and allocates the certiﬁcates directly to the local authorities or municipalities
(Federal Model I). The advantages of the system are the direct application of a standard
allotment formula for all municipalities and the high number of market participants.
However, the direct allocation has the major drawback of disregarding regional and
spatial speciﬁcities of municipalities (see Section 3.1). Another possibility is that the
national reduction goal has to be broken down to the federal states (States Model I).
In this case, the states are responsible for setting the speciﬁc reduction goal, which the
municipalities (the market participants) have to meet. A higher acceptance of the cap-
and-trade scheme can be expected because the federal states can set reduction goals in
speciﬁc regions or municipalities. Moreover Walz and Ku¨pfer discuss a federal states
model (States Model II) wherein municipalities can trade only within a federal state.
However, due to the eﬃciency gains of the cap-and-trade system, Walz and Ku¨pfer
recommend the implementation of a national market. Nevertheless, since the federalism
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reform has strengthened the legislative power of the federal states, federal states models
have become a subject of discussion (see also Ko¨ck and Bovet, 2008a). Legislative aspects
will play an important role if the federation imposes binding goals on the federal states
and if a trading system should be implemented.
Studies have analyzed regional diﬀerences that have to be taken into account when set-
ting regional targets or reduction goals for the federal states. Hansju¨rgens and Schro¨ter
(2004) discuss how the federal states can allocate the certiﬁcates on the regional level.
Based on the regional building law, the federal states can allocate the certiﬁcates to
the region planning level. In these models, the ﬁnal allocation of the certiﬁcates to the
municipalities would be the task of the regional planning. Hence, the reduction goal is
set by the administrative district or a supervisory planning authority. Depending on
which institutional level the trading system would be implemented, two diﬀerent types
are possible (Regional Model I and II). Ko¨ck and Bovet (2008a) emphasize that the
implementation of such models is less practicable and requires more legal adjustments
than the direct allocation of the certiﬁcates. An advantage of this models is that the
regional council can also take communal interests into account, which might facilitate
the acceptance of the new instrument (principle of counterﬂow). However, it remains
unclear if and how the regional council, which comprises communal representatives, is
able to negotiate the allocation of certiﬁcates as well as fair allocation rules.
Two further models in which the market participants are the regional planning au-
thorities are conceivable (Federal States Model III and IV). In these models, the supe-
rior authority is responsible for the trading and receives a basic budget to support the
trading, auctioning and the implementation of planning tools. The drawback of this
modeling is that the local authorities have to negotiate the land development plans with
the respective supervisory authority and are not able to buy or sell certiﬁcates directly
at the market. A data collection phase is necessary wherein the local authorities develop
regional land development plans. In case a municipality is not willing to coordinate the
development plans, the achievement of intended regional reduction goals is not possible
and a renegotiation of the reduction goals between the federal states and the regions
is necessary. Hence, high additional administration costs might appear if such Federal
States Models will be implemented.
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Model #Market
Participants
Compatibility
withInterests
ofthe
Federation
Compatibility
withInterests
oftheStates
Compatibility
withInterests
ofthe
Regions
Compatibility
withInterests of
theMunicipality
Compatibility
Constitutional
Law
Federal ModelI high
1148
high low low medium low
StatesModelI high
1148
medium high low medium medium
StatesModelII medium
456*
medium high low medium medium
States Model III medium medium high medium low medium 
301
StatesModelIV low medium high medium low medium
17**
RegionalModelI high low medium high medium high
1148
RegionalModelII medium
456*
low medium high medium high
*averagenumberofmunicipalitiesinafederalstate
**averagenumberofregionsinafederalstate
Table 2.5: Own Assessment of the Allocation Models
Table 2.5 compares the diﬀerent models by evaluating the compatibility with the
interests of the involved institutions, the number of the market participants and the
compatibility with the German Constitutional Law. The advantage of Federal Model I,
States Model I and the Regional Model I is the high number of market participants
because a nation-wide trading system is implemented. In contrast, the low number
of market participants is a drawback of the States Model IV wherein on average 17
districts would trade on a federal states market. The Federal Model I seems to be
more compatible with the interests of the federation because no reduction targets have
to be negotiated with the federal states, in contrast to high additional administration
costs in the regional models. From the perspective of the federal states, the four states
models seem to be appropriate. The federal states are able to set individual targets
for regions and municipalities. Against it, regions and local districts could prefer the
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regional models. From the perspective of the municipalities, the States Model III and
IV might be evaluated as inapplicable because negotiation with the superior planning
authority is necessary and no direct transfer of certiﬁcates is possible.
The table points out that the more institutions are involved in the cap-and-trade
scheme, the more individual interests can be considered. Hence, regional models ensure
the highest compatibility with the German Constitutional Law by considering planning
aspects from the regional planning authority as well as interests of the federal states.
However, as mentioned above, this also results in higher administration costs. The
table indicates that the states models and the regional models are more compatible with
the interests of the involved institutions than the federal model. These models might
guarantee a high acceptance of the new instrument and seem to be an appropriate
approach to solve the regulatory choice problem. The table also indicates that the
states and regional models have some pros and cons. However, arguing from an economic
perspective, the Regional Model I and States Model I are beneﬁcial due to the fact that
they include a high number of market participants. In contrast arguing from a legal
perspective, the Regional Models I and II are more appropriate because they are more
compatible with the German law.
Ko¨ck and Bovet (2008a) also discuss various distribution criteria to break down the
national goal to the federal states or local authorities. The federation calculates the
necessary reduction for each underlying institution to reduce the total land development
to 30 hectares. The procedure is similar to the burden sharing of the national allocation
plan in the emissions trading scheme, wherein the member states have an individual
reduction goal.
2.3.4 Monitoring by a Supervisory Authority
When introducing a cap-and-trade scheme, further tasks, such as monitoring the land
development, arise. At the end of a planning period, the municipalities can use their
development certiﬁcates to legalize their development plans. A regional development
planning authority or a supervisory authority has to examine whether the regional de-
velopments are in accordance with the amount of certiﬁcates hold by the municipalities
to monitor the municipal development. The supervisory authority is a regional planning
37
2 Institutional and Economic Aspects of Tradable Development Certiﬁcates
institution or administrative district that is responsible for the coordination of the mu-
nicipal land development plans. Furthermore, the federal states can also be interpreted
as supervisory authorities due to their legislative power (Section 2.3.2). Another possibil-
ity of monitoring the land usage, is the municipal self-checking of the land development
combined with a subsequent reporting to the supervisory authorities. Furthermore, a
building plan can only be approved (§10 BauGB) if enough certiﬁcates are available.
In the case of a discord in land usage, which means that a municipality holds less
certiﬁcates than required, the supervisory authority imposes sanctions. In the run-
up of the certiﬁcates trading, the type or degree of these penalties must be speciﬁed.
In general, sanctions are assessed by looking at the volume of trade aﬀected. Bizer
et al. (2008) note that these penalties must be proportionate, dissuasive, eﬀective and
admissible in terms of the German law. For instance, sanctions could be about ten times
as high as the expected market price. By setting high sanctions, the participants will
have incentives to prevent the realization of land development plans without having an
adequate certiﬁcates coverage.
The advantage of a system with tradable development certiﬁcates is that the under-
lying regulation problem is solved by a market system. To establish a sustainable and
eﬃcient market system over time, a proper regulatory framework is needed. As discussed
in Section 2.3.2, the regulatory framework has to make sure that the national targets
are met. This includes the monitoring of the land development and the imposition of a
special administrative penalty when a municipally has not enough certiﬁcates.
Both, a supervising authority and a supervised authority, are supposed to integrate
the monitoring of the land development in their coordination processes of organization
and administration to avoid additional transaction costs for the monitoring. However,
monitoring is not only a special issue of the tradable development certiﬁcates system,
it also would have to be executed if another policy instrument was introduced. To fa-
cilitate this task, a supervisory authority can gather information by means of databases
for a faster and more ﬂexible data management (see Chapter 4). All development plans
would be stored in a central planning tool, which will be managed by a local supervising
authority and which provides a comparison of these plans depending on the regional de-
velopment. Furthermore, by using a speciﬁc frontend (calculation tool) to that database,
private broker and unassisted municipalities (Section 2.2.4) could get access to the nec-
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essary data without knowing the detailed arrangement of speciﬁc planning strategies
(Figure 2.3). Thereby, the private broker is able to determine appropriate development
plans and will buy or sell certiﬁcates at the exchange depending on the current (or
possible) market prices.
Figure 2.3: Market Participants and the Supervising Authority
2.4 Summary and Discussion
A system of tradable development certiﬁcates is a promising instrument to reduce the
land usage in Germany. An appropriate design of a policy instrument, including the
specialties of the respective policy area, the market design and the institutional design,
can aﬀect the success of the instrument in reality and has been discussed in many studies.
Thus, diﬀerent design options have to be carefully investigated before actually applying
the instrument in practice. The introduction of a tradable development certiﬁcates
system could give rise to several legal and other planning policy concerns. However,
as discussed in Section 2.3.2, a cap-and-trade system for land usage is compatible with
the legal framework currently in place and has to be consistent with the restrictions in
spatial planning.
Furthermore, the national reduction goal has to be negotiated with the federal states.
Establishing a national or federal exchange is possible by ignoring speciﬁc local aspects
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in regions. The continuous double auction in combination with a primary allocation that
is based on an appropriate allotment formula is proposed in the literature as a market
mechanism for a TDC scheme. Even when the market is illiquid, the market mechanism
might support an eﬀective certiﬁcate trading and ensure a fast price discovery process
(Bizer et al., 2008). The biggest challenge when introducing a cap-and-trade system is
the reliability of the regulatory framework that is responsible for monitoring and sanc-
tioning. In this context, numerous practical challenges must be taken into consideration
when implementing such a scheme, regardless of whether a federal states model or a
regional model is implemented (Section 2.3.3). In case the position of a supervising
authority can be strengthened, the realization of a suitable cap-and-trade scheme for
land development is possible. Based on the ﬁndings from the last section, the following
allocation process for tradable development certiﬁcates is proposed (Figure 2.4).6
Figure 2.4: Allocation Process
6The process is the same regardless of whether a federal states model or a regional model is introduced.
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First, the supervisory authority determines the demand for ﬂoor space and estimates
an individual index for land development for each municipality. This procedure is already
carried out by the regional planning institutions in Germany. Therefore, the regional
planning institution collects the necessary data and coordinates the land development
plans (Step 1). Hence, the superior institutions have to collect data about population,
settlement and traﬃc areas, nature protection areas, and historical population growth
in their region. In addition to this, the supervising authorities could also support the
trading, auctioning and the implementation of planning tools (Section 2.2.4).
Based on the forecast for new settlement and traﬃc areas by the regional planning,
the federal states could allocate the certiﬁcates to the regions (Step 2). Alternatively,
the criteria discussed in Section 2.2.2 can be used. Based on basic endowment, the
adaptation of land development plans has to be renegotiated (Step 3). In the next step,
additional certiﬁcates can be auctioned or bought at the secondary market (Step 4). On
the basis of the new endowment, further adoptions of land development plans can also
be negotiated by repeating steps 3 and 4.
The allocation of the certiﬁcates to the municipalities is based on the basic endowment
criteria (Step 5). Appropriate criteria for the ﬁnal free allocation of the certiﬁcates
would, again, be the combination of economic, ecological and social criteria. Afterwards,
the supervisory authority has the task to monitor the land development plans and the
municipalities have to hand in the certiﬁcates when developing new areas (Step 6).
Before introducing the new instrument, it is necessary for the government to analyze
the economic impacts of a speciﬁc trading scheme for the involved parties. A system
of tradable development certiﬁcates is a ﬂexible policy instrument that takes local au-
thority interests into consideration (Bovet, 2006; Senftleben, 2008). Furthermore, the
government needs to know how a design inﬂuences the behavior of the market partici-
pants and the eﬃciency of the trading scheme. Hence, the incentives and interests of the
involved institutions should be analyzed in detail, which is also the focus of the following
chapters. It is possible that not every party will maximize its economic beneﬁts due to
incomplete information, lack of cost transparency and bounded rationality. The next
chapter focuses on the decision making processes of local representatives and the main
characteristics of their decision situation. The goal of the chapter is to design a decision
framework that serves as a basis for the development of appropriate decision support
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tools. These tools can also support the data collection steps of the supervisory authority
and can play an important role when introducing a cap-and-trade scheme in Germany.
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Development
The closing discussion in Chapter 2 has emphasized the need to analyze municipal
decision making and the decision situation in order to understand possible implications
when introducing a tradable development certiﬁcates system. This chapter proposes
a decision making framework that helps to understand municipal decisions in order to
design appropriate decision support tools for municipal decision makers. Such decision
support tools can facilitate the decision making of local representatives even if a system of
tradable development certiﬁcates is not existing. The tool can also support the municipal
and regional data collection and can provide planning assisting tools, as well as additional
support tools for a tradable development right system. The implementation of regional
planning tools, that accurately reﬂect all regional characteristics and data, is only feasible
if the municipalities facilitate the regional data collection by providing their speciﬁc
data (e.g. planned population growth or available brownﬁelds) that cannot be collected
precisely by other institutions. Whereas this chapter analyzes the municipal decision
making, the design and the implementation of a decision support system based on the
proposed framework will be described in Chapter 4.
Various participants are involved in the process of land development and have inter-
ests that depend on the regional community context and the type of the municipality.
In the next sections, characteristics of the decision makers and the timing of decisions in
land development within the regions will be presented. For a further description of the
municipal decision situation, some municipal structures and their interdependencies in
regional networks will be analyzed. A decision making framework will be developed by
identifying characteristic dimensions of communities in terms of land usage and other
relevant aspects (e.g. structure of the policy network). The structure of the regions
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is characterized along the following ﬁve dimensions: Political Institution, Structure of
Policy Networks, Structure of Spatial Areas, the Demand for Floor Space and the Com-
munity Context. Furthermore, it will be discussed how the lack of cost transparency
can considerably inﬂuence the decision situations, diﬀerent modeling approaches for the
decision situation will be shown, and the resulting Cost Paradox, Development Dilemma
as well as cooperation concepts in land development will be described. The land devel-
opment dilemma describes a situation wherein municipalities compete for households in
a region and negative externalities (spillover eﬀects by moving households and ﬁrms)
impact the outcomes of the municipalities. As a negative consequence of an uncoordi-
nated land development, municipalities develop more new land than actually demanded.
Such a dilemma situation can be solved by introducing municipal cooperation concepts.
Hence, a short overview about the research on municipal cooperation concepts will be
given in Section 3.4, especially with focus on land development. Such cooperation con-
cepts in land development are joint land development plans that are established between
municipalities within a region. Within this context, it will be discussed how diﬀerent
cooperation concepts in land development might be inﬂuenced by structural aspects of
the region and by incentives of the involved actors as well as their relationships. In the
last section of this chapter, it will be discussed how the framework can be applied and
how it can be used to combine methods from diﬀerent disciplines in order to facilitate
the transdisciplinary research in this domain.
3.1 Decision Making Framework in Local Land
Development
Municipal decision makers determine land development decisions for future time horizons
at speciﬁc points of time depending on the speciﬁc characteristics of the municipalities
and regions. The main task of the decision makers is to provide ﬂoor space areas for
settlement and commercial purposes by realizing development in the inner or outer
areas of municipalities in the respective planning period. In the next sections, the
diﬀerent groups involved in the land use process and the timing of their decisions will
be analyzed. The necessary properties of the institutions, the individuals, and the
main environmental conditions in land development will be described to understand the
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decision situation and a decision making framework will be proposed. The characteristics
of the framework facilitate the analysis of the decision making and the behavior of
municipal representatives from diﬀerent perspectives.
Several approaches for the classiﬁcation of municipal decision making have been sug-
gested in the literature depending on the particular perspective. Municipalities and
regions typically can be diﬀerentiated by their spatial orientation, the constellations of
political actors, the structure of the regional network, the level of institutionalization
and the binding intensity between municipalities. Wilske (2007) mentions that basic
aspects with regard to land use situations are the municipal data, such as the popula-
tion trend or the structure of spatial areas, the spatial position of a municipality, the
available development potential and the political framework. The structures of regional
or metropolitan networks may inﬂuence the likelihood of voluntary solutions for diﬀerent
issues, e.g. regarding a coordinated land development as mentioned in the last section.
If the likelihood is low, standardized and centralized solutions seem to be more appro-
priate for resolving diﬀerent sets of externalities and interdependencies (e.g. negative
eﬀects by an uncoordinated land development). Hence the municipal decision making
in the context of cooperation concepts may give insights which aspects have also an in-
ﬂuence on the municipal decision situation. Feiock (2007) analyzes the decision making
between municipalities in the context of cooperation concepts and proposes a distinc-
tion depending on the dimensions political institution, policy networks and community
context. More speciﬁc, Gawron (2004) focuses on cooperation concepts in land develop-
ment and distinguishes between dyadic neighborhood-based cooperation, metropolitan
cooperation between cities and hinterland, and regional-orientated cooperation that in-
cludes all municipalities of one region. Each approach allows a diﬀerent view on land use
decisions and the institutionalization of cooperation concepts discussed in Section 3.4.
Based on the approaches from the literature, the ﬁve dimensions political institution,
structure of policy networks, community context, structure of spatial areas, and demand
for ﬂoor space have been derived and will be described in the following sections. The ﬁve
dimensions reﬂect the main characteristics of the decision situation from diﬀerent van-
tage points within the scope of this book and deﬁne a framework wherein land decision
of local authorities are made.
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3.1.1 Political Institution (Vertical Policy Network)
Municipalities are represented by the elected local oﬃcials. These decision makers act
in the interest of the municipality, but have also personal interests, which might aﬀect
their behavior as representatives. However, the process that leads to land development
and land usage (land usage process) is characterized by an interaction of various groups
of actors playing diﬀerent roles (for an overview see Gutsche and Schiller, 2007). Next
to individual decisions, coordinated group decisions are also made. Diﬀerent actors and
their speciﬁc decisions in this decision making chain make the task and the decision
processes in land development even more complex. Wrong incentives or bounded ra-
tionality of decision makers can lead to wrong decisions with negative consequences for
the municipalities. Depending on individual and institutional interests, local decision
makers perceive the decision situation individually diﬀerent and initiate further decision
making processes based on their individual perception (see Kahneman, 2003).
On the one side, municipalities and owners of areas are the providers of areas. On the
other side, households and ﬁrms are the consumers of areas and make location decisions.
Moreover, actors between the two sides, such as project developers, business development
agencies, or utility companies with other preferences, complicate the decisions as to
where, when and how areas will be developed. Other actors, for instance agencies
responsible for social and technical infrastructures or customers who pay for the service
provision, are only indirectly involved in the land development, but might be aﬀected
by follow-up costs of the land development projects. Therefore, actions within the
framework are inﬂuenced by many institutional and individual aspects.
In comparison to large municipalities, decision makers in small municipalities usually
have limited resources to conduct and monitor a professional spatial planning because
they work mainly on a voluntary or part-time basis for the municipality. As a result,
these participants have usually no in-depth knowledge in the ﬁeld of building and con-
struction. Hence, the content of a land development plan that is transmitted to a devel-
opment oﬃce is, in small municipalities, often determined by non-professionals. There-
fore, it is possible that established concepts and strategies often will be used without
carrying out more detailed ﬁscal analyses of diﬀerent development alternatives. Hence,
the basis of decision making for the private development oﬃces are drafts of land de-
velopment plans, construction plans, or municipality development concepts that only
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insuﬃciently reﬂect trans-regional and long-term development factors. The goal of the
municipal commissioner is merely to have an aﬀordable, legally covered development
concept. The mayor decides in coordination with the local council which development
plan is ﬁnally carried out by the rural municipality. In many cases, the most simple and
easiest way of ﬂoor space provision is the development of new land. In urban municipal-
ities, on the contrary, experts who can abstract from the overall development concept
and personal motives are usually in charge of developing the basis for decision making.
Therefore, there is not only a strong discrepancy between the knowledge and incen-
tives of the participants acting in municipalities and the possibilities that result out of
the usage of innovative methods of modern spatial and urban planning sciences, but
also between the interests and motives of the local participants within the framework.
The location decisions within the land development planning are a complex process of
individual decisions by heterogeneous actors in speciﬁc situations. The connection of all
individual decisions might cause ineﬃcient settlement structures with high infrastruc-
ture costs even in case all involved decision makers act cost-conscious (see Gutsche and
Schiller, 2007). An overall planning, supported by a supervisory authority that collect
all information and facilitate the decision making of each actor, could solve this problem.
The vertical policy network comprises all policy relationships between municipal de-
cision makers in a municipality, inﬂuenced by personal incentives. The structure of the
vertical policy network might have a major inﬂuence on land use decisions and also on
the establishment of cooperation concepts. For instance, if municipalities have success-
fully developed a commercial area, the establishment of further cooperation concepts
(e.g. a coordinated land development regarding housholds) seems to be more likely than
in case the past cooperation has failed. In many countries, the state constitutions and
the enabling legislation vary between the federal states. Local municipalities are em-
bedded in the institutional framework of the states, but have planning authority over
their territory (Section 2.3.2). Within the institutional framework, the elected oﬃcials
and local administrators may establish collaborations with other municipalities for the
coordination of land development in a region. The executive of the municipality can ini-
tiate and propose collaboration projects, but the city council has the function of a veto
player in the political system (Tsebelis, 2002). Thus, before ﬁnalizing land development
plans or fostering intercommunal cooperation, a council approval is necessary. If the
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council is elected with a high majority of votes, it is likely that the council has the same
interests as the executive and that the executive gets an approval (Clingermayer and
Feiock, 2001). Dissimilar interests between elected and non-elected oﬃcials can have a
strong impact on the collective actions of an authority within its metropolitan area or
region. Furthermore, agreements with neighboring municipalities often imply that local
oﬃcials give up some power. Thus, strengthening a regional coordination of municipali-
ties reduces the independence of municipalities and involves the risk for politicians that
agreements are contrary to the interests of the local population. If the agreed regional
policies and the preferences of the district constituent are diﬀerent, it is diﬃcult for
municipal representatives to weigh up the beneﬁts of the regional agreement and the
risk of losing votes at the next election. Internal conﬂicts resulting from vertical inter-
dependencies and diverging political priorities in the decision making chain can hinder
or slow down the realization of intercommunal cooperation in land development.
Since cooperation in land development is usually a long-term agreement, short elec-
tion cycles of the local representatives can inﬂuence the time horizon of a collaboration.
Short-term gains from not coordinating the land development could be more important
for local leaders than the beneﬁts from a repeated cooperation in the long-term. The
longer the terms of oﬃce for elected oﬃcials and administrative authorities are, the less
selective beneﬁts exist and the more likely are intercommunal agreements. Therefore,
personal interests, like individual career incentives, can decisively inﬂuence the behavior
of local oﬃcials and the decision as to whether entering into collaborative arrangements
or not (McCabe et al., 2008). Although elected oﬃcials are mainly responsible for
their own constituencies, decisions in land usage can also inﬂuence other regional con-
stituencies. For example, if one municipality can attract households from neighboring
municipalities by providing attractive building areas, a crucial eﬀect on residential loca-
tion decisions from other constituencies is possible. Hence, it is necessary to also have
a closer look at the network relationships between municipalities (the horizontal policy
network) and the structure of the regional policy network.
3.1.2 Structure of Policy Networks (Horizontal Policy Network)
Horizontal network relationships between neighboring municipalities with regard to a
joint land development are typically voluntary and self-organized in Germany. Usually,
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relationships and agreements about land development form a complex regional structure,
in which local decision makers act in a social network (Thurmaier and Wood, 2002). In
large networks, the credibility of commitments is enhanced by receiving more information
about the other municipalities’ local policies, programs, and implementation problems
(Feiock, 2009). Many European and American states enable local municipalities to enter
or exit agreements without being reviewed or monitored by a supervising or coordinat-
ing agency. Thus, network agreements on regional and intercommunal land development
can reduce the likelihood of uncoordinated land development plans by means of reputa-
tion, reciprocity, and trustworthiness. Moreover, political institutions and local decision
makers with similar values, norms, and beliefs, called Institutional Homogeneity, tend to
cluster each other in a speciﬁc region (Carley, 1991). Consequently, agreements about
land development are more likely if representatives share similar interests.
The establishment of an appropriate joint land development plan in a region and the
implementation of a regional decision support system requires information about the land
development plans and the structure of the spatial areas in all municipalities. For the
collection of the associated spatial and ﬁnancial data a broad access to private informa-
tion (e.g. the calculated costs and incomes of a land development plan) of municipalities
is necessary to design a regional land development plan (see Section 3.4). The provi-
sion of crucial data and information about the costs or proﬁts of planned development
areas requires a high level of trust between the involved parties. Weakly-tied networks
can oﬀer solutions to coordination problems and strongly-tied networks can enable trust
and credible commitment (Feiock, 2007). In both cases, the transaction costs of a joint
action in land usage can also be reduced. Especially in strongly-tied or reciprocating
networks, the incentive for free-riding or defecting from a cooperation is less present as
municipalities receive information about the eﬀorts and behavior of the other munici-
palities. Lubell (2007) has shown that strongly-tied relationships can increase mutual
trust and the likelihood of compliance with the agreement when the relationship lasts
over a longer time period. Municipalities can beneﬁt from having a positive reputation
and can use it as social capital for future negotiations in their network.
Feiock (2007) has shown that voluntary coordination mechanisms are mainly found
in metropolitan areas with high fragmentation and complex institutional networks. The
fragmentation of service responsibilities between country governments, agencies, and
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districts characterizes networks in metropolitan areas. Within these networks, decisions
made by one community inﬂuence incomes and costs of others. The more complex
such a network is (e.g. in regions with many municipalities), the more suitable are
self-organizing coordination mechanisms with low transaction costs instead of complex
standardized solutions (Section 3.4). By generating economies of scale in land develop-
ment and internalizing spillover eﬀects (e.g. negative externalities such as unused areas),
the success of interlocal agreements between few municipalities can trigger collaborative
agreements with more municipalities, which results in additional beneﬁts by more eﬃ-
cient land usage for a region (Einig, 2003). These negative spillover eﬀects are mainly
inﬂuenced by the geographic position of municipalities in a region and the types of
municipalities that are deﬁned by the speciﬁc community context in a region.
3.1.3 Community Context
The community context of a municipality can be described by the spatial centrality,
the level of integration into the regional network, and the distance to important central
industry or commercial areas. The speciﬁc community context might inﬂuence the inten-
sity of negative spillover eﬀects of the uncoordinated land development, the suitability
of intermunicipal cooperation concepts and the possible gains from cooperation by re-
ducing the total new land development and urban sprawl. Feiock (2009) argues that
homogeneity between the municipalities is important in order to establish intermunici-
pal cooperation. Agency costs for oﬃcials acting on behalf of citizens and the eﬀort to
aggregate the preferences of all actors are higher in heterogeneous municipalities. Stud-
ies in the area of metropolitan governance propose a classiﬁcation of municipalities and
institutions with similar characteristics by means of a cluster analysis (Siedentop, 2005;
Wilske, 2007). The studies characterize municipality types by identifying relevant socio-
demographic and structural residential criteria of municipalities. The main indicators
for the clustering of municipalities are population density and age structure, centrality in
terms of labor, population and employment dynamics, prosperity and tertiary education.
Figure 3.1 shows four municipality types and their relation to some municipal indi-
cators as well as migration processes between these municipalities (the classiﬁcation is
derived from Siedentop, 2005). Municipalities in suburban and commuter areas (Types 2
and 3) are characterized by a high level of tertiary education. Young households, middle
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class households and socially mobile persons searching for building land are responsi-
ble for a disproportionate rise of prosperity and a decreasing average age in suburban
municipalities. Employees, who use the increasing transport infrastructure, do not have
to live close to their work place and can settle down in these areas. Due to the sub-
urbanization and urbanization processes, the population and employment dynamics are
higher in more central municipalities and city centers.
In many central cities (Type 1) a so called counter urbanization can even be observed.
Counter urbanization means that the population moves away from urban areas into new
smaller municipalities in rural areas or into other urban areas. Nevertheless, central cities
in metropolitan areas have the highest level of centrality in terms of the labor market
and a high population density. On the contrary, municipalities in rural areas (Type 4)
tend to have a lower population density and an old age structure, and are characterized
by less prosperity and low tertiary education. Only when a rural municipality is in closer
distance to working facilities, a positive population growth is probable (Type 3). These
commuter towns are primarily residential and can also be seen as peripheral suburbs of
a nearby metropolis.
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Employment Dynamics
,   
Employment Dynamics
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Figure 3.1: Types of Municipalities
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The typiﬁcation is mainly based on the spatial position and the size of a municipality.
These two factors inﬂuence the strategies of a municipality considerably in terms of
land development. Thus, municipalities can initiate diﬀerent amounts of new settlement
development. Dahm (2006) shows that small municipalities develop more new areas
compared to metropolitan areas relative to their size. Thus, the smaller a municipality
is the more land it develops. Although small municipalities develop more areas, the study
reveals no signiﬁcant population growth in these municipalities. Small municipalities are
characterized by urban sprawl and an accumulation of unused areas.
As an example, the decision process in small, rural municipalities (Type 4) and in
large, urban municipalities (Type 1) will be compared. The planning rhythms and the
planning horizon of a land-need prognosis typically diﬀer between small municipalities
and larger cities, and also depend on the community context (Dahm, 2006): In small
municipalities, a larger area development is often done in advance in order to oﬀer
demanders a continuing construction possibility. However, this procedure is linked to
ﬁnancial risks within the planning horizon in the case of non-usage of the areas and,
consequently, missing tax incomes. While the provision of new areas and the land devel-
opment or land use by the residents occurs simultaneously in larger cities, Dahm argues
that a delay between the provision and the usage of the areas can be observed in smaller
municipalities. Larger municipalities are, however, confronted with a large number of
dimensions, such as commercial areas, with diﬀerent qualitative and quantitative prop-
erties that have to be taken into account in the municipal land-use planning within a
certain planning period.
The reasons for the growing land development in rural municipalities diﬀer from those
in urban agglomerations (see Dahm, 2006). Land development in small municipalities
is triggered by the desire of private households to build a home. These households,
however, have other preferences with regard to housing and location than households
in urban areas. Single- or double-family-houses with gardens are the preferred housing
types of households in rural areas (Gutsche and Schiller, 2007). Land saving and a
resource-eﬃcient land development is of little or no importance in small municipalities.
Planning regulations on the national as well as on regional levels are less important in the
case of small municipalities, as suﬃcient development potential is available in the outer
areas of the municipalities. Municipal administrations and the actual land users, the
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owners or contractors, are in close contact on the political level in rural municipalities.
As a consequence, the municipal representatives often take into account the personal
needs of the respective land user. Especially, due to the proximity between political
representatives and their voters, a certain degree of inﬂuence on the decision makers
cannot be avoided when specifying development concepts.
In case municipalities share common borders, and, furthermore, residential or com-
mercial areas are adjacent to each other, interdependencies and spillover eﬀects between
them tend to be higher. In case of a land use conﬂict (competition for households or
ﬁrms), no municipality can avoid the conﬂict and the situation has the character of a
dilemma situation (see Section 3.3). If a municipality would develop areas without re-
garding the needs of the other municipality in a speciﬁc time horizon, this can lead to
retaliation in the future by the other municipality. Moreover, cooperation gains due to
economies of scale in the bordering area can often be realized in these scenarios and a
cooperative solution in land development (a joint land development plan) is more likely.
These observations underline the need to carefully analyze the community context in
order to understand how land use decisions in municipalities are made.
3.1.4 Structure of Spatial Areas
The structure of the municipal spatial area deﬁnes the decision making space regarding
the possible land development strategies. A coordinated land development and a space-
saving development in the inner area is only feasible if a municipality is able to align its
development plans with the structure of the underlying spatial areas. The development
of new areas or the recycling of brownﬁelds can change the spatial structure and the
density of land use. Measurement parameters for the density of land use can be ﬂoor-
space indices, population density, or density of workplaces per hectare. Consequences
are the utilization of transport systems, social infrastructures (e.g. schools, hospitals)
and public infrastructure systems (e.g. roadways and sewage disposal).
In metropolitan areas, open spaces run short and, as a result, the development focuses
on the inner areas of the municipalities. As a response to the public pressure of the
constituent, open space is often used as green areas for recreation. The inner areas can
be large brownﬁelds or vacant lots between built-up areas. Additional ﬂoor space can
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also be created by increasing the maximum allowed urban density. On the contrary,
rural-peripheral regions have no shortage of open space. Here, municipalities develop
more new settlement areas and can easily increase the transport infrastructure in order to
attract households and ﬁrms. The development of areas within the city is not necessary.
In contrast to the development of new areas, development of inner areas leads to a
more eﬃcient utilization of the existing infrastructure and to overall cost savings. The
comparison illustrates that the community context and the structure of spatial areas are
closely linked.
In municipal planning, local actors calculate the expected demand for new ﬂoor space
within a speciﬁc time horizon. In order to realize the given land-need forecast, the mu-
nicipal decision maker has diﬀerent alternatives for providing the necessary ﬂoor space.
As mentioned above, settlement and commercial areas can be provided by revitalizing
areas in the inner area of a municipality, or by developing new settlement areas in the
outer area of the municipality. When deciding, the municipality has to take the objec-
tives from the land-need prognosis into consideration. That means that the requested
development objectives have to be met by a combination of inner and outer develop-
ment in each planning period. The resulting expansion of settlement areas within a time
horizon can diﬀer according to the speciﬁc municipality type.
In large agglomerations, municipalities often use their development potential within
their district. Using further areas aﬀects the number of remaining recreation and open
areas. Consequently, the development of new areas in the inner area is often impeded
by the resistance of the local population. Thus, restrictions from the vertical policy net-
work inﬂuence the available development potential. Frequently, increasing the maximum
density in existing areas or concentrating on brownﬁeld recycling are the only remaining
options to provide additional ﬂoor space in the inner area. In many municipalities, the
existing brownﬁelds and gaps exceed the long-term demand for ﬂoor space. However, it
is only rarely possible to develop settlement and commercial areas in the inner area with
similar properties. For example, some areas could be partially contaminated and can,
therefore, not be used for a considerable time because of high development cost. In prac-
tice, municipalities develop the cheapest available development options ﬁrst. Typically,
closing gaps between buildings is cheaper than recycling brownﬁelds. Hence, the more
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land development is necessary in the inner area of a municipality, the more expensive
the development per hectare becomes to meet the demand for ﬂoor space.
3.1.5 Demand for Floor Space
The extent to which a municipality uses new land and the locations of the new de-
velopments depend on various factors. Dahm (2006) classiﬁes the essential aspects of
land development into quantitative and qualitative aspects. A challenge is that many
municipalities do not know the precise demand for space in the inner and outer zones.
Many municipalities, even with a stagnating population, plan a demand for new areas
despite an excess supply of space for living purposes exists in a region. The calculation
of the municipal demand is based on both, estimates and empirical values of the re-
cent past that are inﬂuenced by population movements of the (re-)urbanization process
(Section 3.1.3). The overall size of the potentially settling population and industry
can be considered as a proxy for the demand for new areas in a certain region. Thus,
the expected land development of a municipality results from a prognosis estimating the
population growth and an analysis of the preferences of the land demanders. Apart from
the invariable topological factors of the location, the synergy of these factors inﬂuences
the local demand, measured in ﬂoor space for living or commercial purpose, for devel-
opment areas in the inner and outer zones. Therefore, the demand has a long-lasting
eﬀect on the settlement characteristic of a municipality over long planning periods.
Apart from the quantitative need of ﬂoor space for residential and commercial usage,
the qualitative needs of the population and the industry (e.g. housing types, transporta-
tion connection, long-term extensibility) are further factors in land development. These
factors might be important when households decide to move from an urban area to a
rural area (counter urbanization process) and include housing density, the market price
for housing, pollution levels, or crime levels. This qualitative demand depends on the
regional characteristics, or even on the speciﬁc location. Therefore, demand for land in
one location cannot simply be replaced by the provision of land in other locations or in
other regions. Certain linkages between the demand and a location or a region have to
be taken into account during the decision processes. Based on the total development of
new areas and the demand for new areas in a region, new areas can cover the demand
for ﬂoor space at diﬀerent speeds.
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The diﬀerent dimensions of the political networks, the structure of regions and mu-
nicipalities presented in this section deﬁne the context of decision making of the oﬃcials
and inﬂuence their perception with regard to beneﬁts and costs of joint actions in land
development. To model the decision processes of local municipalities, generally two
mechanisms, bilateral contracting and multilateral collective action for local units can
be used (Feiock, 2002, 2007). In the next section, the aspects of the municipal decision
making in the land usage domain will be discussed in order to elaborate an institutional
collective action framework that describes the Cost Paradox as well as the Development
Dilemma.
3.2 The Cost Paradox in the Decision Chain
The competition between municipalities for households and ﬁrms has led to an expansion
of settlement and commercial areas and to a growing municipal infrastructure (Einig,
2005; Gutsche and Schiller, 2007). In spite of a stagnating or even decreasing popula-
tion this trend still continues in many regions. However, many unused areas exist in
the inner areas of municipalities that could be recycled for residential or commercial
usage. Mu¨ller-Kleissler and Rach (2001) show that four out of ﬁve municipalities plan
to cover the demand for ﬂoor space by developing new areas in the outer area. Many
studies analyze why the development of new areas goes on, while the brownﬁelds remain
unrecycled and some new areas remain unused (Gutsche, 2006; Gutsche and Schiller,
2007; Siedentop, 2007). Within the scope of the debate about a sustainable and eﬃ-
cient settlement development, cost transparency in location and planning decisions of
municipalities, households, and ﬁrms becomes more and more important: Only if all
actors behave cost-consciously, more eﬃcient regional structures will be possible. The
understanding of the complex interdependencies between planning decisions of munic-
ipalities and location decisions of households and ﬁrms complicates the realization of
cost transparency. The fact that incorrect estimates of the costs associated with land
development result in ineﬃcient land usage is often noted. However, in order to get a
suﬃcient understanding of the complex structure of the decision chain within a munici-
pality in land development, more comprehensive explanations and modeling approaches
are necessary (see Section 3.3).
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The heterogeneity of the diﬀerent groups and decision makers in municipal devel-
opment has been the subject of many research analyses (e.g. Feiock and Carr, 2001;
Thurmaier and Wood, 2002; Evans, 2004). Empirical studies have shown how concrete
instruments can be introduced in order to avoid the negative eﬀects of the lack of trans-
parency in land development (e.g. Einig, 2003, 2005). Actors which are involved in the
land development process minimize their own costs, but due to the lack of transparency
this results in ineﬃcient regional structures regarding the land development and the asso-
ciated costs. Other studies have analyzed the ﬁscal impact of the municipal development
by comparing the recycling of inner areas and the development of new areas (Rothe, 2005;
Billing, 2004; Mainz, 2005; Seiler, 2006; Preuß and Floating, 2009). Furthermore, in-
creasing the transparency of the land use processes will demonstrate the ﬁscal impact of
diﬀerent land development plans and can lead to the reduction of new land development
(Bodenschatz and Scho¨nig, 2004; Reidenbach et al., 2007). Urban studies and studies
on migration have revealed that next to economic aspects, non-economic aspects, such
as preferences of households for speciﬁc residential areas, also play an important role for
the decisions of the actors. Depending on the role of a group, diﬀerent aspects and cost
factors are more or less important. However, the studies show that economic aspects are
usually predominant. For instance, Gutsche and Schiller (2007) create proﬁles for each
group of actors in order to describe the characteristics of the speciﬁc decision making
situation of each actor. The proﬁles help to analyze the impact of costs on the individual
decisions. By systematically analyzing the actors and their motivations during decision
making processes in more detail, the lack of transparency can be analyzed in more detail.
The dimensions of the framework will be used as a guideline to explain the costs of land
development and to identify false incentives in the decision chain.
Policy Network Political and ﬁnancial considerations on the vertical policy network
motivate municipalities to develop new land for commercial and residential use. As
mentioned above, many actors are involved in the process of developing land. Thereby,
the municipalities often pass costs for developing new areas on investors or the general
public. If remaining infrastructure costs were negligible, a development project can
be considered as appropriate and feasible. The calculation of potentially high follow-
up costs is diﬃcult and is therefore often ignored in this decision process. Distorted
costs perception and bounded rationality of actors will lead to wrong decisions when
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an actor does not consider all indispensable costs. As a result, the total net value of
development projects is often overestimated (Siedentop and Schiller, 2006; Gutsche and
Schiller, 2007; Henger and Thoma¨, 2009). The studies have shown that the calculated
increasing tax receipts by the settlement of new households are often not feasible. For
the owners of the building lands, land speculations and expectations about future prices
of their property play an important role. If the property tax is too low, the occurrence
of speculation eﬀects is increased. In this case, land owners have fewer incentives to sell
unused property and are more patient, even passive, with regard to their dealings. The
restrictions from the vertical policy network (Section 3.1.1) arising during the decision
making of the actors might hinder the eﬃcient usage of spatial areas and may exclude
the realization of alternative development plans.
Spatial Structure Gutsche and Schiller (2007) examine various factors of the cost
transparency in more detail by describing the impact of spatial structure in a region
with homogeneous municipalities. Crucial for the costs are the regional location of the
municipality and its spatial structure, especially the density of land. For instance, if a
municipality is less dense, the speciﬁc costs per houshold, e.g. per schoolchild, tend to be
higher than in denser, urban municipalities. Gutsche (2006) has shown that the costs for
public infrastructure strongly depend on the density of use. As a rule-of-thumb, which
proves to be true in many studies, Gutsche (2006) states: “Half the density of use, double
the infrastructure costs for each unit.” Therefore, small municipalities that develop large
new settlement areas face high costs for the maintenance of the infrastructure. The
development costs also depend on the regional location of the new areas. In case the
new areas can be well integrated into the existing infrastructure, no new facilities are
necessary and the municipality can save costs.
Community Context The community context of a municipality inﬂuences the costs for
the maintenance of the social infrastructure partially covered by external utility compa-
nies (Section 3.1.4). The demographic trend in many countries can get municipalities
in sparsely populated suburban or rural areas (Type 4) in ﬁnancial diﬃculties when the
population is declining. Consequences are even higher costs for the remaining residents.
The resulting costs are reimbursed by all households of the municipality in the form of
duties. Therefore, utility companies have less incentive to avoid long network sections
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per user or long facility lifetimes, as households bear the increased costs, regardless of
whether they live in new or in existing areas (Gutsche and Schiller, 2007). Such a trans-
fer of costs to other parties can cause problems in case the costs have no signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the own decision, but impacts the outcomes of other actor groups included
or excluded in the land use process. Another major challenge is to involve groups that
are excluded during an individual decision making. For instance, the development of
new residential and commercial areas determined by a municipality has negative con-
sequences with tremendous costs for the general public in case the technical and social
infrastructure in municipalities becomes more and more expensive.
Demand for Floor Space As mentioned in Section 3.1.5, the demand for ﬂoor space
is characterized by the location decisions of households, ﬁrms, and investors. During
the decision making process of the households and ﬁrms, the infrastructure costs play
a less important role. The low land prices of suburban areas conceal the high costs in
these areas, which are born by all households. However, Gutsche and Schiller (2007) have
shown that the low living costs are outweighed by the additional mobility costs associated
with these areas and the households often do not take the long-term costs into account
when making their location decisions. The community context and the structures of
the spatial areas inﬂuence the costs of the transport systems. For instance, households
in suburban areas with few public transport services travel greater distances by car.
Low land prices in suburban areas make these locations also attractive for investors and
ﬁrms. From an individual perspective, the low price levels overcompensate the higher
infrastructure costs for the development of these densely populated areas. However, the
regional cost advantage of developing denser areas by a coordinated land development is
not taken into account in the individual decision making process of local representatives
(see Section 3.3).
The conﬂation of all individual decisions into the decision chain for land usage often
leads to an ineﬃcient settlement structure in regions even though actors believe to
decide economically rational. Gutsche and Schiller (2007) describe this contradiction
as a costs paradox wherein “actors involved in property development try to minimize
their respective costs. However, the end result of these individual decisions is a highly
cost-intensive regional settlement structure.” Thus, a discrepancy between individual
perception of costs and the observed regional costs characterizes this cost paradox. The
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cost paradox is enhanced by the lack of transparency within this complex decision making
process of many actor groups. It should not be confused with the building land paradox
(Davy, 1996), which has the character of a collective action problem.
The common characteristic of the two concepts is that the behavior and decisions
of local actors in the land development process are uncoordinated. However, the cost
paradox is based on the bounded rationality of the actors acting successively in the
vertical decision chain. By contrast, within the scope of the building paradox, or dilemma
in land development, actors on the horizontal level make uncoordinated decisions at the
same time, which results in a higher land provision than actually needed. Nevertheless,
both concepts entail urban sprawl and high follow-up costs for the infrastructure. By
modeling the individual decision situations from a regional perspective, the cost paradox
can be explained. The introduction of information systems and decision support systems
to avoid the cost paradox should reduce costs for the community and the region, make
the costs more transparent and avoid wrong incentives along the decision making chain.
Awareness raising campaigns, for example, could help actors to take all costs into account
during the location decisions. By doing so, the discrepancy between individual and
collective eﬃciency in land development can be equalized.
3.3 The Development Dilemma in Land Usage
Local decisions about land usage and the development of new areas in a municipality
are inﬂuenced by the relationships to other municipalities in the region. In many cases,
municipalities compete with each other for new businesses or households: When one
municipality wins, other municipalities loose (Einig, 2005). In such a scenario, the
location of a ﬁrm or the settlement of households, are exclusive, meaning that there is
rivalry between municipalities in a region and that a household or a ﬁrm settles in only
one municipality. If all municipalities compete against each other for the settlements
by providing new building land, the situation has the structure of a dilemma situation
and negative spill-over eﬀects between the municipalities exist. This dilemma situation
is characterized by an ineﬃcient infrastructure (caused by unused new land) and losses
of tax receipts in these municipalities. Thus, the competition for new businesses and
households and the expected increase of the municipal tax incomes characterize many
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land use decisions. The more serious the problem is and the more new land will be
developed, the greater would be gains from cooperation and the more likely involved
municipalities seek an agreement of a restricted use of a good (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom
et al., 1994).
The ﬁnancial situation of municipalities plays an important role in land development
and inﬂuences the probability of collective actions as well as the realization of coordinated
land development plans. As coordinated land development plans are diﬃcult to deﬁne,
transaction costs for the coordination of joint actions in land usage tend to be relatively
high (see Section 3.4). Moreover, coordinated land usage projects for long time periods
can create mutual dependencies between the municipalities due to the necessary long
term commitments. Thus, by coordinating their land usage strategies, it is possible
that their individual ﬂexibility is reduced to adapt land usage plans in case the demand
for residential or commercial areas will change in the future. For instance, if demand
increases in only one municipality participating in the cooperation, the municipality
will have an incentive to develop more new areas than others within the cooperation.
Consequently, this party might be tempted to resign on the contract, which incites the
other participants to develop their own areas. For many municipalities, the development
of new areas seems to oﬀer possibilities to stabilize or improve their ﬁnancial situation.
In practice, however, this eﬀect is often overestimated—in extreme cases, the ﬁnancial
situations of the municipalities may even get worse (Einig, 2005). As a result, the
uncoordinated land development causes excessive costs by a high amount of unused new
areas.
New information and decision support systems can enhance cost transparency during
decision making, but cannot alone solve the collective action problem and the devel-
opment dilemma. This section shows, how a lack of transparency of municipal costs
or incomes may inﬂuence the structure of the decision situation and how it enforces a
potential dilemma in land development. First, the characteristics of the development
dilemma between two municipalities will be discussed from a game-theoretical perspec-
tive by presenting a competitive situation in two diﬀerent games. Second, a more general
game-theoretical approach will be introduced to model the situation in a region with
more than two municipalities. If municipalities face a dilemma game with land devel-
opment, intercommunal cooperation concepts are promising instruments to address the
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collective action problem. Hence, the section concludes with a discussion of cooperative
concepts that may be helpful to achieve a cooperative solution of this collective action
problem.
3.3.1 Competitive Situations between Two Municipalities
Game-theoretical models can be used to describe urban conﬂicts and to analyze coop-
erative solutions in a decentralized system of governance (Steinacker, 2004). Formal
models usually depend on speciﬁc assumptions, which are critical for the model predic-
tions. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the important drivers which are relevant
in actual settings. By variation of the model parameters, the model can be applied to
situations that diﬀer between regions or that reﬂect particular municipal characteristics.
In the following, a competitive situation between two homogeneous municipalities will
be considered. The outcome of the competitive situation is calculated by the municipal
decision maker depending on his perception of the related costs and is, thus, strongly
impacted by the transparency of these values in a speciﬁc situation. In the following, the
impact of cost transparency will be demonstrated by describing two exemplary games.
The ﬁrst game models the structure of a bilateral intergovernmental conﬂict and has
the structure of a dilemma situation. The payoﬀ structure captures the competitive
nature of the relationship between the municipalities (Rubin and Rubin, 1987). Two
neighboring municipalities have the possibility to provide living space by recycling in-
ner areas or by developing new land in the outer areas. The interaction of the two
municipalities can be characterized as a non-cooperative game with two players. Each
player has two pure strategies: Inner Development (I) and Outer Development (O). The
recycling of brownﬁelds in the inner area of a municipality (I) is associated with costs of
2 monetary units. In the example, the development of new areas in the outer area (O)
costs 3 monetary units.
In the game, the migration of households and ﬁrms and the incomes by population
dynamics will be also taken into account. The higher this value, the higher is the
incentive for a municipality to develop new areas. Municipalities usually calculate that
new areas will be entirely used (Dahm, 2006). In reality, however, oversupply of new
areas can be observed, which leads to empty properties. In the example, if only one
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municipality develops outer areas, additional population settlement in the outer area
increases the tax incomes by 4 in one municipality, and decreases the tax incomes by 4
in the other municipality. Considering the costs for the development of diﬀerent areas in
each municipality leads to a payoﬀ of +1 for the municipality with the outer development
(tax income of 4 minus development costs of 3) and to a payoﬀ of -6 for the municipality
that chooses inner development (development costs 2 and a tax decrease of 4). If both
municipalities choose the same strategy in this example, no municipality has changes in
tax incomes. The resulting payoﬀ matrix is shown in Table 3.1.
Municipality 2
I O
I −2, −2 −6, +1
Municipality 1 O +1, −6 −3, −3
Table 3.1: Payoﬀs Game 1 (Prisoners’ Dilemma)
In such a classical dilemma situation, it is always better to develop outer areas, regard-
less of the other municipalitys’ decision. As defecting (the development of new areas) is
a (strictly) dominant strategy for both players, the game has a (unique) Nash Equilib-
rium (O,O) in dominant strategies: No player has an incentive to switch to a diﬀerent
strategy in this game independent of what the other does. However, the outcome in this
equilibrium is not Pareto-optimal. If both municipalities would develop the inner areas,
they would be both better oﬀ.
In practice, the outcome of the game depends on the individual perceptions of the de-
cision situation, i.e. the estimates of associated costs and incomes. A careful calculation
of infrastructure costs and social costs is necessary to deﬁne the outcomes of the game
in a speciﬁc situation (Section 3.1). As mentioned in the last section, the structure of
the vertical network mainly inﬂuences the distribution of the costs among the diﬀerent
actors and the existence of the cost paradox. In case, the municipalities have to bear
the additional infrastructure costs caused by urban sprawl (and not the residents), the
costs for the outer development tend to be higher. Hence, the infrastructure costs for
developing new areas in the outer areas O are higher and the payoﬀs in the (O,O), (I,O)
and (O,I) outcomes of the game change. Furthermore, if transparency is enhanced, a
more detailed overview of all possible development areas in a municipality is possible.
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Especially in urban municipalities of Type 1, a comprehensive overview of all available
development options is not always present. Only if a municipality knows all brownﬁelds
and other development options within its territory, the development of the areas with
the lowest costs will be possible. Therefore, the costs for inner development I decrease
and the payoﬀs in the (I,I), (O,I) and the (I,O) outcomes of the game increase.
Hence, for the second game, a higher cost transparency by a correct cost calculation
of all possible development options will be assumed. This will inﬂuence the individual
perception of the game on the part of the municipalities and might change the structure
of the situation. Table 3.2 shows the structure of the new game that assumes cost
transparency. The diﬀerence to Game 1 is that the outer development is more expensive
with associated costs of 7 monetary units, and the development of inner areas is cost
neutral with associated costs of 0. In this case, the payoﬀs of the game will change and
will reﬂect the fact that outer development is less attractive than formerly assumed.
The game now reﬂects a situation with the absence of the cost paradox and wherein the
preferences of the local representatives are completely convergent.
Municipality 2
I O
I +0, +0 −4, −3
Municipality 1 O −3, −4 −7, −7
Table 3.2: Payoﬀs Game 2
In this game, the recycling of inner areas in both municipalities is still Pareto-superior
but now I is a dominant strategy and the strategy proﬁle (I,I) is a Nash Equilibrum in
dominant strategies. Due to the fact that the Pareto Optimum is also a Nash Equilibrium
(I,I), the development of inner areas in both municipalities is easier to establish in the
new Game 2 than in Game 1. The new game has no longer a dilemma structure and the
development in the inner area is more likely. The example points out that the analysis of
costs is necessary to identify if a real development dilemma between municipalities exists
or not. If cost transparency can be enhanced, the realization of cooperation concepts
that establish intercommunal agreements and reduce the new land development are more
likely.
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Other aspects that were discussed within the proposed framework may have also an
impact on the structure of the game and the existence of a dilemma situation. For
instance, non-monetary aspects can inﬂuence the payoﬀ structure. However, reputation
aspects can work in two directions: On the one hand, the development of new areas is
an indicator for the attractiveness of a municipality and increases its prestige. In this
case, additional non-monetary values increase the valuation of the development of new
areas. On the other hand, the initialization of sustainable land development concepts
increases the reputation and might be an important driver for the strategy I. However,
the question arises if and how these aspects can be valued by the municipal decision
makers in practice.
The various aspects discussed in both games illustrate how the individual perception
of the decision situation changes the structure of the game and may inﬂuences land use
decisions of local representatives. The shortcoming of both modeling approaches is the
assumed symmetry in the players’ positions. Political and economic asymmetries can
favor some municipalities in cooperation and involve problems when negotiating the fair
division of beneﬁts (Feiock, 2009). The dimension community context of the framework
deﬁnes diﬀerent municipality types and their relation to each other, and helps to un-
derstand how asymmetries in the players’ positions may inﬂuence the outcomes of the
games. In metropolitan conﬂicts between urban and suburban municipalities, the het-
erogeneity between the players is typically high. Both municipalities are interested in
joint land development plan, but have diﬀerent preferences with regard to the outcomes
in this cooperation. In the following sections, the main focus will be on regions with
homogeneous municipalities and only at some points aspects of heterogeneous munici-
palities will be discussed.
Next to the community context, the frequency of the interaction also has an impact on
the possible game results over time and the stability of the Nash Equilibrium. Typically,
the situation as presented in Game 1 can be found in practice as a repeated interaction
between municipalities. By repeating the same interaction, an actor is able to reward
or punish past actions of the other actor. Due to the folk theorem, a cooperation can
be established in the inﬁnitely repeated game (with no discounting or with a suﬃcient
small discounting) by subgame perfect equilibria.1 A possible strategy to establish such
1In this context, a discount rate close to 1 can be assumed, due to the high probability that the
interaction continues in future periods.
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an equilibrium, is the ‘grim trigger’ strategy. Here, the opponent will be punished when
deviating in the game. For instance, both municipalities could try to establish the
outcome (I,I) in Game 1. In a repeated interaction, a player could now punish the other
one if he deviates from the solution (I,I) by applying the grim trigger strategy: If the
other municipality would develop new areas, the municipality can punish the other one
by choosing the outer development in all future periods so that no advantage of any
player exists. In such a case, the additional incomes of the other player can be cancelled
out. Furthermore, Steinacker (2004) discusses such a repeated game in the context of
metropolitan conﬂicts, models a realistic repeated interaction between municipalities
and analyzes further aspects of such a game. The author argues that the likelihood
of cooperation depends on more factors, e.g. the number of rounds or risk aversion
of the local representatives. Hence, a repeated interaction between municipalities can
establish the Pareto-optimal solution (I,I) and may facilitate the coordination of their
land development plans by reducing the outer development as observable in practical
use cases (see Section 3.4).
3.3.2 Competitive Situations between Two and More Municipalities
In Germany, the development dilemma arises only rarely within the scope of dyadic re-
lationships (Einig, 2008). Usually, more than two municipalities are involved in the land
development process of a speciﬁc region. Hence, cooperation between municipalities and
the coordination of land development plans among cities is typically a collective action
problem in a competitive environment (Olson, 1971; Ostrom, 1990). Some collective ac-
tion models (e.g. Steinacker, 2004) highlight that the major conditions having an impact
on the likelihood of cooperation are the characteristics of the good and the heterogeneity
of the actors. The discussed competitive situation between two municipalities and the
impact of the framework on the presented games, show that there is still a need for new
approaches to model collective land use decisions and the interaction of decision makers
in the land use domain.
The following n person game helps to improve the understanding of intercommunal
competition, similar to the examples presented in the last section. The game considers a
region with n > 1 homogeneous municipalities competing for households in an one-stage
game. Each municipality i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} is characterized by a given development goal
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ei, which determines the demand for new ﬂoor space for residential, commercial, and
industrial purposes within a speciﬁc time horizon. The demand for ﬂoor space can be
covered by recycling areas yi in the inner area or by developing new areas xi in the outer
area of the municipality under the condition ei = yi + xi. For all other municipalities
in the region, the land development is summarized by X−i =
∑
j =i xj. Thus, the overall
development of new land in the region is X = xi + X−i. When developing new areas,
municipalities have to seal additional surfaces in their territory. In this case, forest or
agricultural areas will be converted into residential or commercial areas. Typically, these
new areas are generously developed and will be less densely populated than areas in the
center of the municipalities (Section 3.1.4).
As mentioned in Section 3.1.5, one reason to develop new areas in the outer zone of
the municipality instead of recycling existing areas is the high demand for new attrac-
tive building land on the part of the households and ﬁrms. Therefore, it is assumed
that new land is developed in municipalities in order to attract a proportion of those
households, which are willing to move from one municipality to another municipality in
the considered region. The variable mi > 0 deﬁnes the number of households in munici-
pality i seeking for new building land within the region. In total, the number of regional
households, that are willing to migrate is given by M = ∑ni=1 mi. The settlement of new
households is associated with additional tax receipts of i > 0 per household. Accord-
ingly, the higher the expected number of movers or tax receipts are, the higher are the
incentives for the development of new residential areas and the more competitive is a
region. In this approach, the tax income or loss, caused by the migration of households
between municipalities in a region based on the individual share xi
X
= xi
xi+X−i of new land
a municipality develops, is:
Pi(xi, X−i) = i · ( xi
xi + X−i
· M − mi) (3.1)
If, for instance, there are two municipalities A and B in a region and only municipality
A develops new areas, i.e. X−A = xB = 0, all households seeking new building land in
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the region will settle in municipality A. The additional tax incomes for municipality A
would then be:
PA(xA, xB) = A · (xA
xA
· (mA + mB) − mA)
= A · mB
On the one hand, municipalities can attract households by increasing the amount
of new development areas. On the other hand, the development of new areas also
increases the infrastructure costs Si(xi) (e.g. waste and sewage disposal, street cleaning,
administration) by an amount of ci > 0 per new hectare xi:
Si(xi) = ci · xi (3.2)
As mentioned above, an alternative development strategy can be the recycling of inner
areas. The costs for developing inner areas are inﬂuenced by the structure of the spatial
areas and can be calculated by a given convex cost curve Ci(yi) for the inner development
yi, with C ′i(yi) > 0 and C ′′i (yi) ≥ 0. Furthermore, since yi = ei − xi any development
of new areas xi implicitly speciﬁes inner development of ei − xi. Thus, the costs for the
inner development given the development of xi new areas are given by Ci(ei − xi) and
it holds Ci(yi) = Ci(ei − xi).
The decision problem of the municipality is to choose an appropriate amount of new
areas and recycling of existing areas for a given demand. The main task for each munic-
ipality resulting from (3.1), (3.2), and the given cost function Ci(ei − xi) is to maximize
the total payoﬀ Ri of the individual land development:
Ri(xi, X−i) = Pi(xi, X−i) − Si(xi) − Ci(ei − xi) (3.3)
Inserting (3.1) and (3.2) into (3.3) leads to:
Ri(xi, X−i) =
xi
xi + X−i
· M · i − ci · xi − Ci(ei − xi) − mi · i (3.4)
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By derivating the formula with respect to xi one obtains the following necessary
condition of an inner solution for the Nash Equilibrium:
max
xi
Ri(xi, X−i) =⇒ dRi(xi, X−i)
dxi
!= 0
=⇒ xi + X−i − xi(xi + X−i)2 · M · li − ci + C
′
i(ei − xi) != 0
⇐⇒ X−i(xi + X−i)2 · M · li − ci + C
′(ei − xi) != 0 (3.5)
If all municipalities are homogeneous, the game is symmetric and l = li = lj, c = ci =
cj, m = mi = mj, e = ei = ej, C(.) = Ci(.) = Cj(.) holds for all i, j. If concentrating
on symmetric Nash Equilibria, i.e. x˜ = xi = xj and X˜−i = (n − 1) · x˜, Condition 3.5
simpliﬁes to:
=⇒ n − 1
n2
· M · 
x˜
+ C ′(e − x˜) − c = 0
⇐⇒ C ′(e − x˜) = c − n − 1
n2
· M · 
x˜
Resubstitution of M by n · m leads to:
=⇒ C ′(e − x˜) = c − n − 1
n
· m · 
x˜
The symmetric Nash Equilibrium is a strategy x˜ = xi each player chooses, and which
fulﬁlls the above condition. For instance, if there are no movers (m = 0) or no taxes
(l = 0), the infrastructure costs in a municipality should equal the marginal costs of
inner development. Due to C ′i(e − xi) > 0, also the right side of the condition is greater
than zero, and c − n−1
n
· m·
x˜
> 0 holds. This leads to the following property of the Nash
Equilibrium:
x˜ >
n − 1
n
· m · 
c
Hence, the number of municipalities, the number of movers, the tax incomes, and
the infrastructure costs inﬂuence the lower limit of the land development x˜. High tax
incomes and a high amount of movers increase this lower limit in the Nash Equilibrium,
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while higher infrastructure costs decrease the limit of new land development within the
model.
In order to analyse how a small change of m aﬀects the value of x˜, the implicit function
H(.) can be written down:
H(n, e,m, l, c, x˜) := C ′(e − x˜) + n − 1
n
· m · 
x˜
− c = 0 (3.6)
Using this function H(.), it is possible to answer how changes in m aﬀect the corre-
sponding x˜. Since H(.) = 0 the implicit function theorem applies and one obtains:
dx˜
dm
= −
∂H(.)
∂m
∂H(.)
∂x˜
= −
n−1
n2 · lx˜
−C ′′(e − x˜) − n−1
n
· m·l
x˜2
=
n−1
n2 · lx˜
C ′′(e − x˜) + n−1
n
· m·l
x˜2
> 0
This shows that an increase of the population dynamics by an increasing number of
movers m in a region leads to an additional new land development. Hence, the higher
population dynamics are, the less areas should be developed in the inner zone of the
municipality. The impact of increasing n (assume for simplicity that n is a continuous
variable) can be analyzed similarly by using the implicit function H(.) and applying
again the implicit function theorem:
dx˜
dn
= −
∂H(.)
∂n
∂H(.)
∂x˜
= −
2
n2 · m·lx˜
−C ′′(e − x˜) − n−1
n
· m·l
x˜2
=
2
n2 · m·lx˜
C ′′(e − x˜) + n−1
n
· m·l
x˜2
> 0
Hence, for increasing discrete n the land development x˜ is positive and an increasing
number of municipalities within a region, competing for households and ﬁrms, increases
the amount of new land being developed.
70
3 Decision Making in Local Land Development
The Pareto Optimum for the region can be calculated by maximizing the total outcome
of all municipalities in the region. This can be done by the calculation of the optimal
new land development x1, .., xn in all municipalities:
max
x1,..,xn
n∑
j=1
Rj(xj, X−j) ⇐⇒ max
x1,..,xn
n∑
j=1
( xj
xj + X−j
· M · lj − cj · xj − Cj(ej − xj) − mj · lj)
Representatively for each municipality in the region, the necessary condition in the
Pareto Optimum will be considered for municipality i. From the perspective of a mu-
nicipality i the overall payoﬀ of all municipalities will be maximized if:
d
∑n
j=1 Rj(xj, X−j)
dxi
!= 0 (3.7)
The derivation leads to:
⇐⇒ X
∗
−i
(x∗i + X∗−i)2
· M · i − ci + C ′i(ei − x∗i ) +
∑
j =i
(
−x∗j
(x∗j + X∗−j)2
· M · j) = 0
If the tax incomes are the same in each municipality (l = li = lj) it holds:
C ′i(ei − x∗i ) = ci
Hence, if the municipalities are homogeneous regarding the taxes, the marginal costs
for the inner development should equal the infrastructure cost for new land development
and each municipality develops the amount of xi = x∗i ,∀i that fulﬁlls this condition.
In case the municipalities have diﬀerent tax incomes per household or ﬁrm, a more
divagating land development between the muncipalities can be expected due to the
diﬀerent tax incomes.
If the game is symmetric and the municipalities are homogeneous, it holds c = ci = cj,
e = ei = ej, and C(.) = Ci(.) = Cj(.),∀i, j. Thus, the land development x∗ = xi = xj is
the same in each municipality and it holds:
=⇒ C ′(e − x∗) = c
71
3 Decision Making in Local Land Development
Hence, in the Pareto Optimum each municipality develops the same amount of xi =
x∗,∀i that fulﬁlls the condition that the marginal costs for recycling the inner areas
equal the infrastructure costs of new areas. The cost relation between inner and outer
development and the spatial structure determines how much inner area will be developed.
If the infrastructure costs for the development of new areas are high, more inner areas
should be developed. The comparison of the resulting equation in the Pareto Optimum
and the equation in the Nash Equilibrium leads to:
C ′(e − x˜) + n − 1
n
· m · 
x˜
= C ′(e − x∗) (3.8)
Because the term n−1
n
· m·
x˜
is greater zero, the equation shows that C ′(e − x∗) >
C ′(e − x˜). The variable y˜ = e − x˜ determines how many areas should be recycled in the
inner areas in the Nash Equilibrium and y∗ = e − x∗ the amount of recycled areas in
the Pareto Optimum. Due to the assumption that the cost function is convex, less new
land should be developed in the Pareto-optimal solution than in the Nash Equilibrium,
and more ﬂoor space in the inner areas y∗ > y˜. Figure 3.2 illustrates this relationship
and shows that the higher the number of municipalities, the tax incomes or number of
movers is (summarized by Δ = n−1
n
· m·
x˜
), the higher is the diﬀerence between the Nash
Equilibrium and the Pareto Optimum.
The resulting conditions of the proposed model outline the land development dilemma
and give an idea how the structure of spatial areas, demand for ﬂoor space and the
community context will foster urban sprawl. The simpliﬁed approach of the model
also reﬂects some basic aspects that may be observable in real land development (Sec-
tion 3.1). In order to adapt the model for regions with Type 2 or Type 3 municipalities,
higher population dynamics can be modeled by increasing the number of households
searching for new building land. The prosperity of the households can inﬂuence the ex-
pected tax incomes. Population density and centrality of a municipality determine the
average infrastructure costs. For instance, centralized municipalities with high densities
(Type 1) tend to have low costs for the maintenance of the infrastructure per hectare
(Section 3.1.3). However, due to low population dynamics, municipalities of Type 1
and Type 4 tend to have more development options available in the inner area and
more ﬂexible development strategies. Furthermore, the analysis shows that the more
municipalities compete in a region, the more diﬀers the land development in the Nash
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Figure 3.2: Theoretical Solutions and Abatement Costs
Equilibrium from the Pareto Optimum. Accordingly, Feiock et al. (2005) as well as
Olberding (2002) found that the number of local municipalities in a region has a nega-
tive eﬀect on the probability of collective action that is necessary to solve metropolitan
conﬂicts.
3.4 Cooperation Concepts in Land Development
Case studies have shown, that by realizing coordinated land development plans amongst
municipalities, the dilemma situation could be solved and more eﬃcient land develop-
ment plans in ecological and economical terms could be established (for an overview
see Einig, 2008). However, this makes cooperation between municipalities necessary. In
political science, forms of cooperation are considered to be the third way of social con-
trol after market-based and hierarchical approaches (Section 2.1.2). Usually, forms of
cooperation are classiﬁed into coordination, negotiation and mediation (Powell, 1996).
Issues of metropolitan governance and cooperative agreements have already been ana-
lyzed by researchers since the 1990s, without generating a comprehensive understanding
of the conditions of how to achieve sustainable intercommunal cooperation. First studies
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that integrate diverse perspectives on development competition and cooperation solu-
tions has been started in the last years (e.g. Feiock, 2002). The coordination of regional
land development plans by establishing collaboration between municipalities have been
proved as a solution to avoid the high usage of new land and has been realized in many
regions (Einig, 2003; Spannowsky and Borchert, 2003).
Joint actions of the local units are feasible by consolidating functions of the local
authorities, by establishing horizontal interlocal policy agreements and by overlaying
nested services enabling a collective action (e.g. a joint municipal land development,
Feiock and Carr, 2001; Thurmaier and Wood, 2002). However, a voluntary collabora-
tion is not easy to establish in practice. Considering governmental fragmentation, it is
often diﬃcult to give concerted responses to problems like interjurisdictional competition
(Downs, 1994; Katz, 2000). In many cases, self-organizing local units are incapable to
deal with existing spillover problems (Lowery, 2001; Olberding, 2002) and a cooperative
solution is necessary to coordinate the regional land use planning (Einig, 2008).
Cooperation concepts in land development can be established in many ways. On the
one hand, legal agreements for coordinated land development are initiated by voting and
participation procedures (in larger municipalities with a more complex administrative
machinery), or by decisions of few elected oﬃcials (in small municipalities with more
hierarchical structures). On the other hand, the coordination of land development can
also be initiated on a voluntary basis. In the latter case, the institutionalization of coop-
eration is possible on the basis of weak-tied, non-hierarchical relationships that represent
voluntary cooperation projects without legal commitments. In Germany, new weak-tied
forms of cooperation on the regional level have been developed over the last years (see
Gawron, 2004). The binding intensity is relatively low and legal agreements between
the municipalities are very rare. In contrast to a hierarchical, vertical coordination of
land development managed by a supervisory authority, the new approaches are based on
the horizontal coordination principle. Weak-tied cooperations are often a preliminary
stage of subsequent more binding relationships that involve binding agreements in order
to strengthen the cooperation between local units (Gawron, 2004). Thus, the level of
institutionalization is interpretable as a dynamic process with diﬀerent developmental
levels that are associated with changes in the complexity of the interdependencies be-
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tween the municipalities. The regional context in which these interdependencies occur
is determined by the characteristics of the framework presented in Section 3.1.
A cooperative solution requires a continuous interaction between the participants to
establish agreements on structures and binding decisions of the group (Ostrom, 1990;
Ostrom et al., 1994). Municipalities with a homogeneous community context and sim-
ilar neighboring jurisdictions are more likely to start a cooperation including a higher
interdependency due to the repetition of the interaction. By contrast, the more het-
erogeneous the community context is, the more diﬃcult is it to foster voluntary inter-
communal agreements even though no cost paradox exists. Moreover, in metropolitan
areas with more frequent interaction the establishment of regional cooperation is more
likely. Thus, whether a collective action by a coordinated land development is possible,
depends mainly on the structure of the horizontal policy framework (Section 3.1.2).
The more political instruments and initiatives are combined to achieve a regional co-
ordination of the development plans in such a scenario, the more complex is the resulting
horizontal network (Einig, 2008). By analyzing regional coordination in diﬀerent case
studies, Einig proposes a framework for regional land development in Germany, that
consists of a multistage phase model (Figure 3.3). In the stage Regional Data Collec-
tion, the collection of all municipal data in the region is necessary to estimate the future
demand for ﬂoor space and the population dynamics. In the next step, the municipalities
have to negotiate the regional goals and agreements. Based on the target agreement,
the regional planning can design diﬀerent regional land development plans. When an
appropriate development plan is identiﬁed and realized, the regional planning has the
task to monitor the land development in the region. The design of the framework for
regional coordination is similar to the proposed TDC framework (Section 2.4), for in-
stance regarding the data collection and monitoring, although the framework for regional
coordination focuses only on coordination of the municipal development.
For the establishment of cooperation concepts, joint gains are essential (Steinacker,
2004). In case of a joint land development plan, the gains would be the reduced in-
frastructure costs of denser and more compact areas. A basic component when coordi-
nating land development is the establishment of rules how to divide the gains between
the involved municipalities. The coordination of development plans can reduce regional
disparities in tax incomes and can weaken the competition for new development areas.
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Figure 3.3: Framework for Regional Coordination (Einig, 2008)
Problems can occur if the municipalities are heterogeneous and some municipalities have
more power than others, e.g. in urban-suburban conﬂicts (Wuschansky and Ko¨nig, 2006).
Furthermore, if many municipalities are participating, the fair division of costs and in-
comes is very complex (Einig, 2008). However, Wuschansky and Ko¨nig have shown that
in most regional coordination projects in Germany, two or three municipalities are in-
volved. Due to the low number of participants, the transaction costs in these projects are
not very problematic. The division of the tax incomes could follow simple rules (e.g. the
proportional amount of new development areas) or could be negotiated in each speciﬁc
use case. Nevertheless, these rules should be considered as fair by the participants (see
Brams and Taylor, 1996). However, this makes the collection of required data and a
further collaboration of all regional municipalities necessary.
The transaction costs of bargaining a cooperative solution are crucial for the estab-
lishment of self-organized cooperative solutions. Einig (2005) as well as Spannowsky and
Borchert (2003) emphasize that a cooperative solution is only feasible if the payoﬀs of
the agreement are higher than those of a non-cooperative solution. The larger the gains
from an agreement, the more likely the transaction costs will be outweighed (Libecap,
1994; Ostrom, 1990; Lubell, 2007). Feiock (2007) distinguishes between four sources
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of transaction costs to coordinate the actions of local authorities: information costs,
agency costs, negotiation costs and enforcement costs—all these costs must remain low
in order to enhance the probability of cooperation and in order to avoid the development
dilemma. Furthermore, a cooperative solution in building land politics is only possible
if the transaction costs can be reduced (Einig, 2003; Gillette, 2001).
Information costs comprise the costs to inform all participants about the possible
outcomes of the cooperation. Information asymmetry and incomplete information can
impede recognition of potential gains from cooperative land development and coopera-
tion between municipalities. The community context of the framework mainly aﬀects
the information costs of a joint action in land development. In municipalities with
large policy networks (Type 1), gathering necessary spatial data is more expensive than
within small municipalities. In regions with heterogeneous municipalities, information
costs seem to be higher than in homogeneous municipalities with common interests (Sec-
tion 3.1.2). Furthermore, the number of municipalities and the distance between them
can have an impact on the information costs as well (Feiock, 2007).
In case public oﬃcials do not properly represent the interests of their constituents,
principal-agent problems might arise and the likelihood of cooperative agreements de-
creases. Hence, the characteristics of the vertical policy network inﬂuence the amount
of the arising agent cost in land development. For example, constituents will face higher
taxes due to increasing infrastructure costs of non-cooperative land development ini-
tiated by their agents. Next to costs caused by the agreement negotiation, costs for
dividing the joint beneﬁts between the parties are also created. A fair division of the
gains tends to be more problematic between heterogeneous municipalities than between
homogeneous municipalities when both partners have similar bargaining strengths. If
municipalities have diﬀerent types (e.g. Type 1 and Type 4), it has to be negotiated how
the beneﬁts of the joint land development plan should be divided because their basic
municipal criteria tend to be less homogeneous.
Enforcement costs are the costs for monitoring and enforcing the agreement. The
costs depend on the characteristics of the horizontal policy network and might be re-
duced when the contracting municipalities make repeated creditable commitments to
each other over long periods of time. However, the characteristics of vertical policy net-
works and preferences of constituencies or other interest groups should also be analyzed
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more systematically. The following discussion facilitates the analysis of new collective
action frameworks that describe the decision making processes in land development and
the eﬀects of the cost paradox, as well as the existence of a development dilemma.
3.5 Summary and Discussion
The presented models reﬂect only partially the complex process of land use decisions.
The proposed approaches mainly analyze how the structure of the spatial area, the de-
mand for ﬂoor space, and the community can be modeled and how the cost paradox
might inﬂuence land use decisions. The decision making framework was introduced to
get a deeper understanding of land use decisions in local municipalities. For instance,
in small municipalities the inﬂuence of vertical policy networks might have a higher in-
ﬂuence on land use decisions of the local representatives than in large municipalities.
Decision makers in small municipalities tend to have a lack of instruments and tools
to develop land use plans that are eﬃcient from an economic perspective. Due to the
fact that land consumption is caused by small municipalities, the establishment of deci-
sion support tools and the training of the local decision makers in these municipalities
might support more eﬃcient land development in ecologic terms. As mentioned in this
chapter, land development, which is eﬃcient from an economic view, might reduce the
development of new areas and, thus, counteract the ecological problem caused by urban
sprawl.
This example highlights the importance of analyzing decision situations of local au-
thorities and the timing of their decisions within this framework. Recent studies only
provide limited views on decisions in land development and possible collective action
problems. The framework serves as a basis for further analyses and a more interdisci-
plinary view on the topic. The characteristics of the framework have a crucial impact
on the decision situation and the decision making of local authorities. It was shown
that two eﬀects can occur when local actors make decisions, the cost paradox and the
development dilemma. Both eﬀects can hinder intercommunal cooperation if competi-
tion exists, reinforce extensive land use and, thus, lead to urban sprawl. The decision
making within this framework was discussed and it was shown how the structure of
the framework, which classiﬁes regions and municipalities, inﬂuences municipal decision
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making. The separation allows general statements about diﬀerent eﬀects on land use
decisions in diﬀerent types of municipalities from an interdisciplinary point of view.
Figure 3.4 depicts the framework and the integration of the decision chain in the land
development process that entails the new land usage in a speciﬁc planning period. The
framework for land use decisions highlights the link between structural aspects of munic-
ipalities and the municipal decision making. The calculation of land development plans,
the development of new areas, and the local land use decisions of households and ﬁrms
delineate the main decision steps. The calculation of alternative land development plans
is the ﬁrst step in the land use decision chain. The design of alternative development
plans is mainly inﬂuenced by the structure of the spatial areas in the inner and outer
zones of a municipality. Depending on the available area and the demand for new ﬂoor
space, categorized into diﬀerent segments like commercial or residential areas, a munic-
ipality might consider diﬀerent development plans as feasible. Internal conﬂicts in the
vertical network, including personal interests of local representatives, interest groups,
or land owners, can inﬂuence which of the options are worked out and presented in
more detail. The lack of cost transparency combined with bounded rationality of deci-
sion makers has an impact on the calculation of the associated costs and can raise the
likelihood of a cost paradox in this step.
Alternative development plans are the result of the ﬁrst step and represent the deci-
sion making basis for local representatives in the next step. For local representatives,
the horizontal policy network and the structure of policy networks within the region
play a more important role. Due to legal agreements and relationships between local
representatives within a region, some development options that should be preferred con-
sidering economic criteria are sometimes not feasible. Therefore, municipalities with
many established relationships and agreements might have fewer development options.
Furthermore, the community context deﬁnes the balance of power within the regional
municipalities. Well located municipalities and municipalities with a lot of property are
in better negotiation positions and have more feasible strategies. Due to collective deci-
sions amongst the municipalities, typical dilemma situations could occur in this step. By
using game-theoretical models, diﬀerent aspects of land use decisions can be analyzed.
In order to solve the collective decision problem, the initialization of cooperative con-
cepts and the strategic interaction between the municipalities are necessary. The more
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Figure 3.4: Framework of Land Use Decisions
serious the problem caused by high population dynamics is, the larger are the gains
from solving it and the greater is the likelihood of a coordinated land development. As
in other common pool resource situations, dramatic welfare losses resulting from the
development dilemma can be expected depending on the speciﬁc scenario.
In the third step of the decision chain, households and ﬁrms make location and land
use decisions. Based on the available areas within the region, households migrate to new
municipalities and build new houses, and ﬁrms put up new large buildings, respectively.
The usage of new areas is the output of this decision making process. The outcome
directly modiﬁes the initial situation of the planning process in later planning periods
and also reﬂects changes of the framework. The framework can help to understand how
local authorities in decentralized systems of governance compete and cooperate with
respect to the use of land. Furthermore, the framework for land use decisions can serve
as a basis for other modeling approaches, especially for the design of decision support
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tools. When modeling an information system and decision support tool, the focus should
be on the structure of spatial areas, demand for ﬂoor space, and the community context.
Based on the proposed framework, in the next chapter, the modeling and implementation
of a regional information system and decision support tool that facilitates the municipal
decision making is shown.
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Development
The variety of problems regarding the municipal decision making in land usage high-
lighted in Chapter 3 underpins the need for new methodologies and tools to support
these decisions. The presented decision making framework (see Section 3.1) strength-
ens the necessity to design new, more comprehensive decision support systems (DSS)
that support local planners with respect to policy making and spatial planning. Modular
components of decision support tools could cover interdisciplinary facets of the proposed
framework and help to integrate the tools for speciﬁc use cases. Furthermore, the imple-
mentation of a system of tradable development certiﬁcates, as discussed in Chapter 2,
implies additional requirements for such a system. Analyzing the interaction of real
world actors with such a new decision support system in ﬁeld studies or experiments
(see Chapter 5) provides insights into decision making processes and can help to identify
further requirements for designing new, more appropriate tools or to redesign existing
systems to support land use decisions. In this chapter, an overview about Decision
Support Systems for land usage in Germany will be given, and a model as well as an
implementation of a decision support system that focuses on a TDC scenario will be
introduced. The chapter will close with the application of the system in the Spiel.Raum
ﬁeld study, as well as a summary of the ﬁndings.
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4.1 Overview of Decision Support Tools for Land
Development
The development of tools that support policy-making for a sustainable management
of land has been progressing in the last couple of years (for an overview see Matthies
et al., 2007). The approaches include the modeling of ecological systems, as well as
of economic and human subsystems (e.g. social and policy networks). Due to complex
interdependencies of socio-political, ecological and economic aspects in environmental
quality management, new environmental decision support systems (EDSS) or spatial
decision support systems (SDSS) for spatial planning have been developed in the recent
years. Interactive computer based information systems utilize environmental models
and data, and provide user friendly graphical interfaces. Thus, the tools facilitate cost
calculation and improve the decision making of local decision makers. With an EDSS, the
decision maker can compare environmental scenarios, e.g. the actual state of a scenario
in an use case, with the optimal theoretical state calculated by the EDSS. Especially in
Germany, many EDSS and SDSS have been implemented and applied in regional ﬁeld
studies in the last few years (for an overview see Preuß and Floating, 2009). The next
section will present the functionality and the modeling of some of these software tools.
4.1.1 Was-kostet-mein-baugebiet.de
Gutsche (2009) implemented diﬀerent information systems to support the decision mak-
ing of local representatives and private households. Local decision makers can compare
diﬀerent development scenarios and the software calculates the proceeds and costs, as
well as the associated development of areas. The online software tool is free of charge
and is available via the internet platform www.was-kostet-mein-baugebiet.de.
A particular module allows the user to calculate living and mobility costs, and facili-
tates land-use decisions of private households (www.womo-rechner.de). Another module
provides estimates of the infrastructure costs of diﬀerent development options. This
module focuses on the follow-up costs of development scenarios and deliberately avoids
the comparison of the technical infrastructure costs and possible municipal tax incomes.
A comparison typically overestimates the expected incomes of new development areas
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as mentioned in Chapter 2. There are two versions of the module: a free internet
application and an oﬀline excel tool.
Figure 4.1: Speciﬁcation of a Scenario with the Tool (Data Input)
The online tool demonstrates the main features of local land development and allows
municipal decision makers to make a rough calculation of follow-up costs of diﬀerent
development options (Figure 4.1). The main purpose of the calculation is to simulate
scenarios by deﬁning how many gaps should be closed, and how many areas should be
developed in the inner and outer areas in a municipality by setting an average building
density for each area. Based on these inputs and reference values, the software dis-
plays the running costs for streets, sewage systems, water pipes and power supply lines
(Figure 4.2).
For a more detailed calculation and a comparison of diﬀerent planning scenarios,
Gutsche (2009) recommends the oﬀline tool. The excel tool precisely estimates the
follow-up costs for maintaining the technical and social infrastructure, and also inte-
grates a model for population forecasts. The software itself is also free of charge and
facilitates the design of municipal and regional land development plans. However, due
to its complexity, the usage of the complete module is only possible in combination with
consulting services of the software provider. In contrast to the online tool, the user
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Figure 4.2: Running Costs when Realizing the Speciﬁed Scenario (Data Output)
can deﬁne diﬀerent development areas and the software calculates the total technical
infrastructure costs, as well as the amount of traﬃc areas. When there is no detailed
data available, the software provides benchmark values.
4.1.2 Fokosbw
The Institute for Applied Research of the Hochschule fu¨r Wirtschaft und Umwelt Nu¨r-
tingen-Geislingen and the STEG Stadtentwicklungs GmbH Stuttgart developed, in co-
operation with eight municipalities, a practice-oriented software tool to estimate the cost
eﬀectiveness of development projects. The cooperation with local actors from specialized
disciplines, which are involved in the land development chain, facilitated the design of
the software tool. This included the development of concepts for modeling the EDSS
and the identiﬁcation of necessary requirements for a practical implementation. Fur-
thermore, based on an empirical study in 25 regions, characteristic values for diﬀerent
types of municipalities were derived. The classiﬁcation was based on the calculation of
the diﬀerent costs and incomes, as well as on the structure of the spatial areas in the
municipalities.
85
4 A Decision Support System for Land Development
The design and usability of the software interface was also evaluated by the local
decision makers and the feedback was used to redesign the platform. In addition to an
oﬀline version of the software, an internet platform is available (www.fokosbw.de).
Figure 4.3: Speciﬁcation of a Scenario by Area-related Inputs
The software calculates diﬀerent development projects and compares them over a
time horizon of 25 years. Municipalities can enter basic area-related data of the city
planning (Figure 4.3). The software then calculates the associated costs. The costs are
divided into 18 cost types, e.g. preparatory costs, development costs, running costs of
the technical infrastructure, education costs, ﬁnancing costs, or costs for buying and
incomes from selling building land (Figure 4.4). The municipalities that participated
in the study emphasized the importance of integrating ﬁnancing costs and incomes
associated with the building land (Hauerken et al., 2009). In contrast, education costs are
rated as less important. For the calculation of social infrastructure costs, the estimated
population growth is included in the analysis. On the basis of few data, the software
calculates diﬀerent costs of diﬀerent development projects, allows the comparison of
the projects and, thus, facilitates the decision making of local representatives. Most
municipalities that were involved in this study appreciated the application of the tool
because it enhances the cost transparency of the diﬀerent development projects and
improves municipal decision making. Hauerken et al. emphasize that the success of the
tool and the realization of cost eﬃcient regional land development, also depends on the
structure of the horizontal and vertical policy network.
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Figure 4.4: Output of Diﬀerent Costs in the Speciﬁed Scenario
4.1.3 LEANkom
LEANkom is a software tool that aims at enhancing the transparency of costs and in-
comes of the municipal land development. The following institutions participated in the
application-oriented, interdisciplinary project LEAN2: Institut fu¨r Landes- und Stad-
tentwicklungsforschung GmbH, Stadt- und Verkehrsplanungsbu¨ro Planersocieta¨t, Insti-
tut fu¨r Raumplanung TU Dortmund (IRPUD), Ingenieurgesellschaft GmbH, Lehrstuhl
fu¨r Planungstheorie und Stadtentwicklung RWTH Aachen, and nine municipalities as
partners from practice. The implementation of the DSS is based on studies analyzing
municipal decision processes from a theoretical perspective and on empirical case stud-
ies (e.g. Feldmann and Klemme, 2007; Krause-Junk, 2008). Furthermore, the authors
have announced future versions of the software that will also support the analysis of
communal interdependencies to facilitate a coordinated regional land development (see
Preuß and Floating, 2009).
The two basic aims of the project are to design an user-friendly tool and to develop
a detailed modeling of the municipal decision processes. A high user-friendliness can
be realized by implementing a simple user interface that allows an easy data entry
and data output. The detailed modeling of the municipal decision situation requires
the speciﬁcation of diﬀerent development projects by entering data into the platform
(see Figure 4.5). The main challenge is to implement a simple user interface with few
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input ﬁelds, which is also able to describe the structure of spatial areas with reasonable
accuracy.
Figure 4.5: LEANkom Software
In LEANkom, the data is distinguished into basic data, municipal data and project
data. Basic data are for instance property taxes or the amount of municipal ﬁnancial
compensation. Municipal data comprises more detailed information about the munic-
ipalities (e.g. level of income or number of train stops). Project data is a case-by-case
description of municipal development projects on the basis of land development plans.
To facilitate the data input, the software also provides an interface to import GIS-data
of the plans. The software supports the calculation of the proﬁtability of individual
municipal projects, as well as the ﬁnancial impacts of speciﬁc land development plans
that result from the combination of diﬀerent municipal projects. The costs are divided
into development costs, education and social costs, ﬁnancial costs and taxes within a
time horizon of 20 years. Furthermore, population data is used to calculate the educa-
tion and social costs based on the degree of utilization of facilities and municipal taxes
(Krause-Junk, 2008). After the speciﬁcation of the scenario, the software displays the
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resulting incomes and costs on a clear and transparent output page. Furthermore, the
export of the data to Microsoft Excel is supported.
4.1.4 Fin.30 - Fla¨chen intelligent nutzen
Similar to the above described projects, the goal of the project Fin.30 is to make costs
of diﬀerent development plans more transparent to decision makers. The result of the
project is an excel tool for local decision makers based on the city planning that was
tested in some case studies. The model includes location speciﬁc characteristics and
calculates both one-time and running costs of the social and technical infrastructure.
Furthermore, the model distinguishes technical infrastructure costs between inner and
outer areas. Based on the estimated population growth, the software estimates the
costs of the social infrastructure. Due to the fact that the land will be converted from
agricultural into new building land, the model also considers increases in land values.
Tax incomes resulting from the settlement of new households are not modeled. The
software discounts all annual incomes and costs of a 15-year land development plan and
outputs the ranking of diﬀerent land development plans.
4.1.5 Regionales Portfoliomanagement
The realization of a more eﬃcient regional land development is the central focus of
the research project “Regionales Portfoliomanagement” supported by the Institut fu¨r
Stadtbauwesen und Stadtverkehr der RWTH Aachen, the empirca Qualitative Markt-
forschung, Stadt- und Strukturforschung GmbH, as well as the Forschungsinstitut fu¨r
O¨kosystemanalyse und -bewertung. Diﬀerent cooperation concepts have been analyzed
in the region Bonn/Rhein-Sieg/Ahrweiler. Coordinated land development in the region
is supposed to avoid the competition between municipalities and to reduce the negative
ﬁscal impacts. An existing GIS-based information system has been extended by integrat-
ing additional modules for the calculation of costs and for the coordination of regional
planning. The usage of the cost module allows the calculation of ﬁnancial impacts of the
regional development on the basis of reference values for a time horizon of 20 years. The
regional information system can also be used to monitor the regional land development
or to integrate additional policy instruments. Furthermore, diﬀerent regional develop-
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ment strategies have been compared and evaluated in the case study by analyzing social,
economic and ecological consequences of the regional land development.
4.2 Designing a Decision Support System for Land Use
Decisions
In this section, three diﬀerent designs of a decision support system for land use decisions
are presented. To facilitate the task of selecting appropriate land development plans by
local representatives, an adequate design of the DSS is necessary. First, a basic model
will be presented which then will be extended to be used in the context of tradable
development certiﬁcates. The extension of the DSS was applied in the Spiel.Raum ﬁeld
study (see Section 4.5) and was implemented as a part of the ﬁeld experiment with the
local representatives, which will be described in Chapter 5. The third model will extend
the design of the DSS by considering competition for households and applies the game-
theoretical model from Section 3.3.2. A comparison of the implemented DSS and the
other decision support systems will be given at the end of this chapter in Section 4.6.
In order to model the decision situation of a municipal representative in the DSS, many
variables come into question depending on the speciﬁc characteristics of the proposed
framework. This chapter focuses on the decision making of municipal representatives,
while location decisions of the households are only considered indirectly. As described
in Chapter 3, the municipality type and the decision making of local representatives are
inﬂuenced by diﬀerent criteria. Basic criteria to deﬁne the municipality type and the
community context are, for instance, population, number of employees, or the budget of
the municipality. For instance, a criterion for measuring the prosperity is the municipal
budget per capita or the unemployment rate, which can be entered into the database
or can be imported from other information systems. Furthermore, an Environmental
Decision Support System for land development should apply criteria that deﬁne the
structure of the areas and the demand for ﬂoor space to provide a realistic basis for the
decision making in municipalities.
For a more detailed description of municipal decision situations, the structure of the
municipal territory, the settlement and traﬃc areas, as well as the associated ﬂoor space
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areas will be modeled. Table 4.1 shows the structure of spatial areas, which is the basis
of the EDSS models described in the following sections (see Statistisches Bundesamt,
2008). The territory of a municipality is divided into settlement and traﬃc areas, as
well as open space. Settlement and traﬃc areas include sealed surfaces as well as the
associated free spaces. Further areas, such as graveyards, recreation and plant areas also
belong to this category. Open space is deﬁned as agricultural area, such as cropland or
farmland, forest, and water area.
Settlement Area (sealed)
+ Settlement Area (unsealed)
+ Plant Area (no mining land)
+ Recreation Area
+ Graveyards
= Settlement Area
+ Traﬃc Area
= Settlement and Traﬃc Area
+ Open Space
= Municipal Territory
Table 4.1: Structure of Spatial Areas
While the settlement and traﬃc areas reﬂect the structure of spatial areas, the ﬂoor
space is used as a measure to model the municipal demand for living space. Settlement
and traﬃc area per capita is an indicator for space consumption, mainly inﬂuenced by
the given ﬂoor space indices and site occupancy indices. Floor space is the total size of
all ﬂoors of a building on a plot area. The total ﬂoor area of buildings on a settlement
area can vary depending on the Floor Space Index (FSI).1 If the FSI is 3.0, the total
ﬂoor area of a multi-level building can be up to three times the sealed settlement area
of a plot.
A municipal land development plan deﬁnes the conversion of open space into new
settlement and traﬃc areas and determines structural changes of the spatial area. Fur-
thermore, the land development plan of a municipality is based on the demand for ﬂoor
space within the respective time horizon. Typically, land development plans are drawn
for periods of 10 to 15 years. This time horizon is manageable for most municipalities
1In some states, the term Floor Area Ratio (FAR) is also used.
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and similar time horizons (15 to 25 years) are also used in other decision support tools
which have been presented in Section 4.1.
Furthermore, the decision support system used in the ﬁeld study assumes that the
time horizon is divided into planning periods, in which adaptations of land development
plans are possible. Due to the slow adaptation of land development plans and the plans’
long validity, longer planning periods than e.g. in emissions trading schemes seem to be
appropriate. As mentioned in Section 3.1, it depends on the speciﬁc municipality type
how often land development plans are revised. Hence, planning periods between one and
ﬁve years appropriately reﬂect the decision making processes in municipalities, which
are inﬂuenced by changes of the policy networks and the demand for ﬂoor space.
For the calculation or forecast of the requested ﬂoor space, the population development
and the development of living space per capita can be used. The demand for commercial
ﬂoor space can be determined by calculating the development of the working population
and the predicted ﬂoor space per worker. In the following, the development goal of
municipality i in a planning period j is deﬁned by the total amount of new ﬂoor space
e¯ij. The overall development goal of municipality i over all periods is ¯¯ei =
∑
j e¯ij. The
demand for new areas is determined by ﬂoor space, whereas the land development is
deﬁned by the increase of settlement and traﬃc areas. In the next section, the relation
of the two area types will be described by showing exemplary development options for
a municipality.
4.2.1 Speciﬁcation of Land Development Plans by Development
Options
The task of a municipal decision maker is to design an appropriate land development
plan to cover the demand for ﬂoor space in a certain planning period. Based on the
current spatial structure of the municipality, a land development plan can be deﬁned
by a set of development options that restructure the areas of the municipality. By
realizing a development option and restructuring spatial areas, a municipality can cover
the demand for ﬂoor space by households and ﬁrms.
Municipalities can use two categories of development options to provide ﬂoor space:
Development options that determine the new land development in the outer area by
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converting open space into new settlement and traﬃc areas, and development options
that reuse or extend the usage of existing settlement and traﬃc areas in the inner areas
without developing new land. The delimitation of the types is modeled according to
§13a BauGB, which deﬁnes development plans for an internal development of munici-
palities. Therefore, the development of new areas for external development deﬁnes the
development of areas on the edge of a settlement. For a further categorization in the
DSS, it will be distinguished between ﬁve diﬀerent development option types:
• Recycling of brownﬁelds (in the inner area)
• Increase of ﬂoor space indices (in the inner area)
• Closing of gaps (in the inner area)
• Redevelopment of existing settlement and traﬃc areas (in the inner area)
• Development of new areas (in the outer areas)
In each municipality, a set L of development options is available from which a subset K
is selected for a land development plan in a speciﬁc scenario. Each selected development
option k ∈ K of a municipality i is characterized by the provision of νijk hectares ﬂoor
space in planning period j. The speciﬁc provision of ﬂoor space can be determined
for diﬀerent planning periods. This is the case if large new development areas in the
outer area provide ﬂoor space over a long time horizon and cover the demand of many
planning periods. Thereby, the sum of ﬂoor space provided by the options over all
planning periods is limited by the maximum amount of ﬂoor space ν˜ik, which an option
can provide:
∑
j
νijk ≤ ν˜ik (4.1)
Furthermore, the total amount of ﬂoor space, which the selected development options
provide in a planning period j is given by:
ν¯ij =
∑
k
νijk (4.2)
Typically, the maximum FSI inﬂuences the building density of development options
and the building density is higher in the inner areas than in the outer areas of a munici-
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pality. This is due to the fact that the usage of the inner areas is more intense. A higher
ﬂoor space index in the inner area allows a municipality to provide more ﬂoor space, e.g.
by closing a gap, than in outer areas with a lower ﬂoor space index. Furthermore, dif-
ferences regarding the type and the degree of building and land use are being neglected
by this tool, and new ﬂoor space in the inner and in the outer areas is regarded as being
of equal value.
4.2.2 Structure of the Spatial Areas
Municipalities have diﬀerent development options, which determine changes of the spa-
tial structure of the municipal territory while covering the demand for ﬂoor space. Typi-
cally, development options in the inner area do not change the total amount of settlement
and traﬃc areas. They only restructure a speciﬁc area. In contrast, the development
of new areas increases the amount of settlement and traﬃc areas. For the deﬁnition of
development options, the speciﬁc area, which is linked to the quantity of the provided
ﬂoor space (Section 4.2.1), has to be speciﬁed.
A development option k is associated with total changes σ¯ik in the spatial areas in
municipality i (e.g. the increase in settlement and traﬃc areas). Changes in the settle-
ment and traﬃc areas caused by a development option in a speciﬁc planning period j
in municipality i are summarized by σijk. Therefore, the total land development of all
development options in a planning period j
σ¯ij =
∑
k
σijk (4.3)
is the amount of new areas that has to be developed in order to provide ν¯ij ﬂoor space in
this period. Thus, the average realized ﬂoor space index τij = ν¯ijσ¯ij depends on the types
of the selected development options. In case the options are not realized completely in
one planning period, the amount of ﬂoor space provided in a planning period is divided
by the maximum amount to calculate the proportional share νijk
ν˜ik
of total settlement and
traﬃc areas σ˜ik:
σijk =
νijk
ν˜ik
· σ˜ik (4.4)
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This calculation emphasizes the connection between settlement and traﬃc areas as
a measurement for new land development, and the ﬂoor space area as a measurement
for the provision of living and working space. By summarizing the new settlement and
traﬃc areas of all realized development options within the planning horizon, the total
land development of a municipality calculates to
¯¯σi =
∑
k
∑
j
σijk . (4.5)
The realized land development plan is associated with diﬀerent costs and incomes that
are based on the individual costs and incomes of each development option.
4.2.3 Costs and Incomes of Development Options
The realization of a development option is associated with one-time costs C and incomes
V , as well as running costs c and incomes v in the following periods. Table 4.2 sum-
marizes the costs and incomes that characterize the development of areas. Incomes and
costs that are linked to population dynamics, such as tax incomes or family compen-
sations, are not considered in the basic model of the DSS (for an extended model see
Section 4.4). The basic model is based on the assumption that the realization of the
development goal is ensured, the municipal population is constant and that ﬂoor space in
the inner and outer areas are considered as perfect substitutes. Hence, the basic model
only includes costs that are associated with the development or restructuring of areas.
In the following, the present value P˜ V ik is used to summarize the costs and incomes of
option k in municipality i (interest rate r ∈ [0, 1]):2
P˜ V ik = (V − C) + v − c
r
(4.6)
2The present value includes the present value of the perpetuity, which is an annuity with periodic
payments that start on a ﬁxed date and continue indeﬁnitely.
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Incomes Costs
One-time
• Revenues from selling prop-
erties, V
• Planning Costs, CP
• Purchase Costs, CU
• Development Costs, CD
• Costs for Demolition Work,
CW
• Costs for Renovation, CR
• Other Costs, CO
C = CP +CU+CD+CW +CR+CO
Running
• Property Tax B, v • Direct and Indirect Operat-
ing Costs, cO
• Maintenance Expenditures,
cM
• Levies, cL
c = cO + cM + cL
Table 4.2: Costs and Incomes in the Basic Model
If a development is stretched over many periods, the proportional present value for the
realization of a development option providing νijk ∈ [0, ν˜ik] ha ﬂoor space in a planning
period can be calculated as follows:
PVijk =
ν¯ijk
ν˜ik
· P˜ V ik (4.7)
The total present value P¯ V ij of a land development plan in planning period j is:
P¯ V ij =
∑
k
PVijk (4.8)
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4.2.4 The Decision Problem in the Basic DSS
The task of a local decision maker is to cover the demand for ﬂoor space in each planning
period by choosing development options and an appropriate land development plan.
The tool supports this decision making by a comparison of incomes and costs of the
land development plans in diﬀerent scenarios. The decision situation is similar to the
described situation in Section 3.5 (framework of land use decisions), in which local
representatives evaluate diﬀerent, alternative land development plans. By using the
interest rate r ∈ [0, 1] in a planning period, the discount rate δj for each planning period
j can be calculated:
δj =
1
(1 + r)j
(4.9)
The discount rate must be included, when calculating the net present value of a land
development plan ¯¯PV i for municipality i:
¯¯PVi =
∑
j
∑
k
δjPVijk
=
∑
j
δjP¯ V ij
As mentioned above the amount of ﬂoor space provided by the realization of develop-
ment options in a planning period j should cover the demand for ﬂoor space e¯ij in all
planning periods:
e¯ij =
∑
k
νijk (4.10)
From an economic perspective, development options that provide ﬂoor space with
a high net present value should be developed ﬁrst. However, in practice other aspects
during the selection of a land development plan could be relevant (e.g. the policy network,
see Section 3.1). For instance, surveys within the Spiel.Raum study have shown that
non-economic criteria are also important. The preferences of the participants during the
selection of development options in the ﬁeld study will be described in Chapter 5. A
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simple approach to select the development options from an economic perspective is to
calculate the ratio of net present value per hectare ﬂoor space ik:
ik =
P˜ V ik
ν˜ik
(4.11)
Then, it is possible to sort all options according to the speciﬁc ik in order to determine
the optimal land development plan: A development option a ∈ L would be preferable to
an option b ∈ L (a  b) if the ratio of a is higher than the ratio of b (a > b). The ap-
plication of such a selection maximizes the ﬁnancial outcome of a land development plan
that assumes a land usage of the new areas and disregards population dynamics. Before
an extension of the basic model with additional cost parameters including population
dynamics (Section 4.4) is presented, the next sections introduce necessary extensions of
the model if a TDC scheme is introduced as described in Chapter 2.
4.3 Designing an EDSS for a TDC Scheme
As mentioned in the last section, municipal decision makers realize the given develop-
ment goal by developing areas in their municipality. The land development can include
the conversion of open space into settlement and traﬃc areas. When introducing a TDC
scheme, a municipality has to submit a corresponding amount of certiﬁcates to a super-
visory authority for cancellation. An EDSS for a TDC scheme that supports the decision
making of local representatives in such a scenario will be presented in this section. Such
a DSS was also implemented as a prototype within the Spiel.Raum study and will be
presented in more detail in Section 4.5.
As deﬁned in Chapter 2, a tradable development certiﬁcate legitimates the conversion
of one hectare open space into new settlement and traﬃc areas. The total amount of
initially allocated TDCs limits the development of new areas in all municipalities. For
the conversion of recreation areas with speciﬁc characteristics, exemption regulations
can be applied, so that certiﬁcates are not necessary to develop these areas, even though
they are considered as settlement and traﬃc areas.3 The municipalities can trade TDCs
3As discussed in Chapter 2, areas that may not require certiﬁcates could be parks, zoological gardens,
game enclosure or botanical gardens.
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amongst each other. The inner development is characterized by planning measures that
improve the usage of existing settlement and traﬃc areas. Inner areas can be developed
within the limits of §13a BauGB or §34a BauGB Abs. 4 Satz 1 Nr. 1 and Nr. 2. As a
result, no new settlement and traﬃc areas have to be developed and no certiﬁcates are
necessary for the development of inner areas.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, a supervisory authority can set a reduction goal in the
TDC system and allocate a total number of certiﬁcates in a planning period. The total
amount of allocated certiﬁcates z¯j limits the total land development in a planning period.
Without the possibility to trade certiﬁcates, the municipal land development σ¯ij would
be limited by the number of certiﬁcates z¯ij allocated to a municipality i in a planning
period j. Due to the fact that a central market place is implemented in a TDC scheme,
municipalities can buy or sell certiﬁcates to realize the speciﬁc land development plan.
Furthermore, if banking is allowed (Section 2.2.3), the remaining certiﬁcates z¯ij − σ¯ij
will be added to the municipalities in the next planning period.
4.3.1 The Decision Problem in a DSS for TDCs
In contrast to the decision problem discussed in Section 4.2.4, a municipal decision maker
has to take into account even more aspects during his decision making. For instance,
the available amount of certiﬁcates or the current market price might inﬂuence the
selection of the development plan and the trading strategy (the timing of selling and
buying certiﬁcates at the market). To facilitate decision making in a TDC scheme, the
implementation of further functions in the decision support tool is needed. Furthermore,
the tool should be tailored to the task of the participants and the available data.
The DSS should also facilitate the comparison of alternative development plans, for
instance if the planned municipal development is not feasible due to a shortage of cer-
tiﬁcates. By comparing diﬀerent land development plans, abatement strategies that
facilitate an eﬃcient achievement of the total reduction goal as described in Chapter 2
can be elaborated. Therefore, the proposed EDSS allows a comparison of diﬀerent land
development plans and enables the calculation of a theoretical price for the TDCs (the so
called indicator price). The indicator price of TDCs enables the comparison of planning
alternatives to support the elaboration of an appropriate abatement strategy. In the
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next paragraphs, the calculation of the indicator price in the tool will be demonstrated
by comparing two alternative land development plans.
The calculation of the indicator price is based on a comparison of the present values
¯¯PV Ai and ¯¯PV Bi of two alternative scenarios A and B in a municipality i. The values ¯¯PV Ai
and ¯¯PV Bi reﬂect all incomes and costs associated with the land development discounted
over all periods at the time of the decision. The planning tool allows a comparison
of the two planning scenarios A and B. In this example, planning scenario A is the
current scenario and B is an alternative scenario, which is associated with less new land
development. The software calculates the present value of the land development plan
¯¯PVi in the municipality i by adding up the discounted present values (discount rate δj)
of each development option k in each period j (Section 4.2.4):
¯¯PVi =
∑
j
∑
k
δj(PVijk) (4.12)
In order to compare the two planning scenarios also the additional incomes and costs
for developing a speciﬁc amount of area σBijk and σAijk (the diﬀerence of the new settlement
and traﬃc areas), given a price for the TDCs of pi per hectare, have to be discounted for
the calculation of the indicator prices. Hence, the values∑j
∑
k σ
B
ijk ·pi and
∑
j
∑
k σ
A
ijk ·pi
will be discounted for a land development plan. Due the fact that for a speciﬁc indicator
price both scenarios have the same monetary outcome, the following equation holds:
¯¯PV Ai +
∑
j
∑
k
δj(σAijk · pi) = ¯¯PV Bi +
∑
j
∑
k
δj(σBijk · pi)
Based on these values, the EDSS calculates the indicator price pA,Bi associated with
the two land development plans in a planning period:
⇐⇒ pA,Bi =
¯¯PV Bi − ¯¯PV Ai∑
j
∑
k δj(σAijk − σBijk)
The indicator price signals for which price a participant should change its current
abatement strategy A to a new alternative abatement strategy B. That is the case,
when the marginal costs of the land development plan B are equal or less than the value
of the certiﬁcates needed to realize the planning strategy A. When the price is negative,
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abatement strategy B is always more proﬁtable even without a certiﬁcate system. Hence,
the planning tool enables an economic comparison of two land development plans with
diﬀerent abatement strategies and supports the selection of development options during
each planning period.
4.4 EDSS Design with Intercommunal Competition
The following game-theoretical model will extend the basic model by aspects of inter-
communal competition and additional costs related to the usage of the new development
areas. As mentioned in Section 4.2.3, the basic DSS does not include changes in tax
incomes or other population-based values by assuming a constant population and disre-
garding population movements. The demand for ﬂoor space is still given, but the usage
of the areas by the settlement of new households is assumed to be uncertain. Depending
on the development of all municipalities in a region, determined by all municipalities si-
multaneously, the settlement in each municipality varies. For this, the game-theoretical
approach, presented in Section 3.3, will be used to extend the basic model of the EDSS.
The EDSS model can be used to solve the described collective action problem by en-
hancing the cost transparency in a region or to establish cooperation concepts, which
have been also discussed in Chapter 3.
In this model, the demand for ﬂoor space in a planning period j is determined by
the number of households mij that make new location decisions in a municipality i.4
Table 4.3 shows the incomes v and costs c per capita that are associated with the
settlement of a new household. In order to calculate the average additional incomes in
municipality i, the present value li for a given interest rate r will be calculated in the
DSS. The value of a perpetuity is used by assuming that the descendants of a household
will live in the municipality for an indeﬁnite period of time and, hence, the annuity
continues indeﬁnitely:
li =
v − c
r
(4.13)
4For simpliﬁcation purposes, only households and the demand for ﬂoor space in living spaces are
considered. The interpretation for ﬁrms, or other dimensions of ﬂoor space, is similar.
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Incomes Costs
Running
• Share of income tax, vS
• Subsidies and levies, vI
• Family compensations, vF
v = vS + v

I + v

F
• Operating costs, cO
• District levy, cD
c = cO + c

D
Table 4.3: Running Costs and Incomes per Capita
The total number of households that are willing to migrate (so called movers) within
a region in one planning period j is Mj =
∑
i mij. In the following, it will be distin-
guished between the provision in the inner area ν¯Iij and ﬂoor space associated with the
development of new areas in the outer area ν¯Aij . The development of new areas in the
other municipalities within the region are summarized by Sj. If no information about the
population dynamics in a region is given, the incomes of a municipality can be estimated
in the model by using the proportion of the new ﬂoor space ν¯Aij of the total new land
development S¯j = Sj + ν¯Aij in the region. The development of new areas inﬂuences the
changes in tax incomes, determines the net present value in a municipality and reﬂects
population dynamics:
P¯ V
M
ij (ν¯Aij , Sj) = li · (
ν¯Aij
Sj + ν¯Aij
· Mj − mij) (4.14)
As mentioned in Section 4.2, a municipality is able to cover the given demand e¯ij for
ﬂoor space in one planning period by realizing diﬀerent types of development options.
The demand for ﬂoor space can be covered by developing ﬂoor space ν¯ij in one plan-
ning period. By developing more areas at the edge of the municipality than before, a
municipality is able to attract new households and ﬁrms. Thus, the quotient of these
two area types can be interpreted as a criterion for the attractiveness of the total land
development plan of a municipality. If a municipality develops more new areas, the
settlement of new households and ﬁrms is more likely. Furthermore, this diﬀerentiation
enables the usage of costs and yields functions for these two area types.
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In the following, it is assumed that the development options are realized according
to economic criteria and that municipalities develop the cheapest options ﬁrst (Sec-
tion 4.2.4), in order to model the costs curve for the total inner development instead
of calculating the costs for each development option individually. For instance, the
costs of providing ﬂoor space of ν¯Iij in the inner area, e.g. recycling brownﬁelds, can be
approximated by the following quadratic cost function:
P¯ V
R
ij(ν¯Iij) = ai · ν¯Iij2 + bi · ν¯Iij + di (4.15)
The parameters ai, bi, di > 0 enable the individual adjustment of the cost function for
each municipality in the DSS. If no ﬂoor space in the inner area is provided, no recycling
costs exist (P¯ V Rij(0) = 0). Typically, closing gaps between buildings is cheaper than
the recycling of brownﬁelds (Section 3.1.4). This means, that the more areas ν¯Iij will
be developed in the inner areas, the higher are the marginal costs for restructuring the
inner areas:
P¯ V Rij
′
(ν¯Iij) > 0 (4.16)
P¯ V Rij
′′
(ν¯Iij) ≥ 0 (4.17)
However, the more areas will be developed in the outer areas, the higher are the
costs of maintaining the social and technical infrastructure. As in the basic model, the
average ﬂoor space per hectare of new settlement and traﬃc areas is speciﬁed by the
realized ﬂoor space index τij in municipality i within planning period j. If no detailed
data about additional technical and social infrastructure costs for one hectare of new
areas resulting out of the development of one hectare of new land is available, the
costs should be estimated (e.g. education costs) by reference values from studies (see
Section 3.2). Thus, the total infrastructure costs P¯ V Cij of a municipality depend on the
total development of new settlement and traﬃc areas σ¯ij and increase with the costs of
ci per hectare:5
P¯ V
C
ij(σ¯ij) = ci · σ¯ij ⇐⇒ P¯ V Cij(ν¯Aij) = ci ·
ν¯Aij
τij
(4.18)
5As introduced in Section 4.2.2: τij = ν¯ijσ¯ij .
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4.4.1 The Decision Problem in the Game-theoretical Model
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the calculation of the demand for ﬂoor
space is derived from the expected population development. However, due to the pop-
ulation dynamics the provision of a speciﬁc amount of ﬂoor space does not necessarily
mean that a certain number of households will settle in the municipality within this
model. Within the game-theoretical approach, a municipal decision maker reﬂects a
player i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, who has the task to select a development plan and an appro-
priate inner ν¯Iij and outer development ν¯Aij of areas to cover the given demand for ﬂoor
space of e¯ij. Hence, each player has to choose simultaneously an amount of ν¯Aij ∈ [0; e¯ij].
Such a decision situation was described in more detail within the proposed framework
of land use decisions in Section 3.3. Depending on the realized land development more
or less households will settle in the municipality and Equation 4.14 is used to reﬂect
the location decisions of the movers. Furthermore, the diﬀerent cost and yield functions
presented in the last section have to be considered. Under the prerequisite that the
given demand has to be covered (e¯ij = ν¯Aij + ν¯Iij), the yield and cost functions (4.14),
(4.15) and (4.18) result in the overall function P¯ V ij(ν¯Aij , Sj) which represents the basis
of the decision making for a municipal decision maker within this model and determines
the outcome for a player depending on the own land development ν¯Aij and the new land
development in other municipalities Sj within the region:
P¯ V

ij(ν¯Aij , Sj) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
−P¯ V Rij(e¯ij) + P¯ V Mij (0, Sj) if ν¯Aij = 0
P¯ V
M
ij (ν¯Aij , Sj) − P¯ V Cij(ν¯Aij) if ν¯Aij = e¯ij
−P¯ V Rij(e¯ij − ν¯Aij) + P¯ V Mij (ν¯Aij , Sj) − P¯ V Cij(ν¯Aij) if 0 < ν¯Aij < e¯ij
(4.19)
If municipalities cover the complete demand for ﬂoor space by the development of
outer areas (ν¯Aij = e¯ij), no costs for inner development have to be calculated within the
DSS. This is likely in case the costs for increasing the infrastructure are relatively low
or the costs for inner development are very high. In case the costs for recycling are low
compared to infrastructure costs, the development of areas in the inner area is more
appropriate. In an extreme case, the total ﬂoor space is provided by the recycling of
areas in the center of a municipality and no ﬂoor spaces have to be developed in the
outer area (ν¯Aij = 0). Due to the fact that the costs for the development of inner areas
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are extremely variable, a mixed development strategy is more likely (0 < ν¯Aij < e¯ij). In
practice, the optimal development strategy is often a mix of development options in the
inner and outer areas: Cheap inner development options, for example the closing of gaps
and cheap area recycling, will be developed ﬁrst. Costly recycling of areas might not
be necessary if the demand for ﬂoor space is covered by already realized options. The
incomes of the new areas depend on diﬀerent factors, such as the number of movers M or
the total development of new areas in a region. From this perspective, the development
of new areas is risky. Sometimes fewer households settle in a municipality if the total
development in a region is too high and more ﬂoor space is provided in the outer areas
than actually needed. In contrast, the development of inner areas is a more conservative
development strategy and the areas will be used. In the next section, the calculations
of the theoretical solutions of this model within the EDSS are shown and some speciﬁc
implications resulting from the chosen model design are discussed.
4.4.2 Theoretical Solutions
The Pareto-eﬃcient solution represents a reference point for the game-theoretical model.
A solution of the proposed model can be derived under the assumption of homogeneous
municipalities. As described in Chapter 3, in most metropolitan conﬂicts homogeneous
municipalities are involved. Hence, the theoretical solutions have been derived under
this assumption in Section 3.3.2. Inserting (4.18) and (4.14) into (4.19) leads to the
following equation, which is the basis for the calculation of the theoretical benchmark:
P¯ V

ij(ν¯Aij , Sj) = −P¯ V Rij(e¯ij − ν¯Aij) −
ci
τij
· ν¯ij + li · Mj · ν¯ij
Sj + ν¯Aij
− li · mij (4.20)
The equation has the same structure as the game-theoretical equation, which was
introduced and discussed in Section 3.3.2. Hence, the calculation of the theoretical
benchmark is similar. Based on this equation the maximum overall present value in the
region can be calculated. The necessary condition in the Pareto Optimum leads to:6
P¯ V Rj
′(e¯j − ν¯Aj ∗) =
c
τj
(4.21)
6The detailed derivation is shown in Section 3.3.2.
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The result shows that the marginal costs of recycling inner areas should equal the
infrastructure costs per realized ﬂoor space in the optimal solution. By calculating the
derivation of the quadratic cost function the equation can be transformed as follows:
ν¯Aj
∗ = 12 ·
2 · a · e¯j + b + cτj
a
(4.22)
This is the optimal amount of ﬂoor space ν¯Aj
∗ each municipality should develop in
the outer area in one planning period. If the required data is entered into the decision
support tool, the tool can calculate the optimal land development plan for a region. The
theoretical solution is independent of the amount of municipalities in a region and the
tax receipts of the households. Corresponding to the assumption that a speciﬁc ﬂoor
space has to be provided by developing inner and outer areas, the optimal amount of
ﬂoor space in the inner area ν¯Ij
∗ = e¯j − ν¯Aj ∗ can be determined for a planning period.
However, due to the fact that land development decisions are made at the same time and
competition for households and ﬁrms exists, the deviation from this land development
strategy is likely. Thus, municipalities have an incentive to develop more new land,
which can be determined by calculating the Nash Equilibrium of the model (see also
Section 3.3.2). For determining the symmetric Nash Equilibrium, the Equation 4.20 has
to be maximized. In the Nash Equilibrium a municipality provides the amount of ﬂoor
space ν¯Aj
∼ that fulﬁlls the following equation:7
P¯ V Rj
′(e¯j − ν¯Aj ∼) =
c
τj
− n − 1
n2
· M · l
ν¯Aj
∼ (4.23)
Hence, the individual net present value of a municipality resulting from the provision
of ﬂoor space in the inner areas will equal the infrastructure costs per realized ﬂoor
space ( c
τj
) less the incomes of moving households per provided ﬂoor space in the outer
areas ( M ·l
ν¯Aj
∼ ), and is inﬂuenced by the number of municipalities within the region. For
the given cost function 4.15, the decision support tool calculates the Nash Equilibrium:
ν¯Aj
∼ =
2 · a · ej + b + cτj +
√
(−2 · a · ej − b − cτj )2 + 8 · a · n−1n2 · M · l
4 · a (4.24)
7The detailed derivation is shown in Section 3.3.2.
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The comparison of this solution and the Pareto Optimum (Equation 4.24), as well as
the impact of the parameters on the solution have also been presented in Section 3.3.2.
For instance, for a convex cost curve it has been shown that more new areas will be
developed in the Nash Equilibrium than in the optimal solution.
The adaption of the model presented in Section 3.3.2 into the EDSS provides additional
functionality for municipalities as well as for a supervisory authority. By enhancing the
cost transparency of each municipality the expected (lower) incomes for developing new
areas could be displayed for a municipality depending on the planned outcome of the
other municipalities in the region and could reduce the new land development. Hence, by
displaying more detailed estimates about the possible incomes when developing new land
the monetary incentives for the municipalities in the region could be reduced. Due to the
fact that the EDSS for TDCs does not include tax incomes, the game-theoretical model
can be used to extend the EDSS for TDCs and can be implemented as an additional
software module into the existing prototype. Furthermore, the implementation of this
EDSS model can be used to calculate possible gains of a collective action for a supervisory
authority within a region to establish cooperation concepts.
4.5 Implementation of an EDSS Prototype: The
Spiel.Raum Study
The previous sections have shown the structure of a decision situation in order to support
the decision making of local representatives by a DSS, whether population dynamics
exist or not. First, the decision situation and the associated decision problem of local
representatives was presented on the basis of a basic model (Section 4.2.4). This decision
problem is characterized by selecting land development options to cover the demand for
ﬂoor space. Second, if a TDC system is introduced, further aspects might inﬂuence the
decision making of local representatives and the DSS can be extended by an additional
indicator price module (Section 4.3.1). Results of case studies can be helpful to estimate
the speciﬁc model parameters, e.g. the demand for ﬂoor space or the infrastructure
costs of new land development, of the proposed models in diﬀerent regions. Finally,
the game-theoretical model can be integrated into the DSS that reﬂects the impacts of
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competition for households and metropolitan conﬂicts in diﬀerent community contexts
or analyzes the decision making of local representatives.
In this section, the implementation of an EDSS that is based on the basic model and
that addresses further aspects of a TDC system will be presented. As mentioned in
Section 1.3, a cap-and-trade scheme for land development was investigated with local
authorities by means of the ﬁeld experiment. Within the Spiel.Raum ﬁeld study, which
was conducted with 14 German municipalities, a ﬁrst EDSS prototype with TDCs was
implemented in practice. The EDSS was implemented as an internet tool, in which
the participants were asked to enter municipal data. After the implementation of the
EDSS and the collection of ﬁeld data, a TDC ﬁeld experiment was conducted with the
municipalities. In Chapter 5, the design of the ﬁeld experiment will be presented and
the decision making of local representatives will be analyzed and evaluated.
4.5.1 Field Data Collection
Within the Spiel.Raum study, the design of the TDC scheme and the software tool
were discussed with the participating municipalities and communal interest groups on
several workshops before the ﬁeld experiment was conducted. Afterwards, the local
representatives collected data of their municipalities regarding the time period between
2008 and 2022, divided into ﬁve planning periods each lasting three years. In order to
facilitate the ﬁeld data collection and to provide technical assistance on how to enter
the data into the platform, two workshops with the participants were conducted in 2007
and 2008, respectively. These workshops also included reports on past experiences with
experiments for emission allowances and a discussion of the results with the participants.
The ﬁrst workshop focused on diﬀerent design parameters of the EDSS. This included
the discussion of the necessary real world data (e.g. costs and spatial areas), the struc-
turing of data at the software platform (as described in the Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.1)
and the design of decision support tools. Basically, it was distinguished between two
types of development options: development options in the inner area and options in
the outer area of a municipality (see Section 4.2.1). A development option speciﬁed a
potential development project in a municipality and the associated development costs
and areas (see Figure 4.6). The realization of development options in the outer area
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required an amount of certiﬁcates speciﬁed by the baseline scenario. However, for the
realization of options in the inner area8 no certiﬁcates were needed. Typically, these
development options should allow a denser city development and were more expensive
(see Section 3.2). It was possible that inner development required a negative amount of
TDCs, which meant that participants received certiﬁcates for implementing the project.
Figure 4.6: Speciﬁcation of a Development Option in the Spiel.Raum DSS
At the second workshop, a ﬁrst test run with the participants using ﬁctitious data
was carried out to collect feedback and suggestions for an improvement of the EDSS.
The test run included the deﬁnition of development options, the speciﬁcation of the
development goal and a test of the trading platform. In the next step of the study, the
participants collected data with respect to their cities’ inner and outer-city potentials
for further development including associated costs. The municipal data was entered in
8As deﬁned in the German law §13a BauGB or §34 BauGB Abs. 4 Satz 1 Nr. 1, 2.
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a structured and comparable format into the EDSS. The participants entered the main
data that determined the community context, such as the number of population, number
of employees, the budget of the municipal household and the detailed structure of the
spatial areas (Section 4.2.1).
Possible changes of the spatial areas were determined by the speciﬁcation of develop-
ment options. A development option was speciﬁed by its name, its type, its net present
value, the structure of the spatial areas, and an informal, textual description.9 Prede-
ﬁned forms for the area structure, which were based on the structure of spatial areas in
Germany, were provided to simplify this task for the participants. An online help, which
included a comprehensive description of the area types as deﬁned in the cataloguing of
the German Federal Statistical Oﬃce, was available. The participants could enter as
many development options as available in their municipality. The territory, the settle-
ment and traﬃc areas, and the total ﬂoor space was used to calculate the settlement
and traﬃc area per capita and the realized ﬂoor space and site occupancy indices. The
software automatically calculated some key indicators, for instance the municipal budget
per capita. Furthermore, the EDSS automatically calculated the amount of certiﬁcates
that was necessary for realizing a development option in the ﬁeld experiment based on
the spatial structure of the area.
At the end of the data collection, the EDSS also asked the participants to specify
targets in terms of the provision of living space and industrial real estate and to deﬁne a
baseline scenario representing the actual planning in a city for the next 15 years if there
were no restriction for the development of new land.10 The representatives decided
which options would be developed in a planning period. This implied that an individual
demand for new ﬂoor space was set in each planning period. The demand for ﬂoor
space determined the development goal of a municipality in the two dimensions living
space and ﬂoor space for commercial use. The participating representatives determined
these development goals of the municipalities in the EDSS. The scenario was used as the
reference scenario (baseline scenario) of the ﬁeld experiment. Furthermore, the baseline
9When no data was available, estimations from studies were used to complete the database (Reiden-
bach, 2007).
10As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, 15 years are the general time horizon of a land use plan
in Germany.
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scenario showed the total amount of new settlement and traﬃc areas that a municipality
planned in each planning period to cover this demand for new ﬂoor space.
4.5.2 Scenario Analysis in the EDSS
During the ﬁeld experiment, alternative development plans could be analyzed by the
participants (e.g. regarding the amount of TDCs, see Chapter 5). The participants’ task
during the ﬁeld experiment was to cover the development goal by combining develop-
ment options in the inner and outer area of their municipality in each planning period.
To facilitate the task for the participants, the DSS allowed a comparison of two land
development plans (Section 4.3). In addition to the decision in which planning period
the development option would be developed, the participants could specify a priority
for each option. Options declared with a higher priority were automatically developed
ﬁrst by the system. When a development option was not fully realized in a planning
period, the development option had the highest priority in the next period. This should
facilitate the task for the participants of selecting appropriate development options. The
participants could test diﬀerent scenarios by altering the timing of the land usage or the
order of the development options.
When the participants selected a development option, the platform calculated the pro-
portional incomes and costs for the speciﬁc planning period as presented in Section 4.2.3.
Therefore, the participants could consider economic aspects in their planning strategy
to provide ﬂoor space in each planning period at minimal costs (see Figure 4.7). Devel-
opment options that were not fully realized until the end of the planning horizon were
considered in the respective proportions. The planning tool calculated all net present
values and compared the scenarios from an economic perspective. The comparison of
the demand for TDCs and the resulting indicator price were also displayed. During
the simulation, the Decision Support System was made available to the participants,
which simpliﬁed the adaptation of the land development plan by displaying price signals
for selling or buying development certiﬁcates on the market place on the basis of two
diﬀerent planning strategies (Section 4.3.1).
At the end of a planning period, the DSS delivered an overview of the new developed
areas in a municipality. The certiﬁcate stocks for the diﬀerent planning periods and
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Figure 4.7: Scenario Analysis in the Spiel.Raum DSS
the payment transactions were traced in separated accounts and could be monitored by
the local decision makers. The municipality could use this information to adapt the
trading strategy, for example initiating the purchase of more certiﬁcates when there
was a shortage. This feature should reduce the risk of paying sanctions and enhance
the calculation of land development plans by monitoring the stock during the planning
simulation.
4.5.3 Results of the Field Data Collection
The municipal representatives gathered 263 development options for the ﬁeld study. 209
of these options were selected for the realization in the planning horizon and deﬁned the
baseline scenario. Depending on the size of the municipality, the amount of development
options diﬀered between 7 and 69 per municipality. Table 4.4 depicts the characteristics
of the development options gathered from the municipal representatives.11 On average,
11A more detailed description of the ﬁeld data is already given by Ostertag et al., 2010.
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a development option provided 6.97 ha of ﬂoor space. Options that are deﬁned in the
baseline scenario are associated with the development of 7.46 ha ﬂoor space each. In
contrast, not preselected (alternative) options only provide 5.08 ha, which are mainly
smaller projects in the inner area. The baseline scenario includes many new development
areas in the outer area. Due to fact that new development areas are large residential or
commercial areas, new development areas can be seen as indivisible and tend to provide
more ﬂoor space. The average amount of new settlement and traﬃc areas in the baseline
development is also higher. Development options in the baseline are connected with an
average increase of 6.54 ha settlement and traﬃc areas, whereas the alternative options
have an average new development of 0.57 ha. Most of the alternative development
options are options in the inner area and do require less or no development of new areas.
All Options Selected
Options
(Baseline)
Unselected
Option
Provided Floor Space (in ha) 6.97 7.46 5.08
Settlement and Traﬃc Areas (in ha) 5.31 6.54 0.57
Realized Floor Space Index (in ha) 0.76 0.88 0.11
Present Value (in mu) 279.55 489.52 -533.11
Table 4.4: Main Characteristics of the Development Options
The division of the new settlement and traﬃc areas by the provided ﬂoor space de-
livers a value for the eﬃciency of land development (Section 4.2.2). The realized ﬂoor
space index makes clear how many new areas have to be developed on average for the
provision of a hectare new ﬂoor space. In the baseline scenario, the municipalities plan
the realization of 0.88 ha new settlement and traﬃc areas per one hectare ﬂoor space
(see Table 4.4). The alternative options have a quotient of 0.11 ha, which means that
the realization of alternative options would be linked to the development of denser areas
and allows more sustainable development in terms of land consumption. However, the
alternative options are linked to cuts in the municipal incomes and have on average a
lower present value. The average net present value of development options deﬁned in
the baseline scenario is 489.520 monetary units on average, which means that the de-
velopment of new areas is associated with incomes. The data gathering was conducted
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from the point of view of the municipal representatives and reﬂects results from many
studies. As mentioned in Chapter 3, recent analyses have shown that the perception of
costs and incomes of development options might be inﬂuenced by a lack of transparency
during the data collection.
4.6 Summary and Discussion
In this chapter, the design and the implementation of a decision support system for
tradable development certiﬁcates was presented. The deﬁnition of municipal land devel-
opment projects is a central requirement in order to make an accurate comparison of dif-
ferent municipal development plans possible. For the deﬁnition of diﬀerent development
options, the software includes speciﬁc online forms and a comprehensive online-help.
Compared to other decision support systems, the dimension ﬂoor space was introduced
as the central value for an appropriate comparison of diﬀerent development strategies.
Furthermore, the decision support system determines the structure of the areas that are
linked with a 15-years land development plan and with the demand for ﬂoor space. Simi-
lar to other planning tools, the presented DSS includes a basic model without considering
population movements and distinguishes area-related costs and incomes. However, by
using the introduced extended modeling approach, these incomes can also be included.
Table 4.5 compares the characteristics of the decision support tool with the modeling
and implementation approaches of the other EDSS.
The internet-based platform also provides a market module that enables the imple-
mentation of a TDC market. A planning tool signals the price, for which a speciﬁc
development scenario is linked with higher incomes, and facilitates the municipal deci-
sion making. The platform for TDC schemes also supports the municipal accounting.
At the end of a planning period, the platform delivers an overview of the total new
developed areas in a municipality. The certiﬁcate stocks for the diﬀerent planning pe-
riods and the payment transactions will be calculated in separate accounts and can be
monitored by the local decision makers. The municipality can use this information to
adapt the trading strategy, for example initiating the purchase of more certiﬁcates if
there is a shortage. The system will reduce the risk of paying sanctions and enhance the
calculation of land development plans and the stock over a long time horizon.
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Tool Software Case
study
Time
Hori-
zon
(years)
Incomes Costs
Was-kostet-
mein-
baugebiet.de
Excel Tool,
Internet Tool
- 10-100 - Technical and
social infras-
tructure
Fokosbw Excel Tool,
Internet Tool
25 regions 25 Taxes, ﬁ-
nancial
compensa-
tion
Technical and
social infr., ﬁ-
nancial
LEANkom Excel Tool 9 munici-
palities
20 Taxes, ﬁ-
nancial
compensa-
tion
Technical and
social infr.,
planning,
ﬁnancial
Fin.30 Excel Tool 3 munici-
palities
15 Revenues by
selling prop-
erty
Technical and
social infr., ﬁ-
nancial
Portfolio-
management
Excel Tool One region,
Regional
cooperation
20 (Estimation
of utility)
Social infr.,
planning,
ecological
Spiel.Raum Internet Tool 14 munic-
ipalities,
TDC
scheme
15 Revenues by
selling prop-
erty
Technical in-
frastructure,
planning,
ﬁnancial
Table 4.5: Comparison of the EDSS
In the ﬁeld study, the 14 municipalities entered their municipal data into the web-
based platform. This data collection was the basis for simulating a system of tradable
development certiﬁcates. The next chapter will introduce the design and set-up of the
ﬁeld experiment and will present the results of two simulation runs. Furthermore, the
chapter analyzes the trading strategies of the local decision makers as well as the abate-
ment strategies that were elaborated on the basis of the implemented decision support
tool.
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in a Field Experiment
In the previous chapter, the model and the implementation of a decision support system
for tradable development certiﬁcates in Germany were described. Based on the proposed
data model, the design of a software platform as well as the data collection in a ﬁeld
study with actual municipalities were presented. In the data collection phase of the
presented ﬁeld study Spiel.Raum, the task of the participants was the speciﬁcation of
development options in the inner and outer areas of their municipalities on the software
platform, as well as the determination of a baseline scenario. By deﬁning a baseline
scenario, a municipality set the development goal determined in ﬂoor space for each
planning period in an actual scenario without the presence of a TDC system. The
total development of new settlement and commercial areas, which would be developed
in the baseline scenario, was the basis for the amount of TDCs allocated in the ﬁeld
experiment. However, in the ﬁeld simulation a reduced amount of TDCs was emitted to
the municipalities. The reduced amount of TDCs determined the reduction goal in the
simulation that was set in order to limit the development of new areas and to reduce
new land development.
In this chapter, a ﬁeld experiment within the scope of the ﬁeld study Spiel.Raum will
be presented. The local representatives of the municipalities which also participated
in the ﬁeld data collection, simulated a system of tradable development certiﬁcates in
two subsequent simulation runs. Hence, the ﬁeld experiment is based on the collected
data of the ﬁeld study. First, the design of the ﬁeld experiment and the task for the
participants in the preparation phase of the ﬁeld experiment as well as in the simulation
runs will be presented. Second, theoretical benchmarks and hypotheses about expected
abatement strategies, price discovery processes and trading strategies of the participants
116
5 Tradable Development Certiﬁcates in a Field Experiment
will be shown. The hypotheses serve as a guideline for analyzing the ﬁeld data in the
simulation run and are investigated in the third section. The analysis is based on the
main results of the Spiel.Raum study (Mu¨ller et al., 2010; Ostertag et al., 2010, as well
as a so far unpublished working paper). The chapter concludes with a short summary
and a comparison of the simulation results.
5.1 The Field Experiment Spiel.Raum
In addition to classical laboratory experiments, more realistic ﬁeld experiments with
a speciﬁc contribution to economic policy making have been carried out over the last
years (see Cardenas and Carpenter, 2005; Carpenter et al., 2005; Harrison and List, 2004;
Sturm and Weimann, 2006). Furthermore, some of the national and regional emissions
trading systems in the US were simulated in experiments prior to the actual implemen-
tation to test selected properties of new policy instruments (e.g. Holt et al., 2007). This
experimental methodology makes it possible to assess the validity of results from theo-
retical models (see Eckel and Lutz, 2003; Loewenstein, 1999). The explorative approach
can also lead to new ﬁndings which, because of the complexity of the environment, could
not have been derived from theory. The simulation game SET UP on emissions trading
combined the advantages of a ﬁeld experiment and a controlled lab experiment, and sim-
ulated an emissions trading scheme with actual companies in a controlled environment
(Schleich et al., 2002; Ehrhart et al., 2003).1 Companies that participated in the ex-ante
simulation also took part in such a system in reality. The artiﬁcial testing environment
developed for SET UP allowed the controlled analysis of the participants’ actual decision
processes and strategies.
The study Spiel.Raum (engl. “Spatial.Game”) was conducted as a ﬁrst experiment
with tradable development certiﬁcates with 14 German cities and municipal syndicates
from 2007 until 2009. Similar to the SET UP study, the main goal of Spiel.Raum
was to design a cap-and-trade scheme for land development and to analyze eﬃciency
gains of the new instrument in a ﬁeld experiment with actual decision makers as well
1For publications in English see also Schleich et al. (2006).
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as to analyze the behavior of the local representatives.2 Furthermore, both studies
applied a two-stage approach: During the ﬁrst stage (Section 4.5), the participating
municipalities collected data on necessary ﬂoor space, fallow land, development areas,
as well as possible development alternatives including the respective short- and long-term
costs and beneﬁts.
During the second stage, the participants simulated the time period from 2008 un-
til 2022 in two subsequent simulation runs under the assumption that a TDC system
was in place, which limited the total development. While the ﬁeld experiment was run
over the Internet, several accompanying workshops were conducted, in which the data
collection, the rules of the experiment or the calculation of the value of a TDC were
explained, and the possible consequences of a TDC system on municipal planning pro-
cesses were discussed. After each of the two simulation runs, the results were presented
to the participants and their feedback was collected, to identify their strategic behav-
ior. Furthermore, it was examined whether diﬃculties had arisen during the simulation
runs in order to collect improvement suggestions for further decision support tools. In
addition, surveys and interviews were conducted focusing on the strategies applied by
the decision makers as well as the inﬂuences of the system on other planning objectives
(see Ostertag et al., 2009, 2010).
The design of the ﬁeld experiment can be characterized as follows by using the termi-
nology of List (2003):
The main subjects of the study were urban and spatial planners. In the following,
they are also called the ﬁeld subjects. Being experts in land use management these
participants are non-standard subjects in the language of experimental economics. In
order to obtain an empirical benchmark for the results, each simulation run was repeated
in the lab with a student control group, so-called standard subjects, using the same
municipal data. The results of the real planners were compared to both, the theoretical
predictions (Section 5.1.2) and the results of the control group. Both groups acted
independently from each other and the participants interacted within a group only by
trading certiﬁcates on the internet platform (Section 4.5).
2Within the study, additional laboratory experiments have also been conducted, which are not the
focus of this book. For the results of the laboratory experiments see Mu¨ller et al., 2010a and Mu¨ller
et al., 2010b.
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Both groups received a guideline, containing detailed information about the ﬁeld ex-
periment as well as the task and the trading rules (Section 5.2.1). The participants were
also provided with calculation tools and an online help functionality. Moreover, a tele-
phone hotline was available in case of questions. One week prior to the experiment, a
short test run for each subject group was conducted in order to verify that everybody
had understood the task and the rules of the game as well as handling the software. This
aimed at guaranteeing that – regardless the very diﬀerent background – both groups had
the same level of information with respect to how the ﬁeld experiment was run. The con-
text of the experiment, the municipal development planning, was thoroughly explained
to the participants.
The commodities in the experiment were TDCs as deﬁned in Section 2.2.1 rather than
abstract goods. At the ﬁrst workshop, it was discussed with the participants which
area types did require TDCs and which did not require (for example various recreation
areas). The resulting structure of the spatial areas was presented at the beginning of
Section 4.2.
The stakes were diﬀerent for the two subject groups. There was no explicit incentive
for the ﬁeld subjects. The cities were only reimbursed for their travel expenditures
related to participating in the workshops. The students of the control group received a
graduate course attendance certiﬁcate, but were not paid. Thus, either for both groups
the payoﬀs were independent from the individual performance in the simulation.
During the experiment, both groups could use additional media (e.g. calculators, lap-
tops) for decision support. Hence, the environment was not strictly controlled. The
experts participated in the experiment (including the ﬁeld simulation) via the internet,
whereas the simulation with the student group was run in a computer lab. However,
both groups operated on the same platform. After the ﬁeld data collection with the local
representatives, the experiment was run in parallel with both groups and with each group
the time period 2008–2022 was simulated twice. The simulation runs were divided into
ﬁve planning periods consisting of three calendar years each. The targets for residential
and commercial ﬂoor space as speciﬁed in the baseline scenario were imposed separately
for each three-year planning period. Since the set of development options was ﬁxed at
the beginning of the simulation, the participants could not search for new, potentially
cheaper options and add them to the platform.
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5.1.1 Allocation of Certiﬁcates
In each period, a certain amount of TDCs was allocated to the municipalities. In the
ﬁrst simulation run, the total reduction potential was 119 ha (27.6%) compared to the
baseline scenario. For the simulation run, only 375 ha of the total demand of 431.4
ha in the baseline scenarios were emitted, i.e. overall emitted to all municipalities and
municipalities obtained 13.1% less certiﬁcates than in the initial baseline development.
At the beginning of the experiment, all municipalities were informed about the individual
amount of certiﬁcates they would receive in each planning period. However, the total
amount of certiﬁcates was not announced at the beginning of the experiment. Banking
of certiﬁcates was permitted and therefore unused certiﬁcates could be transferred into
the next planning period. In contrast, borrowing was not permitted.
Baseline 1 Simulation 1 Baseline 2 Simulation 2
Planning Period I 77.2 ha 100.1 ha 74.3 ha 129.8 ha
Planning Period II 125.0 ha 88.5 ha 127.2 ha 79.4 ha
Planning Period III 84.4 ha 75.0 ha 100.9 ha 54.1 ha
Planning Period IV 52.2 ha 61.5 ha 53.9 ha 39.0 ha
Planning Period V 92.6 ha 49.9 ha 83.1 ha 28.7 ha
Sum. 431.4 ha 375.0 ha 439.4 ha 331.0 ha
Table 5.1: Planned Development vs. Primary Allocation of TDCs
Due to the fact that the municipalities could adjust the baseline scenario between the
two simulation runs, the two baseline scenarios vary slightly. In the baseline scenario
of the ﬁrst simulation, about 431.4 ha new land had to be developed; in the second
simulation run, the planned total land development was 439.4 ha. Moreover, the overall
reduction goal was increased to 24.7% in the second simulation run and only 331 hectares
certiﬁcates were allocated. In addition, the certiﬁcates were emitted asymmetrically with
respect to the municipalities’ reduction potentials (e.g. development options for recycling
brownﬁelds). The total reduction potential in the second run was 238 ha. Thus, the
municipalities had the possibility to reduce the development of new areas by 54.2%
compared to the baseline scenario. Furthermore, the allocation of the certiﬁcates was
done unevenly so that there was a surplus of certiﬁcates in the beginning and a shortage
in the last periods in both simulation runs (Table 5.1).
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5.1.2 Theoretical Benchmark
In the ﬁeld experiment, the eﬃciency of the TDC system can be measured by comparing
the simulation results with an optimal scenario, speciﬁed by individual land development
plans, in which the development goal is achieved at the lowest possible costs. To calculate
the cost-eﬃcient optimum measured in monetary units (mu)3, the development options
of all municipalities were considered and the overall cheapest development options were
realized to achieve the required global reduction goal.
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Figure 5.1: Marginal Cost Curve for Simulation 1
Figure 5.1 depicts the marginal cost curve in the ﬁrst simulation run of the ﬁeld
experiment.4 In theory, the market price should reﬂect the marginal costs of achieving
the cost-eﬃcient reduction of new land use. Figure 5.1 also shows the theoretical market
price (equilibrium price) of 191 mu/ha in the ﬁrst planning simulation based on the ﬁeld
3In the following, all costs and incomes are represented by monetary units.
4A negative value indicates that the realization of development options is linked to incomes.
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data gathered by the participants. In the second simulation run, the theoretical market
price was 429 mu/ha.
Municipality Baseline Optimum
1 9.50 8.50
2 32.30 32.18
3 13.90 7.26
4 20.67 3.39
5 11.55 10.95
6 21.00 21.00
7 72.02 66.01
8 20.00 20.00
9 48.16 43.28
10 11.80 9.84
11 92.00 87.90
12 55.80 49.08
13 16.00 8.00
14 6.70 6.70
Sum. 431.40 374.10
Table 5.2: Land Development (in ha) in the Baseline and Optimal Scenario
In Table 5.2, a comparison between the land development of the baseline and the
optimal scenario is shown. All municipalities had to reduce (or at least not extend) their
land development in such a scenario to achieve the overall reduction goal. Furthermore,
0.9 ha less than the total amount of certiﬁcates allocated to the municipalities should
be developed in the optimal scenario. To realize this reduced land development, the
municipalities had to trade a minimal amount of certiﬁcates (minimal trading volume)
depending on the distribution of certiﬁcates determined by the primary allocation.
The reduction of land development should also be associated with additional costs.
Table 5.3 depicts the net present values of the land development plans in the baseline and
in the optimal scenario for each municipality in monetary units. In total, the achievement
of the environmental goal enhances the overall net present value by 13,619.486 mu in
the optimal scenario, which indicates that the land development plans in the baseline
scenario were not optimal from an economic point of view. In ﬁve municipalities, the
adaptation of the land development plans leads to a lower income regarding incomes
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Municipality Baseline Optimum Diﬀ
1 -418.027 -586.195 -168.167
2 59,191.871 72,393.984 13,202.113
3 3,325.439 2,799.265 -526.174
4 -38,541.336 -42,225.745 -3,684.410
5 0.000 0.000 0.000
6 43,726.585 43,726.585 0.000
7 7,123.810 7,203.774 79.965
8 11,081.154 11,081.154 0.000
9 3,771.389 3,202.064 -569.325
10 22,473.105 22,740.982 267.878
11 24,586.697 25,935.661 1,348.964
12 4,485.807 9,562.767 5,076.959
13 11,776.961 10,275.268 -1,501.693
14 3,768.787 3,862.164 93.376
Sum. 156,352.243 169,971.729 13,619.486
Table 5.3: Net Present Values (in mu) in the Baseline and Opt. Scenario
of the land development plans. Hence, the calculation of the optimum reveals that the
land development in the municipalities could be reduced without resulting in additional
costs for the municipalities. The land development, the theoretical market price and the
total net present value of the calculated optimal scenario are the basis for the further
evaluation of the simulation runs, which is explained in the following sections. The
theoretical scenario represents the cost-eﬃcient land development in the ﬁeld experiment.
In the next sections, the simulation results of the ﬁrst simulation run will be examined
and compared with the calculated theoretical cost-eﬃcient optimum scenario as well as
the initial baseline scenario.
5.2 Evaluation of the Field Experiment
In this section, the decision making of local representatives and the causes and eﬀects
that inﬂuenced the simulation outcome in the ﬁrst simulation run are analyzed. Par-
ticularly, the land development, the price discovery, and the trading strategies of the
participants are analyzed in more detail. The analysis is based on the results of the sim-
123
5 Tradable Development Certiﬁcates in a Field Experiment
ulation runs as well as the results of surveys among the participants subsequent to each
simulation run. These surveys provide further insights into their decision making. Due
to the fact that the initial baseline scenarios of the municipalities were slightly adapted
for the second simulation scenario, the analysis focuses on the ﬁrst simulation run and
the initial baseline scenario determined by the municipalities.
5.2.1 Decision Situation
At the beginning of each period, the participants had to decide which of their potential
development projects they wanted to implement. Hence, the participants could adopt
their development plans, as long as they provided the ﬂoor space originally deﬁned in
their targets. In order to facilitate the task for the participants, the Spiel.Raum software
provided a decision support tool (Section 4.3) which facilitated the economic analysis
and the pairwise comparison of diﬀerent planning strategies. In order to reduce the huge
amount of planning strategies, the number of feasible strategies was restricted in the ﬁrst
simulation run, and 179 of 264 development options were predetermined (Table 5.4).5
On average, the participants could choose from 6.1 development options (minimum 4,
maximum 14). However, in the second simulation a much larger set of feasible develop-
ment options was possible and more than half of the options were disposable (on average
9.9 options).
Simulation 1 Simulation 2
Total number of development options 264 (100%) 268 (100%)
Predetermined options 179 (67.8%) 129 (48.1%)
Number of selectable options 85 (22.2%) 139 (51.9%)
Min. / Avg. / Max. per participant 4 / 6.1 / 14 6 / 9.9 / 18
Table 5.4: Development Options
After the participants had decided which development options they wanted to realize
in the current planning period, they could trade certiﬁcates among each other on the
online market place.6 The software recorded all transactions as well as all costs incurred
5This step was intended to provide a realistic scope of action to all participants, which was manageable
and transparent during the experimental sessions.
6To preclude market power of the three largest municipalities (Munich, Nu¨rnberg and Heidel-
berg/Mannheim) during the trading phase, these municipalities were scaled down by the factors
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by the participants. At the end of a planning period, the software canceled an amount
of certiﬁcates according to the development of new areas in the period. For each missing
TDC, a participant had to pay 1,000 monetary units. In addition, missing TDCs were
automatically subtracted from the allocation of subsequent planning periods.
In each planning period, the local representatives made decisions on development
options and selected a scenario based on criteria, which seemed to be important to
them. One might expect that a participant would carry out development options in the
ascending order of their net present values. However, the results across all participants
suggest that the choice of the development options was not always done to minimize
costs. Some low-cost development options were not realized, whereas more expensive
measures compared to the optimal scenario were realized (Section 5.1.2).
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Figure 5.2: Relations of Cause and Eﬀect
10:1, 5:1 and 3:1. The adjustment was necessary because of the heterogeneous pool of municipalities
in this study.
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Figure 5.2 shows the relevant data that will be analyzed in the following sections.
The arrows hypothesize the relations of cause and eﬀect during the simulation runs and
further logical relationships between the data, which will be the subject of investigation.
The ﬁgure outlines that the amount of allocated certiﬁcates, the political network (sur-
vey item ‘political relevance’) and economic criteria (survey items ‘net present value’
and ‘indicator price’) could have inﬂuenced the selection of the scenario which will be
evaluated in Section 5.2.3.
The ﬁgure also depicts the logical relationships between order prices (purchase and
sale prices) and the market price, as well as some other items (sanction price, max. price,
indicator price) that might inﬂuence the market price. In theory, the orders should equal
the respective indicator price in a municipality, which was introduced and described
in Section 4.3. The resulting market price should reﬂect the scarcity of certiﬁcates
and should help to achieve the global optimum. The survey results can give insights
into what was relevant for the participants when trading certiﬁcates in the simulation.
Hence, the survey examines issues such as the price of last transactions and the orders
in the order book, the sanction payments, the indicator price, and the maximum price
(see Section 5.2.4). The trading volumes are analyzed in Section 5.2.5. The subject
of investigation is the impact of the individual balance of certiﬁcates on the observed
trading volumes in the simulation.
5.2.2 Methodology
In order to analyze the causes and eﬀects presented in the last section, relationships
between the variables (survey and simulation data) are analyzed by calculating the
correlation coeﬃcients and the impact of diﬀerent variables on speciﬁc simulation results.
Since the survey data are ordinal scaled, the Spearman rank correlation coeﬃcient is
used. The Spearman correlation coeﬃcient ρ shows the correlation between the variables
and interprets the strengths of the relationship by a value between -1 and 1.
A positive correlation is linked to a positive correlation coeﬃcient, and a negative
correlation coeﬃcient characterizes a negative correlation. The stronger the relationship,
the more diﬀers the correlation coeﬃcient from 0. Therefore, if there is no correlation
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the correlation coeﬃcient is 0.7 A further interpretation of the correlation coeﬃcient
depends on the speciﬁc context and varies from study to study. Therefore, with respect
to the presented hypotheses, the correlation coeﬃcients are classiﬁed into the categories
as shown in Table 5.5.8
Corr. Coeﬃcient Interpretation
ρ = 0 uncorrelated
0.30 > ρ weakly correlated
0.50 > ρ ≥ 0.30 medium correlated
ρ ≥ 0.50 strongly correlated
ρ = 1 perfectly correlated
Table 5.5: Correlation Coeﬃcients and Interpretation
The correlation analysis of the data is used to identify variables for a regression ana-
lysis. By means of the regression analysis, a set of variables should be identiﬁed, which
can help to explain some of the simulation results. The linear regression models the
relationship between a simulation result and one or more variables (e.g. the results from
the surveys). In the following sections, only the ﬁnal regression model will be presented
and some other, excluded variables will only be discussed (the p-value limit for excluding
variables from the regression analysis was 0.2). Due to the small amount of observations,
the impact of a variable is described as signiﬁcant if the p-value is less than 0.1.
The correlation coeﬃcient is calculated between the items and the diﬀerence between
the simulation and the baseline results. For instance, high political restrictions of local
representatives could hinder the adaption of the land development plan from an economic
point of view. In this case, it could be more likely that local representatives choose land
development plans which are similar to the plans in the baseline scenario. Furthermore,
the current market price and a comparison to the costs for inner development of the
municipalities could play a less important role for these decision makers. In contrast,
pure economic decisions without political restriction (e.g. basing on the indicator price)
7Due to the fact that the correlation coeﬃcient is restricted to the analysis of linear correlation, a
correlation coeﬃcient of 0 does not mean that a non-linear correlation does not exist. Therefore,
some of the data will be depicted in a scatter diagram to obtain ﬁrst-hand impressions of the
correlation.
8When comparing the individual results over all planning periods, the sample size is n = 14 and equals
the number of participants. When using the individual results from each of the ﬁve planning periods
n = 70.
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can lead to a more ﬂexible abatement strategy and to an adaptation of land development
plans in the simulation. Moreover, the items of the survey are compared with the abso-
lute diﬀerences in the diﬀerent scenarios within the regression analyses. No signiﬁcant
inﬂuence of the municipality size on the presented results could be identiﬁed within the
analyses.9 However, this does not necessarily mean that the size of a municipality have
no impact on a system which would be introduced in reality (a discussion of diﬀerent
factors that aﬀect land uses decisions is given in Section 3.1). Furthermore, general im-
plications on the basis of the simulation data will be only made in some of the following
sections—the external validity of some results is inﬂuenced by the ﬁeld data which was
entered by the municipal representatives, as well as the speciﬁc experimental design and
the design of the software platform.
In the surveys the participants indicated whether an item was not relevant (X¯ = 1),
relevant (X¯ = 2), or highly relevant (X¯ = 3). Furthermore, it was possible that a
representative did not answer a question (X¯ = 0). Hence, a result from the survey and
the associated variable X¯ is coded by two dummy variables X and X within the re-
gression analysis.10 The linear regression analysis allows a quantiﬁcation of the strength
of the relationship between variables, and analyzes which of the variables are related
to a simulation result, as well as which of the subsets of variables contains redundant
information. The resulting variables comprise the regression model that should help
to explain some simulation results in more detail. In the next sections, the abatement
strategies, the price discovery, and the trading strategies of the participants are analyzed
in more detail by the correlation and regression analysis. Afterwards, a discussion of the
results regarding the causes and eﬀects in the simulation results will be given.
5.2.3 Evaluation of the Abatement Strategies
The realization of the baseline scenario speciﬁed in the preparation phase was associated
with a development of 431 ha new settlement and commercial areas (Table 5.1). By the
substitution of development options in the outer areas with options in the inner areas,
the municipalities could reduce the total amount of new areas by a maximum amount
9This could be the result of the scaling of the municipalities in the experimental study.
10If X = 0 and X = 1 the item was rated as very relevant, if X = 1 and X = 0 the item is relevant,
and if X = 0 and X = 0 holds the item was not relevant.
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of 119 ha. In comparison to the baseline scenario, this corresponds to a total reduction
potential of 27.6%. In the ﬁrst simulation run, 56.4 ha less than the demand determined
by the individual baseline scenarios were allocated to all municipalities. This implies
that the municipalities obtained 13.1% less certiﬁcates than in their initial baseline
development and had to reconcile their development strategies accordingly.
PP1 PP2 PP3 PP4 PP5 All
Baseline Scenario 77.18 125.02 84.41 52.18 92.62 431.40
Allocation 100.12 88.52 75.00 61.48 49.88 375.00
Simulation Scenario 64.57 98.29 60.01 47.23 74.97 345.07
Transfer +/- 35.55 25.78 40.77 55.02 29.93 -
Table 5.6: Allocation, Transfer and Usage of Certiﬁcates (in ha)
Table 5.6 shows the development of new areas in the ﬁrst simulation run and a com-
parison with the baseline scenario in each planning period. In the simulation run, the
municipalities developed only 345.07 ha new land in the outer zone, which corresponds
to an actual reduction of 20% compared to the baseline scenario. In comparison to the
baseline scenario, the municipalities reduced the total amount of newly developed areas
in each planning period. Due to the fact that banking was allowed, surplus certiﬁcates
could be transferred into the subsequent planning period. In each planning period, cer-
tiﬁcates were transferred from period to period, resulting in a ﬁnal stock of 29.93 ha
certiﬁcates at the end of the simulation.
As discussed in Chapter 3, the land development decisions and the abatement strate-
gies of local representatives are inﬂuenced by many factors. The initial individual balance
of certiﬁcates in each planning period, based on the primary allocation of certiﬁcates
and the baseline scenario, could inﬂuence the adaptation of the scenario regarding the
land development in each planning period. The higher the balance of certiﬁcates in a
planning period, the more areas should be developed in the simulation.
Figure 5.3 depicts the initial certiﬁcate stock of each planning period in each munici-
pality (n = 70) and the periodical diﬀerence between land development in the simulation
run and land development in the baseline scenario by adaptation of the land development
plans. The weak positive correlation of ρ = 0.213 between the two values indicates that
the initial allocation of certiﬁcates does not strongly inﬂuence the abatement strategies
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of the participants. Hence, when participants had more certiﬁcates, not necessarily more
new land was developed in each planning period compared to the baseline scenario.
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Figure 5.3: Allocation of Certiﬁcates and Adaptation of Land Development
The initial required adaption of land development (the diﬀerence between the primary
allocation of certiﬁcates and the baseline scenario) and the observed adaptation of the
land development plan in the simulation (land development in the simulation minus
baseline) for each municipality is shown in Table 5.7. Again, the correlation coeﬃcient
is weakly positive with a value of ρ = 0.101. The results emphasize the supposition that
the initial allocation of certiﬁcates does not strongly inﬂuence the adaptation of the land
development plan. Thus, other factors than the initial allocation trigger the adaptation
of land development plans.
During the simulation, the participants could adapt their land development plans and
reduce the development of new areas. The selection of a scenario and the abatement
strategy in the simulation run can also be inﬂuenced by the policy networks, the net
present value and the indicator prices of a scenario compared to alternative scenarios.
If political relevance is an important criterion for decision making, purely economic
decisions should be less likely. As a result, the net present value, the land development,
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Municipality Initial Adaptation Adaptation in Simulation
1 -1.324 -2.925
2 -4.502 0.832
3 -1.938 -4.550
4 0.849 -15.129
5 -1.610 -4.938
6 -2.927 0.000
7 -10.039 -5.476
8 -2.788 -16.200
9 -6.713 -9.460
10 -1.645 0.000
11 -12.823 -9.900
12 -7.778 -7.441
13 -2.230 -10.000
14 -0.934 -1.140
Sum. -56.402 -86.327
Table 5.7: Adaptation of Land Development Plans (in ha)
and the indicator price of the scenario will diﬀer considerably from the reference values
of the optimal solution. An abatement strategy of a participant, which is based on the
indicator price, might include the net present value of the development options. Hence,
if the item net present value is more relevant, the net present value of the simulation
scenario compared to the baseline scenario should be higher. The development of new
residential and commercial areas could be encouraged by the policy network and the
relevance of this network can impact the new land development (see Section 3.1.1 and
Section 3.1.2).
Hence, the participants were asked after simulation run 1 (S1) and simulation run 2
(S2) what the main criteria for their decisions were and a survey concerning ﬁve items
was conducted (see Figure 5.4).11
The selection of development options in the group of the local representatives was
mostly driven by non-economic criteria. Most of the participants preferred to develop
speciﬁc areas because they had a high political priority. Next to development options
11The results of the second simulation are also listed because a short discussion of the second simulation
follows at the end of the chapter.
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Figure 5.4: Criteria for Decisions on Options
with high political priority, options that did not require any certiﬁcates were also relevant
to the subjects. Furthermore, some participants in the workshop pointed out that they
reduced the demand for certiﬁcates in order to be independent from the market and to
reduce the risk of paying high certiﬁcate prices in later planning periods. These partici-
pants hoarded certiﬁcates at the beginning of the planning simulation. Furthermore, the
participants had diﬃculties in analyzing the scenario from an economic perspective and
it is astonishing how little relevance the most important economic criteria, the indicator
price and the net present value of the development options, had for the municipalities
in the ﬁrst simulation run.12
Preferences During the Adaptation of a Land Development Plan
Based on the simulation and the survey data, the strategic behavior of the participants
will be analyzed in more detail. As mentioned in the last section the amount of allocated
certiﬁcates had only little impact on the abatement strategy of the participants. By
12A comparison between the subjects pools is given by Ostertag et al., 2010. It shows that the student
control group was driven more strongly by economic criteria, which had a positive impact on their
overall incomes in the simulation. Due to the fact that the control group had an economic background
these diﬀerences are not surprising.
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combining the simulation results with the survey results further insights into municipal
decision making are possible. The consideration of the criteria from the surveys allows an
analysis of the preferences during the adaptation of a land development plan. Therefore,
the main focus of the abatement strategy analysis is on the link between the individual
simulation results and the importance of the items for each participant identiﬁed in the
surveys.
Municipality NPV NPC IP SAV POL
1 1 2 1 2 3
2 2 1 2 2 3
3 2 3 3 1 3
4 2 3
5 2 2 3 3 1
6 1 2 1 1 3
7 1 1 1 1 1
8 2 1 2
9 1 2 2 3 1
10 1 2 1 2 3
11 2 1 2 3
12 1 3 2 3 1
13 1 1 2 3 1
14 1 2 3
Avg. 1.38 1.79 1.80 2.15 2.17
Table 5.8: Preferences of the Participants
Table 5.8 shows the results of the survey for each of the 14 municipalities as well
as the ﬁve items, net present value (NPV), net present value per certiﬁcate (NPC),
indicator price (IP), saving of certiﬁcates (SAV), and political relevance (POL).13 The
results show a strong correlation between the net present values and the indicator price
(ρNPV,IP = 0.732). Thus, participants who have considered the net present value during
the selection and adaptation of the land development plan have likely also considered
the indicator price by comparing the new scenario with the previous one. Furthermore,
the net present value is positively correlated with the political priority of development
options (ρPOL,NPV = 0.311). However, the indicator price is negatively correlated with
131 = no relevance, 2 = relevant, 3 = highly relevant.
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the political priority (ρPOL,IP = −0.298). This result indicates that a high political
relevance of a development option can trigger a land development plan which is not
eﬃcient from an economic perspective.
Preferences and the Development of New Areas
Table 5.9 compares the land development of the simulation run with the baseline scenario
for each municipality. In the following, the items of the survey are compared with
the land development in the diﬀerent scenarios. The item NPV is weakly correlated
with the land development in the baseline scenario and the simulation runs (ρNPV,BL =
0.085 and ρNPV,SIM = −0.042). Thus, choosing development options according to these
economic criteria in the experiment is not linked to a speciﬁc amount of new land
development. In contrast, municipalities have determined less new land development
when the participants chose options that are politically relevant (ρPOL,BL = −0.220
and ρPOL,SIM = −0.057). As explained in Chapter 3, especially in small municipalities
the policy networks have a high relevance for local decision makers when selecting a
land development plan. Furthermore, participants who used the indicator price during
their decision making developed less new land in their scenarios (ρIP,BL = −0.270 and
ρIP,SIM = −0.208).
The correlation coeﬃcient between the three items and the diﬀerence between the
simulation and the baseline scenario in terms of land development (Diﬀerence Land De-
velopment, DLA) can provide information about the individual preferences. By means
of the linear regression analysis, the relationship between the land development and
the variables from the surveys is investigated. The regression model is shown in Equa-
tion 5.1 and includes the variables net present value, the indicator price, and the political
relevance.14
DLAi = β0 + β1 · NPVi + β2 · IPi + β3 · IP#i + β4 · POL#i (5.1)
The results of the regression analysis are shown in Table 5.10. Local representatives
who adapt the scenario on the basis of the net present values tend to increase the
14For the regression analysis, the variables from the survey were subdivided by dummy variables as
explained in Section 5.2.2, e.g. the survey results of the item indicator price were coded by the
variables IP (relevant) and IP # (very relevant).
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Municipality Baseline (BL) Simulation (SIM) Diﬀerence (DLA)
1 9.500 6.575 -2.925
2 32.300 33.132 0.832
3 13.903 9.353 -4.550
4 20.666 5.537 -15.129
5 11.550 6.612 -4.938
6 21.000 21.000 0.000
7 72.020 66.544 -5.476
8 20.000 3.800 -16.200
9 48.160 38.700 -9.460
10 11.800 11.800 0.000
11 92.000 82.100 -9.900
12 55.802 48.361 -7.441
13 16.000 6.000 -10.000
14 6.700 5.560 -1.140
Sum. 431.401 345.073 -86.328
Table 5.9: Land Development (in ha)
development of new land by 7 ha on average (β1 = 6.939). A negative correlation
between the usage of the indicator price and the changes of the land development in the
simulation (ρIP,DLA = −0.312) is underpinned by the regression coeﬃcients β2 = −4.721
and β3 = −8.867 of the indicator price variables. Thus, the higher the relevance of the
indicator price, the less land a municipality developed in the simulation. If a decision
maker rated the indicator price as relevant the reduction was 4.7 hectare on average,
and if the item was rated as very relevant even 8.9 hectare were developed less. In
contrast to the economic aspects, high political priority is positively correlated with a
medium correlation coeﬃcient of ρPOL,DLA = 0.417. The inﬂuence of political aspects on
the adaptation of the municipal land development plans is also reﬂected by the positive
regression coeﬃcient of β4 = 2.858, which means that on average 2.9 ha more land was
developed if a decision maker rated political priority as relevant. However, due to the
p-value of 0.119 the impact of the political priority is identiﬁed as not signiﬁcant within
the regression analysis.
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Variable Regression Coeﬃcient Standard Error t-value p-value
Constant -4.246 1.422 -2.986 0.031
NPV 6.939 2.483 2.795 0.038
IP -4.721 1.728 -2.733 0.041
IP# -8.867 3.103 -2.858 0.036
POL# 2.858 1.520 1.880 0.119
Table 5.10: Regression Land Development
Net Present Values of the Land Development Plan
Table 5.11 lists the net present values of the land development plans associated with
the realization of the development options for each municipality. The data is used to
calculate the correlation coeﬃcients with the items of the survey. The item NPV is
weakly positively correlated with the net present values of the baseline and simulation
scenario (ρNPV,BL = 0.085 and ρNPV,SIM = −0.085). Thus, the results of representatives,
who have considered the net present value while selecting an appropriate scenario, are
not related to a high net present value of a land development plan in the simulation.
The item political relevance is also weakly positively correlated with the net present
value of the scenarios (ρPOL,BL = 0.171 and ρPOL,SIM = 0.269). Furthermore, the item
indicator price is negatively correlated with the net present values (ρIP,BL = −0.091
and ρIP,SIM = −0.337). However, the medium correlation coeﬃcient between the land
developed and the net present value of the baseline scenario ρ = 0.417 underpins that
the development of new land is generally linked to additional incomes.
The table also shows the diﬀerence between the net present value between the simu-
lation scenarios of the baseline scenarios (DNP) by the adaptation of land development
plans in the simulation, which is the subject of investigation in the correlation and re-
gression analysis. Equation 5.2 summarizes the variables of the regression model that
had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the change of the net present value in the simulation runs.
DNPi = β0 + β1 · NPVi + β2 · NPC#i + β3 · IPi + β4 · IP#i + β5 · SAV #i (5.2)
The inﬂuence of the item NPV (β1 = 26, 138.380) shows that the higher the im-
portance of the net present value was, the higher was the result in the simulation
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Municipality Baseline Simulation Diﬀerence (DNP)
1 -418.027 -2,634.372 -2,216.344
2 59,191.871 78,214.502 19,022.631
3 3,325.439 2,953.672 -371.767
4 -38,541.336 -43,822.747 -5,281.412
5 0.000 -3,601.887 -3,601.887
6 43,726.585 43,726.585 0.000
7 7,123.810 6,133.992 -989.817
8 11,081.154 -1,580.528 -12,661.682
9 3,771.389 1,887.334 -1,884.055
10 22,473.105 22,473.105 0.000
11 24,586.697 18,521.811 -6,064.886
12 4,485.807 10,271.183 5,785.376
13 11,776.961 9,100.532 -2,676.429
14 3,768.787 2,579.315 -1,189.472
Table 5.11: Net Present Value (in mu)
compared to the baseline scenario (see Table 5.12). On average, a municipality had
a net present value that was 26,238 mu higher than in the baseline scenario if the local
representative rated the item NPV as relevant. The relevance of the indicator price
during the adaptation of the land development plans led to additional costs and reduced
the net present values of the plans in the simulation by 6,314 mu, respectively 33,774
mu (β3 = −6, 314.210 and β4 = −33, 774.235). In case the participants used the net
present value per hectare of the development options during the decision making (dis-
played by the decision support system) the total net present value was 8,066 mu higher
(β2 = 8, 065.625). Furthermore, if participants rated the item SAV as very relevant, a
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the land development plan can also be observed (β5 = 4, 835.505).
In contrast to the economic items, a high political priority has no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on
the outcome in the simulation and the item was also excluded in the regression analysis
(ρPOL,DNP = −0.074).
Hence, political relevance indicates that a municipality has higher incomes in the
baseline, but not necessarily that the incomes are optimal after introducing a system
of development certiﬁcates. Other factors, such as an economic comparison of diﬀer-
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Variable Regression Coeﬃcient Standard Error t-value p-value
Constant -801.540 476.705 -1.681 0.168
NPV 26,138.380 2,335.369 11.192 <0.001
NPC# 8,065.625 1,167.685 6.907 0.002
IP -6,314.210 2,184.538 -2.890 0.045
IP# -33,774.235 3,661.642 -9.224 0.001
SAV # 4,835.505 1,783.668 2.711 0.053
Table 5.12: Regression Net Present Value
ent scenarios and the usage of the indicator prices, seem to be more relevant for the
achievement of higher net present values of land development plans.
5.2.4 Price Discovery
Similarly to the analysis of the abatement strategy, the price discovery process is ana-
lyzed by combining the results of the surveys with the observed transaction prices in the
simulation. The market price in the simulation and the theoretical market price in the
optimal scenario are shown in Figure 5.5.15
In the simulation, the market price was generally higher than the theoretical market
price with a high price variance in the ﬁrst planning period. A high price ﬂuctuation
can be an indicator for an intensive price discovery process in the ﬁrst planning period
(Table 5.13). In the following periods, the market price starts to rise continuously with a
lower price ﬂuctuation. Hence, in the following planning periods II and III, consistently
high transaction prices of the TDCs can be observed. At the end of planning period IV,
the certiﬁcate price decreases again, resulting in a high price variance in the last period
with prices between 500 and 1,500 monetary units per hectare. Thus, a bubble-shaped
price path over the planning periods can be observed, which ends in a complete price
collapse in the last period.
Table 5.13 also shows the diﬀerence between the average market price and the price
in the optimal scenario. Reacting to the high prices, the participants might realize
15According to the Hotelling-rule, the theoretical market price increases at the rate of the interest rate
(here 4%).
16For the calculation of the average price, the transactions are weighted with the trading volumes.
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Figure 5.5: Price Discovery Process in Simulation Run 1
many expensive development options that presumably would not have been activated
following a correct price development. Even though no details about the total amount of
certiﬁcates were given, some participants argued at the ﬁnal workshop that they hoarded
surplus certiﬁcates for speculation purposes instead of selling them on the market. The
high supply of certiﬁcates in the last planning period and the decreasing demand for
certiﬁcates might have led to the price collapse. In the last period, the market price
came back down to a lower level, since unused certiﬁcates had a ﬁnal book value of 80%
of the average market price in the last planning period.17
17It can be noted that the price discovery process in the student control group diﬀered from the price
discovery of the expert group. The market price in the student group was lower than in the expert
group, but also above the theoretical price with a high price variance at the beginning. In response
to the observed high market prices, this could also lead to the initiation of more costly development
options in the student group. The analysis of the student group is not focus of this book. A more
detailed comparison of the two groups is already given by Ostertag et al. (2010).
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PP1 PP2 PP3 PP4 PP5 All
Standard Deviation 665.60 62.92 64.39 131.84 449.16 635.81
Avg. Price16 (in mu) 1,312.74 1,814.41 1,818.82 1,730.26 583.06 1,455.68
Opt. Price (in mu) 189.98 213.70 240.39 270.40 304.16 243.73
Diﬀerence (in mu) 1,122.76 1,600.71 1,578.44 1,459.86 278.89 1,211.96
Table 5.13: Market Price
Preferences of the Participants when Selling Certiﬁcates
In order to analyze the price discovery process in more detail, the participants were asked
which criteria were important when selling or buying certiﬁcates on the market after the
simulation run. The participants could rate how relevant the criteria last transaction
price (TRA), current buy orders (CBU), current sell orders (CSE), maximum price
(MAX), sanction price (SAN), and indicator price (IND) were when trading certiﬁcates.
Figure 5.6 depicts the survey results of the ﬁrst (S1) and the second simulation run (S2).
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Figure 5.6: Criteria in the Price Discovery Process
140
5 Tradable Development Certiﬁcates in a Field Experiment
Due to the fact that this section focuses on the ﬁrst simulation run, the results of
the ﬁrst survey are of importance at this point.18 The ﬁgure indicates that the last
transactions and the current order prices inﬂuenced the price discovery process. In the
following, the analysis focuses on the observed transaction prices and not the individual
order prices. An analysis of the correlation of the individual order prices and indicator
prices has been conducted by Ostertag et al. (2010). The study shows that the order
prices are aﬀected very little by the indicator price and correlate with the prices of the last
transactions. About half of the participants rated the criteria as very relevant. Almost
all participants rated the criteria at least as relevant. In contrast, the maximum price
and the sanction price were perceived less important. Noticeably, also the indicator price
was of less importance than the last transactions and only six participants considered it
during the trading. Furthermore, Table 5.14 lists the results of the surveys for the sell
orders of the six items.19
Municipality IND SAN MAX CSE CBU TRA
1 2 3 1 2 2 2
2
3 1 1 2 3 3 3
4
5 1 1 3 3 3
6 1 2 3 2 2 3
7 1 1 3 3 3 3
8 2 3 3 3
9 2 1 3 3 2 2
10 2 1 1 3 3 2
11 2 2 2 3 3 2
12 1 3 2 2 2 3
13 1 2 3 3 3 2
14 2 1 1 2 2 1
Avg. 1.55 1.64 2.00 2.67 2.58 2.42
Table 5.14: Price Discovery Preferences (Sell Orders)
18The results of the second simulation are also listed because a short discussion of the second simulation
follows at the end of the chapter.
191 = no relevance, 2 = relevant, 3 = highly relevant.
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The item indicator price is strongly negatively correlated with the prices of the last
transactions and the maximum price (ρIND,MAX = −0.590 and ρIND,TRA = −0.638).
Thus, local representatives who had based their decisions to sell certiﬁcates on the
indicator price, rated the maximum price and the prices of the last transactions as
not relevant. The weak correlation between the two items maximum price and the
prices of the last transaction shows also the existence of a link between these items
(ρTRA,MAX = 0.298): If local representatives take the maximum price of 2,000 mu into
account when selling certiﬁcates, they also tend to take into account the last transaction
price. However, due to the fact that almost all transactions are close to the maximum
price of 2,000 mu, the fact that both items are positively correlated is evident.
Price Discovery of the Participants when Selling Certiﬁcates
Table 5.15 lists the data for the further analysis of the price discovery process. The
average selling prices (ASP) are weighted average transaction prices. The table also
contains the weighted average abatement costs (AAC) for each participant. The value
shows the average ﬁnancial eﬀort of each municipality to reduce one hectare of settlement
and traﬃc area. Municipalities which have low average abatement costs, have also low
indicator prices when comparing diﬀerent scenarios.
In the following, the variables that inﬂuenced the average sell price of the participants
are discussed. The correlation analysis identiﬁes that the importance of the maximum
price had a medium inﬂuence on the average prices (ρMAX,ASP = 0.339). Thus, partic-
ipants who sold certiﬁcates at high prices considered the maximum price within their
trading strategy. However, within the regression analysis of the resulting regression
model no signiﬁcant inﬂuence could be observed:
ASPi = β0 + β1 · MAXi + β2 · MAX#i (5.3)
The estimated regression coeﬃcients are shown in Table 5.16. Due to the p-values, the
relevance of the maximum price, identiﬁed in the surveys, had no signiﬁcant inﬂuence
on the high prices in the simulation run. The item may have a positive impact on the
transaction prices, but this impact was not statistically signiﬁcant within the analysis.
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Municipality ASP AAC
1 1,559.260 757.725
2 22,863.739
3 1,524.500 81.707
4 1,041.210 349.084
5 1,552.630 729.422
6
7 180.742
8 1,817.510 781.585
9 1,939.900 199.160
10 658.070
11 1,880.890 612.615
12 1,471.840 -777.479
13 1,287.160 267.643
14 902.730 1,043.397
Table 5.15: Price Discovery Sell Orders (in mu)
The inﬂuence of other variables analyzed within the scope of the regression analysis,
had no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the average sell prices. Between the item sanction pay-
ments and the average price only a weak correlation can be observed (ρSAN,ASP = 0.166).
Furthermore, the indicator price had only little impact on the average sell price and a
weak correlation between these indicators (ρIND,ASP = 0.274) exists. This shows that
the more relevant the indicator price was for a participant, the higher are the average
prices—even though the correlation was identiﬁed as not signiﬁcant in the regression
analysis.
Variable Regression Coeﬃcient Standard Error t-value p-value
Constant 1,040.022 223.072 4.662 0.006
MAX 585.722 315.471 1.857 0.122
MAX# 573.508 352.708 1.626 0.165
Table 5.16: Regression Sell Price
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Preferences of the Participants when Purchasing Certiﬁcates
Table 5.17 shows the results of the survey that are used to analyze the trading behavior
of the participants when purchasing certiﬁcates.20 In contrast to the preferences when
selling certiﬁcates, the correlation between the indicator price and the maximum price,
as well as the correlation between the indicator price and the price of the last transaction
are ρIND,MAX = −0.204 and ρIND,TRA = −0.335. Furthermore, the correlation between
the two items is again weakly positive (ρTRA,MAX = 0.265). Thus, the more relevant the
maximum price was, the more relevant was also the price of the last transaction.
Municipality IND SAN MAX CSE CBU TRA
1 2 3 1 2 2 2
2
3 1 1 2 3 3 3
4
5 1 1 3 3 3
6 1 2 3 2 2 3
7 1 1 3 3 3 3
8 2 3 3 3
9 2 1 3 3 2 2
10 2 1 1 3 3 2
11 2 2 2 3 3 2
12 1 3 2 2 2 3
13 1 2 3 3 3 2
14 2 1 1 2 2 1
14 1.36 1.60 1.56 2.50 2.50 2.50
Table 5.17: Price Discovery Preferences (Buy Orders)
Notably, the indicator price and the sanction payments are positively medium corre-
lated (ρIND,SAN = 0.345). In contrast, only a weak correlation between the two items
when selling certiﬁcates was observed. A possible explanation is that the participants
also considered the sanction payments when buying certiﬁcates. An eﬃcient land de-
velopment plan is only realizable if a municipality has enough certiﬁcates. If enough
certiﬁcates are available, the inﬂuence of the sanction price should be lower, because
201 = no relevance, 2 = relevant, 3 = highly relevant.
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losses of interest by hoarding certiﬁcates should be low compared to the high sanction
payments. Therefore, a relevance of the sanction price only arises in case not enough
certiﬁcates are available. Furthermore, the payment of sanctions could even be beneﬁ-
cial if the price drops more than the sanction payments between the two periods. Both
eﬀects could explain why participants, who consider the indicator price as relevant, also
rated the relevance of the sanction payment high.
Price Discovery of the Participants when Purchasing Certiﬁcates
Table 5.18 lists the average transaction prices when purchasing certiﬁcates (ABP) and
the average abatement costs (AAC).
Municipality ABP AAC
1 762.380 757.725
2 1,435.970 22,863.739
3 1,095.730 81.707
4 349.084
5 729.422
6 620.260
7 1,092.930 180.742
8 1,755.730 781.585
9 199.160
10 1,804.760
11 1,668.280 612.615
12 1,796.020 -777.479
13 381.840 267.643
14 1,408.850 1,043.397
Table 5.18: Price Discovery Buying Order (in mu)
For explaining the observed data and the price discovery process, the inﬂuence of the
items on the average buy price is being analyzed in the regression analysis. The items
sanction price and transaction price are identiﬁed as the variables that signiﬁcantly
inﬂuenced the price discovery process:
ABPi = β0 + β1 · SAN#i + β2 · TRA#i (5.4)
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The regression coeﬃcients of β1 = −817.080 and β2 = −781.771 show that participants
who considered the last transactions and the sanction price tend to buy certiﬁcates at
lower price levels (Table 5.19). If a participant rated the sanction payment (1,000 mu)
as very relevant during the price discovery process, the individual weighted transaction
price was 817 mu lower on average, and if a participant rated the last transaction prices
as important, the prices were 781 mu lower. In contrast to the average sell prices, the
maximum price only had little impact and was excluded in the regression analysis. The
relevance of the maximum price when purchasing certiﬁcates is positively correlated
with the average transaction prices with a weak correlation coeﬃcient of ρMAX,ABP =
0.261. Similarly to the analysis of the behavior when selling certiﬁcates, participants
who rated the indicator price as relevant, realized higher average transaction prices but
with no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the transaction prices. Here, a medium correlation can
be observed with a correlation coeﬃcient of ρIND,ABP = 0.418.
Variable Regression Coeﬃcient Standard Error t-value p-value
Constant 1,579.461 142.704 11.068 <0.001
SAN# -817.080 319.096 -2.561 0.043
TRA# -781.771 201.814 -3.874 0.008
Table 5.19: Regression Buy Price
5.2.5 Trading Strategies
In order to analyze the trading strategies of the participants, the observed trading vol-
umes will be compared to the certiﬁcate balances and the minimal trading volumes of
the optimal scenario (see Section 5.1.2). However, in contrast to the analysis of the
price discovery processes and the abatement strategy, no survey data was available for
the evaluation.
If a municipality does not have enough certiﬁcates in a planning period to realize
the land development, a purchase of certiﬁcates on the market will be necessary. In
case of a positive individual balance, TDC sales can be expected. The same applies
to the balance of certiﬁcates when regarding the remaining periods of the realized land
development plan. If a municipality needs additional certiﬁcates until the end of the
simulation, the likelihood of an additional purchase volume in a speciﬁc planning period
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should be higher. Municipalities with surplus certiﬁcates should sell certiﬁcates on the
market.
PP1 PP2 PP3 PP4 PP5 All
Trading Volume in the Simulation Run 10.02 12.56 7.87 8.68 10.53 49.66
Optimal Volume 15.68 19.15 2.61 3.43 10.58 51.45
Control Group 15.68 16.40 7.35 19.23 11.71 70.37
Table 5.20: Comparison of Trading Volumes (in ha)
Furthermore, the trading volumes could be conform to the minimal trading volumes
of the optimal scenario. The minimal trading volume necessary to achieve the optimal
solution in the simulation is a TDC amount of 51.45 ha (Table 5.20). Compared to this
theoretical benchmark, the experts have traded 2.21 ha less in the simulation run. This
fact shows that the municipalities have not traded enough certiﬁcates to provide a cost
eﬀective solution, whereas the trading volumes in the student group are suﬃcient for an
optimal market result.21
Figure 5.7 compares the observed individual trading balance in each planning pe-
riod (sell volume minus buy volume) of the simulation run (TVS) with the minimal
trading volumes in the optimal scenario (TVO). The Pearson correlation coeﬃcient of
ρTV S,TV O = 0.318 shows that the simulation results are positively correlated with the
trading volumes in the optimal scenario.
The trading volumes of each municipality in each planning period (sell volume minus
buy volume) and the individual certiﬁcate balances in the planning periods (DEP) are
depicted in Figure 5.8. The correlation coeﬃcient ρTV S,DEP = 0.569 shows a strong
correlation between these values, and strengthens the supposition that the trading vol-
ume was mostly driven by the individual demand in each planning period. Hence, if
a municipality has a positive balance of certiﬁcates, also a positive trading volume is
observable.
Figure 5.9 depicts the correlation between the trading volume and the cumulated
demand for certiﬁcates of all municipalities until the end of the simulation (DES). The
strong correlation coeﬃcient ρTV S,DES = 0.510 outlines that the local representatives
21The control group traded certiﬁcates of 70.37 ha in the simulation.
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Figure 5.7: Trading Volumes in the Optimal Scenario and in the Simulation
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Figure 5.8: Trading Volumes and Balance in each Planning Period
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also considered their demand for certiﬁcates until the end of the simulation, and adapted
their trading strategy based on this value.
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Figure 5.9: Trading Volumes and Demand for the Scenario
The regression analysis identiﬁes that the DES and DEP have the highest impact on
the trading volume in the simulation:
TV Si = β0 + β1 · DEPi + β2 · DESi (5.5)
The results of the regression analysis are shown in Table 5.21. The highest impact
on the observed trading volume in the simulation has the periodical need of certiﬁcates
with a p-value < 0.001 and a regression coeﬃcient of β1 = 0.200. In comparison,
the cumulated need for certiﬁcates until the end of the simulation has a lower impact
on the trading volume (p-value of 0.008 and β2 = 0.120). Nevertheless, both variables
signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the amount of certiﬁcates the participants traded in each planning
period.
For a better understanding of the connection between the trading volumes and the
price discovery process, the average transaction prices and the individual balance of
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Variable Regression Coeﬃcient Standard Error t-value p-value
Constant 0.822 0.230 3.567 0.001
DEP 0.200 0.052 3.817 <0.001
DES 0.120 0.044 2.754 0.008
Table 5.21: Regression Trading Volumes
certiﬁcates are listed in Table 5.22. The table shows the average transaction prices
when selling certiﬁcates for each municipality in the ﬁve planning periods. The regression
analysis has shown that if a negative periodical balance (a negative periodical balance
is labeled in the table as P) or a negative scenario balance for the remaining land
development plan (S) exists, the likelihood for transactions (purchasing certiﬁcates) is
higher. Furthermore, if there is a negative balance in a planning period, there is a need
to buy the certiﬁcates in order to avoid sanction payments.
PP1 PP2 PP3 PP4 PP5 All
K1 P,S762.38 P - - - - 762.38
K2 S - P,S1,815.00 S - S1,630.51 P,S1,077.43 1,435.97
K3 - - - 1,637.52 614.81 1,095.73
K4 - - - - - -
K5 - - - - - -
K6 P,S - S - S - S - P,S620.26 620.26
K7 P,S1,552.08 S - S1,853.70 P,S1,839.22 7.96 1,092.93
K8 1,832.95 - - 1,500.53 - 1,755.73
K9 - - - - - -
K10 P,S1,540.00 P,S1,898.12 P,S1,823.89 P,S1,833.06 - 1,804.76
K11 S450.00 P,S1,845.12 - 1,517.00 - 1,668.28
K12 S - S1,798.85 P1,793.97 - - 1,796.02
K13 - - - 1,700.00 372.43 381.84
K14 827.50 P,S1,851.00 1,850.00 1,600.40 - 1,408.85
Table 5.22: Weighted Transaction Prices in the Simulation Run (in mu)
The table shows that most of the trading activities were triggered by the need of
municipalities to buy certiﬁcates in order to have enough certiﬁcates for realizing the land
development in a planning period or the total land development plan. If a municipality
has a negative balance in a planning period, the purchasing of certiﬁcates is more likely
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and the weighted transactions price will be shown in the table. For instance, six out
of the nine municipalities that bought certiﬁcates in planning periods II and III needed
certiﬁcates in order to avoid sanction payments. Only one local representative bought
certiﬁcates without a periodical need and a negative scenario balance. Furthermore,
the analysis of the price discovery process (Section 5.2.4) shows the inﬂuence of the
sanction payments when purchasing certiﬁcates on the market. The results underpin the
supposition that the trading strategy was mainly inﬂuenced by the individual balance
within the planning period and by possible sanction payments.
5.2.6 Outcomes in the Simulation Run
The previous analyses have focused on the impact of diﬀerent items on the total net
present value of the land development plans, the price discovery process and the trading
volumes. In this section, the inﬂuence of the diﬀerent items on the main simulation
outcome, the game result in monetary units is analyzed. If incomes and costs from
trading certiﬁcates as well as sanction payments are added to the net present values of the
land development plans (see Section 5.2.3), the total net present value of the simulation
scenario (the so called individual simulation outcome, ISO) for each participant can be
calculated (Table 5.23).
By means of the regression analysis the regression model identiﬁes which variables have
inﬂuenced the individual simulation outcomes of each player compared to the baseline
scenario. Four factors have been identiﬁed that had an impact on the diﬀerence of the
net present value between the outcome in simulation run and the baseline (DNP), which
results in Equation 5.6. Other variables, for instance the item NPV that is correlated
with the individual simulation outcome of each player (positive correlation coeﬃcient
of ρDNP,NPV = 0.296), had no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the outcome. Similarly, political
priority is only weakly correlated with the total net present value and has no impact on
the simulation outcome (ρDNP,POL = 0.024).
DNPi = β0 + β1 · IPi + β2 · IP#i + β3 · POL#i + β4 · MAXi. (5.6)
The item indicator price has a signiﬁcant impact on the simulation outcome (see
Table 5.24), which is also underpinned by the positively correlated medium correlation
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Municipality Baseline (BL) Simulation (ISO) Diﬀerence (DNP)
1 -418.027 2,873.658 3,291.685
2 59,191.871 67,690.877 8,499.006
3 3,325.439 7,083.640 3,758.201
4 -38,541.336 -33,229.963 5,311.372
5 0.000 623.683 623.683
6 43,726.585 35,522.266 -8,204.320
7 7,123.810 -7,167.631 -14,291.441
8 11,081.154 30,043.002 18,961.848
9 3,771.389 9,618.402 5,847.013
10 22,473.105 7,690.297 -14,782.807
11 24,586.697 5,839.648 -18,747.049
12 4,485.807 -11,059.370 -15,545.177
13 11,776.961 16,050.527 4,273.565
14 3,768.787 1,634.040 -2,134.748
Table 5.23: Outcomes in the Simulation Run (in mu)
coeﬃcient of ρDNP,IP = 0.402. Therefore, if local municipalities include the indicator
price of land development plans into their abatement strategies, additional incomes for
the municipalities are more likely: If a participant rated the indicator price as relevant,
the individual simulation outcome was 21,008 mu higher on average compared to results
of participants that rated the indicator price as not relevant (regression coeﬃcient of
β1 = 21, 008.319). If the participant rated the indicator price as very relevant, the
outcome increases by 21,541 mu (β2 = 21, 541.479).
Thus, by including the indicator price into the abatement strategy, a higher simu-
lation result and a signiﬁcantly higher net present value can be expected. Moreover,
the regression analysis shows the impact of the items political relevance and maximum
price on the individual game result in the simulation scenario (β3 = 12, 143.863 and
β4 = −15, 635.700). However, due to high p-values, a statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence
of these variables can not be proved.22 As an overall result, the regression analysis
proposes that the overall game result was mainly inﬂuenced by the usage of the indica-
tor price supported by the planning tool. Therefore, the usage of the decision support
22Due to the fact that the variable MAX had no signiﬁcant impact on the net present value of the
scenario, another reason for the rejection of the hypothesis that the maximum price has an impact
on the outcome is given.
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tool enhanced the decisions in the simulation run and facilitated the development of an
appropriate land usage scenario.
Variable Regression Coeﬃcient Standard Error t-value p-value
Constant -17,604.618 6,629.587 -2.655 0.057
IP 21,008.319 8,958.745 2.345 0.079
IP  21,541.479 8,060.500 2.672 0.056
POL 12,143.863 7,314.785 1.660 0.172
MAX -15,635.700 7,571.521 -2.065 0.108
Table 5.24: Regression Simulation Outcomes
5.3 Discussion of the Simulation Results
The results of the previous section have shown that the indicator price was relevant
for some local representatives during their decision making in the simulation runs. The
decision support tool allowed the economic comparison of diﬀerent scenarios by signaling
an indicator price. If a municipal decision maker considered the indicator price, which
was provided by the decision support tool, a higher outcome was observable. The more
relevant the indicator price and the net present values of the development options were
for a municipal decision maker, the higher were the total incomes for the municipality
in the simulation. Hence, the implementation of the decision support tool and the
implementation of the indicator price tool facilitated the decision making and supported
the determination of an appropriate individual abatement strategy in the simulation run.
Municipalities that based their decisions on economic criteria, also pursued a reduction
in new land development. In contrast, the political priority had only little impact on
the overall monetary result. When local representatives selected development options
depending on political priority, the total land development was higher. Furthermore, the
results showed the low impact of the primary allocation on the adaption of the initial
land development plan, which was determined in the baseline scenario.
The analyses of the trading strategies in the ﬁrst simulation run revealed that munic-
ipalities took the maximum order price into account, especially when selling certiﬁcates,
and that the indicator price was irrelevant for them. If local municipalities rated the
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indicator price as more relevant, they bought and sold certiﬁcates at prices that reﬂected
the average abatement costs in the simulation more likely. When purchasing certiﬁcates,
the sanction prices were also of importance and inﬂuenced the trading behavior of the
local municipalities. The analyses of the trading strategy revealed that the trading vol-
umes were mainly inﬂuenced by the balance of certiﬁcates in a planning period and not
by minimal trading volumes in the optimal scenario. Furthermore, in planning periods,
wherein the price was relatively high, most municipalities only traded certiﬁcates to
avoid potential sanction payments at the end of the trading period.
Due to the fact that only some participants used the indicator price during the adap-
tion of the land development plans and when transferring certiﬁcates, additional training
courses were conducted after the ﬁrst simulation run. The training courses with the plan-
ning tool were carried out during the second workshop to point out the importance of
this instrument due to the ﬁndings from simulation run 1. As a result, the surveys
showed learning eﬀects for the second simulation run regarding the trading strategies,
which, however, could be overcompensated by the more complex task in simulation 2.
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Figure 5.10: Development of the Market Price in Simulation Run 2
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In the second simulation run, lower market prices than in the ﬁrst simulation run
could be observed (see Figure 5.10). A reason for this might be the surplus allocation of
TDCs in planning periods I and II or learning eﬀects by the additional training courses.
Furthermore, transactions have been observed that are closer to the theoretical price
level in this simulation run. Some experts initiated more costly development options,
potentially in response to the high market prices at the beginning of the simulation run.
Therefore, supply was still suﬃcient and the price level was not increasing in the last
planning periods.
As shown in Section 5.1.1, a total amount of only 331 ha TDCs was allocated in the
second simulation run and the reduction target was more ambitious than in the ﬁrst run.
Nevertheless, the expert group exceeded the required reduction in land development and
developed 309 ha. In comparison, the student control group reduced the development
of new areas only to 337 ha and developed more new areas than the total amount of
certiﬁcates allowed. Due to the ﬁniteness of the planning simulation, it was possible to
develop new areas in the last planning period without handing in the missing certiﬁcates
in the next period. In practice, the surplus certiﬁcates would have been removed from
the initial allocation in the next planning period in order to realize the reduction goal. As
the participating municipalities expect overall proﬁts from new outer-city developments,
limiting urban sprawl was linked to cuts in the cities’ incomes.
Table 5.25 lists the outcomes in the simulation runs and various scenarios of the ﬁeld
experiments on the basis of the initial net present values of the baseline scenario (100%).
The table also shows the outcomes in a no-trade optimum, which represents the optimal
solution if no trading is possible (see also Ostertag et al., 2010). When comparing the
simulation results of both groups with the optimal market results, it can be observed
that the simulation results are quite far from the optimal solution. In both simulation
runs, the net present values in the control group are closer to the optimum than the
results in the expert group. The net present value in the ﬁrst simulation run was 87%
of the baseline scenario in the student and 75% in the expert group. In the second
simulation run, the participants were confronted with the more challenging task. Due
to the ruinous results of three participants, the expert group performed poorly in this
simulation run (-35%). One reason for this result could be that only a few development
options had been predetermined in the second simulation run and hence the task was
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much more complex. However, the result of the student control group (60%) is higher
than the no-trade optimum and eﬃciency gains could also be realized in the second
simulation run by trading certiﬁcates.
The net present value in the ﬁrst simulation run is higher than in the virtual case,
the so called no-trade optimum, in which all municipalities had to reduce their new
development individually by the required 13% without a trading system. Thus, the
simulation results have outperformed this no-trade optimum in the ﬁrst simulation run.
However, in the second simulation run diﬀerent results can be observed. Here, only the
results of the student group outperformed the no-trade optimum.
Scenario Simulation 1 Simulation 2
Baseline 100% 100%
Experts 75% -35%
Control Group 87% 60%
Theoretical Optimum 109% 76%
No-trade Optimum 64% 39%
Table 5.25: Comparison of the Net Present Values
For a comparison of the experimental results and the eﬃciency gains postulated by
theory, the eﬃciency level of each experimental session is calculated. The eﬃciency
measures how much of the eﬃciency gains, generated by an optimal trading compared
to the no-trade solution, have been realized in the planning simulation:
Efficiency = Simulation Result - No-trade SolutionTheoretical Optimum - No-trade Solution
The eﬃciency equals one, when the participants behaved according to the optimal
scenario and realized the cheapest overall reduction potentials. When the eﬃciency is
zero, the simulation result is equal to the no-trade solution and the participants were
not able to use cheaper reduction potentials by trading certiﬁcates. A negative eﬃciency
means that the participants were not able to improve an ineﬃcient no-trade solution by
trading certiﬁcates in the simulation runs. However, by choosing the optimal no-trade
solution as the worst-case reference point, a conservative approach for the calculation of
the eﬃciency level is used.
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Experts Control Group
Simulation 1 0.49 0.93
Simulation 2 -0.82 0.68
Table 5.26: Eﬃciency of the Simulation Runs
Table 5.26 depicts the eﬃciency levels in the four experimental sessions. The students
realized eﬃciency levels of 0.93 and 0.68, which means that they have realized 93% and
68% of the theoretical eﬃciency gains. Previous planning simulations in other domains
have shown similar eﬃciency levels (see Cronshaw and Brown-Kruse, 1999; Schleich
et al., 2006). The negative eﬃciency level of the municipalities in the second simulation
could be a further indicator that actual decision makers have other preferences during
the selection of development options compared to the student group, which focused on
economic aspects when selecting development options.
In spite of the artiﬁcial character of the simulation, the selection of development
options within the simulation was rated as realistic by the participants. The simulation
results of the ﬁeld experiment show that a TDC system can be an appropriate instrument
to reduce the development of new land eﬃciently. An eﬃcient reduction of land usage
can be enabled by new decision support tools that facilitate the municipal decision
making. However, the existence of decision support tools does not necessarily mean
that the instrument works eﬃciently and that gains are always feasible when using the
new instrument. The diﬀerences between the simulation runs, as well as the diﬀerences
between the subject pools, in the ﬁeld experiment are an indication that the participants
need to be familiar with the usage of such DSS.
However, it is questionable whether a purely economic evaluation as an overall criteria
to measure the eﬃciency of the new instrument, is appropriate in this context. Since
the DSS might not map all relevant values, e.g. political priority or complex population
dynamics, the results from this experiment as well as results from similar experiments
should be considered cautiously. For instance, if a municipality ignores the policy net-
work within ﬁeld experiments and bases decisions on economic criteria, high outcomes
in experiments are more likely, but an implementation in reality could be complicated
and might lead to additional costs for other actors within the horizontal and vertical
policy framework (Section 3.2). In future ﬁeld experiments, policy aspects should be in-
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cluded into the modeling of the decision situation in order to evaluate the results of ﬁeld
experiments in land development by those non-economic criteria. For this, the diﬀerent
aspects of the framework proposed in Section 3.1 can be used as a guideline for future
studies.
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In this book, theoretical and empirical methods have been used to investigate the design
of a cap-and-trade scheme for land development in Germany. The results give insights
into how a cap-and-trade scheme can be implemented and reveal how real world decision
makers behave in such a system under close-to-real conditions. Within the Spiel.Raum
study (see Ostertag et al., 2010, Mu¨ller et al., 2010) the experimental methodology was
used in the ﬁeld to gain new insights into the behavior of actual decision makers, which
are diﬃcult to obtain by conducting only theoretical analyses (e.g. Walz et al., 2006,
Ko¨ck et al., 2008, Walz et al., 2009) due to the complexity of the subject of examination.
In the ﬁeld experiment of the study, the decision making of local representatives was
observable and was analyzed in two diﬀerent experimental treatments. For supporting
the decision making process of local representatives, a decision support tool was designed,
which was based on real data stored in an information database. The ﬁeld study points
out the complexity of land use decisions, and emphasizes that causes and eﬀects of urban
sprawl should be investigated in transdisciplinary studies, which may also bring local
representatives into the researchers’ laboratory to analyze the decision making within
other experimental designs and stylized data. In order to answer the four research
questions, the main contributions and the implications of each chapter will be presented
in the following four sections starting with the last chapter and ﬁnishing with the ﬁrst
chapter to discuss the consequences for the underlying chapters, respectively the research
questions. Afterwards, this chapter concludes with an outlook on future work.
6.1 Results of the Field Experiment (Chapter 5)
In order to gain real life experience for municipalities regarding the new instrument, a
potential system with TDCs covering local authorities in Germany was analyzed by using
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the experimental methodology. The experiment was conducted as a ﬁeld experiment with
spatial planners of 14 German cities and municipal syndicates and was based on real
world data of the participating municipalities. The experiment was run with diﬀerent
scheme designs regarding the allocation of the certiﬁcates and the complexity of the task.
By analyzing the market outcomes in the two simulation runs, factors that inﬂuenced
the market outcome, such as the usage of the decision support tool and the complexity
of the task, could be identiﬁed. Compared to the local representatives, a student control
group achieved a higher eﬃciency level. The cost diﬀerence between the simulation
results and the theoretical benchmarks may indicate additional costs of non-quantiﬁable
monetarily goals or the realization of economical ineﬃcient land development plans. The
question as to whether representatives of planning authorities acted ‘less eﬃcient’ than,
for example economic experts, was further investigated in laboratory experiments.1 Of
course, all these ﬁndings are based on a simpliﬁed experimental setting. However, most
of the participants stated in additional surveys that the land utilization and the exercised
development plans in the simulation are realistic.
Despite the fact that most of the local representatives were skeptical about this new
instrument, the ﬁeld experiment has shown that the local authorities were able to reduce
the development of new land in the simulation runs. Some participants realized more
expensive inﬁll projects and partly ﬁnanced these projects with the revenues from selling
unused development certiﬁcates. Moreover, even though one should be careful with the
absolute amount of the cost estimates used for the simulation, the results demonstrate
that the ﬂexibility introduced by the tradability of the development certiﬁcates allowed
overall cost savings as postulated by theory. The results demonstrated that a suitably
developed TDC system can be eﬃcient as well as operational. However, the realized net
present values were further away from the theoretical benchmark than the results in a
student control group. This is an indicator that not all the possible cost potentials were
realized by the local representatives in the ﬁeld experiments. For a more detailed inves-
tigation, the results of the simulation were combined with available data from surveys,
which had been conducted after the simulation runs. This method allowed a further
analysis of the individual decision making of the participants.
1Further laboratory experiments which were conducted in addition to the ﬁeld experiment underpin
these results. The laboratory experiments show that the economics students acted closer to the
theoretical optimum than the spatial planning students, which means that the economics students
reached the reduction goal at lower cost (Mu¨ller et al., 2010a,b).
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According to economic theory, the primary allocation of the certiﬁcates should not
aﬀect the eﬃciency of the trading system. If the initial allocation is ineﬃcient, the
secondary market should correct this situation by reallocating the certiﬁcates to the
‘right’ municipalities. How fast the market can achieve a constellation, wherein no
transaction is possible which enhances the Pareto-eﬃciency, depends on the design and
the trading rules of the secondary market, as well as on the trading behavior of the
participants. The results of the data analysis indicate that the primary allocation of
the certiﬁcates had only little impact on the adaption of the land development plan.
Moreover, some participants used the ﬂexibility of the trading system to adjust the
amount of certiﬁcates in order to realize a speciﬁc scenario and bought the necessary
certiﬁcates at the market place. Hence, it was possible for the participants to realize
the initial baseline scenario and to balance the periodical demand for certiﬁcates by
purchasing additional certiﬁcates on the market.
Some results of the ﬁeld experiment indicated that the implementation of the pro-
posed scheme will not automatically result in the expected cost savings and eﬃciency
gains. In all simulation runs, the overall incomes were lower than in the optimal solu-
tion. Furthermore, the results from the simulation runs with the student control group
showed that eﬃciency gains can be realized when focusing on economic criteria during
the simulation. Possible reasons for ineﬃcient abatement strategies include incomplete
information about the scarcity of certiﬁcates in the future, wrong price signals from the
market, risk aversion of the participants, as well as the consideration of non-economic
criteria during the selection of development options. The analysis shows that the usage
of the decision support tool supported the economic comparison of diﬀerent development
plans and led to higher incomes in municipalities if a TDC scheme is introduced. Local
political goals and economic cost minimization are not necessarily congruent. When
participants based their decisions on the economic criteria, political relevance was less
important. Hence, the measurable economic optimum must not be validated as the only
reference point in the planning process. A strategy evaluation that compares market
results with the monetary optimum is only partly convincing for the comparison of the
two subject pools, and the results of the simulation must be interpreted carefully. As
described in the presented framework for land use decisions, political constraints could
hinder economic decisions of local representatives.
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Wrongly chosen development options, in economic terms, as observed in the ﬁeld
experiment, can also support high market prices, slow down the price discovery process
and reduce the eﬃciency of the trading system. The ﬁeld experiment replicated some
of the typical features of environmental and experimental markets. A gap between
observed prices and optimal prices was observed particularly in the ﬁrst simulation run
and signiﬁcant learning eﬀects in the second simulation run. In the ﬁrst simulation run,
the market price was mainly inﬂuenced by the maximum price and the sanction price.
Market prices that are not based on the abatement costs may inﬂuence the trading
strategy of municipalities, and can lead to a signiﬁcant decrease of the municipal proﬁts
and to a lower eﬃciency of the allowance system. Only if the participants base their order
prices on fundamental values, the market price can correctly reﬂect changes in demand
and in costs between municipalities. Otherwise, the market prices cannot adequately
reﬂect scarcity and the abatement costs.
The dispersion during the price discovery process can have some important policy
implications in the domain of land development. Price ﬂuctuations can lead to the re-
duction of new land development in municipalities with high abatement costs, which
foster ineﬃcient market results. Due to the fact that a land utilization plan determines
the development of cities for a long period (in German municipalities usually 15 years),
a high price variance in this illiquid market can inﬂuence the long-term planning of the
municipalities. This convergence process is critically important for policy applications,
because it can complicate long-term decisions of the municipalities. In emission rights
schemes, various derivative instruments have been developed to hedge long-term pur-
chases and sales of emission rights (e.g. options, swaps, futures, etc). Such instruments
are essential for the calculation of inter-temporal strategies and make an individual cal-
culation of the price discovery possible. A similar development could be expected for
TDC systems. This would facilitate the handling of volatile prices and increase the
acceptance of the new instrument.
6.2 Design of a Decision Support Tool (Chapter 4)
The participants reported at the workshops of the ﬁeld study that they well received the
structured data collection and the comprehensive decision support tool, which supported
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their decision making in the ﬁeld experiment. The decision support tool reﬂects the
municipal decision situation by describing the municipal land development on the basis
of diﬀerent development options and the associated areas, as well as the related costs
and incomes. Many local representatives stated that their sensibility towards costs,
related to development options, was growing when collecting and entering the data into
the online platform. Furthermore, the tool supported the strategic planning and served
as the basis for policy making and development planning in the simulation. Learning
eﬀects on the part of the participants between the two simulation runs, especially with
regard to strategy ﬁnding and pricing, were observable between the two simulation runs
and the participants became more familiar with the usage of the decision support tool.
The design of the platform and the decision support tool enabled the calculation of
follow-up costs for maintaining the infrastructure. Help windows and tool tips were
available to support the decision making over the internet and were integrated into an
user friendly graphical interface. This functionality is an advantage of web based tools
that combine a front end with a database. Against it, oﬄine excel tools, which are
used in most of the current studies, oﬀer only a limited functionality. Similar to other
decision support tools for land development, the implemented tool focused on the actual
demand for ﬂoor space, and did not include population dynamics. Moreover, due to
the geographical distance between the municipalities, the modeling of migration and
the associated eﬀects were of lower importance. However, a game-theoretical modeling
extension of the decision support system that allows the reﬂection and estimation of
population dynamics in diﬀerent regions and metropolitan areas was also proposed.
The observed trading and avoidance strategies highlight the necessity of supporting
information tools, as well as a thorough preparation and training of the decision makers
within a TDC system. Regardless of whether a TDC system is introduced, the simulation
also showed that there is a need for supporting methods and tools in order to precisely
record costs, especially long-term costs. The planning is very complex and depends on
various factors, which cannot be quantiﬁed, or are diﬃcult to quantify. Before the new
instrument can be implemented in practice, it is necessary to enhance the acceptance
for the instrument and the expertise among the market participants. The participants’
lack of experience with this new instrument stresses the need for local authorities to
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acquaint themselves with the rules and the range of possible strategies in a system with
TDCs as a supplement to the existing planning regulation systems.
In contrast to other decision support systems, the implemented decision support sys-
tem focused on the structure of the areas and the integration of a TDC scheme. The
tool distinguished between two categories of development options that can cover the de-
mand for ﬂoor space in a municipality. First, development options which are associated
with new land development by converting open space into new settlement and traﬃc
areas could be speciﬁed. Second, development options in the inner areas, which allow
the reuse or extended usage of existing settlement and traﬃc areas, could be deﬁned in
the tool. Based on this model, the decision support tool calculated the total amount of
TDCs that was necessary to realize a new land development plan in a planning period.
In order to enable the simulation of a system with TDCs, the implemented decision
support system had to reﬂect the structure of the municipal boundaries, the settlement
and traﬃc areas, as well as the associated ﬂoor space areas very accurately. However,
the decision support tool can also be used without the introduction of a TDC system.
For instance, the implementation of a decision support tool on the regional level can be
used to create an eﬃcient regional land development plan by coordinating the municipal
land development.
The participants in the ﬁeld experiment, and respectively the local representatives,
considered further aspects apart from just cost minimization when using the decision
support tool. The decision support tool only reﬂected the recorded costs of the devel-
opment options chosen by the municipal participants, which only partially reﬂected the
preferences of the participants. For instance, priorities in local politics, which were not
explicitly modeled in the ﬁeld experiment, were relevant for their choice of development
options. Hence, local political priorities were the dominant criterion for the choice of de-
velopment options in the strategy ﬁnding of the municipalities. Although municipalities
could enter additional textual descriptions of development options, for instance the rele-
vance of a development option in the political context, a monetary quantiﬁcation of the
data was not possible. Politically and sociologically caused costs are diﬃcult to quantify
monetarily and were not included in the tool. Economic criteria, on the contrary, are
insigniﬁcant for some municipalities, which emphasizes the importance of displaying the
information comprehensibly to the participants. By analyzing the trading strategies of
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the participants, it became clear that the individual marginal costs displayed on the
internet platform by the indicator price tool (which is an economically rational crite-
rion for price bidding levels) was of little importance to the participants although the
participants received assistance in marginal cost calculation.
6.3 Decision Framework for Land Usage (Chapter 3)
The results of the ﬁeld experiment and the limits of the presented modeling approaches
for decision support systems show that more work needs to be done to elaborate institu-
tional collective action frameworks for land development in more detail. The proposed
framework provides a guideline for the integration of new policy instruments into the
land use decision chain. For a more comprehensive understanding of the interdepen-
dencies in the decision process, a multi-step modeling of the decision process is helpful.
Only if the characteristics of the decision process, including the incentives of the deci-
sion makers in diﬀerent environments become clear, a suitable integration of the new
policy instruments into the planning processes is possible. Modeling approaches from
other domains, such as common-pool resource games used in the ﬁshery or water usage
domain, might enrich the modeling approaches in land usage by introducing competition
for households and ﬁrms. Furthermore, the analysis of the vertical and horizontal policy
framework can be investigated within the scope of social network analysis. New theo-
retical modeling approaches in this area can provide further insights into other aspects
during the decision making in land development.
The proposed framework for land development decisions shows that relationships on
the horizontal level can inﬂuence the ability of local bargainers for coordinated collec-
tive actions in land usage and can hinder the realization of some development plans.
As mentioned above, the policy network primarily limits the feasibility of municipal
development strategies or leads to an overestimation of tax incomes. Furthermore, po-
litical relevance of speciﬁc development options in the decision process will increase the
valuation of options that are unfavorable from a purely economic perspective. The intro-
duced model can serve as a basis for analyzing the policy network among governmental
and non-governmental actors for the coordination of land usage in diﬀerent regional
scenarios.
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The decision framework for land usage points out that there still exists a lack of cost
transparency during land development decisions in Germany. By enhancing the cost
transparency, the development of land development plans, which are preferable with
regards to economic, ecological and social aspects, will be more likely. For instance,
in many municipalities the demand for ﬂoor space is overestimated, which leads to an
inadequate development of new areas depending on the community context. In order
to solve the related collective action problem, it is necessary to solve the dilemma of
uncoordinated land development plans. A planning institution as a supervisory authority
in a region should be able to provide a regional database that enables local authorities
to store municipal data to compare the eﬃciency of diﬀerent development plans and to
coordinate the land development. However, this makes a mapping of the regional and
municipal structure of the spatial areas necessary. Some of the recent studies, presented
within this book, have also directed their attention to the impact of regional structures
on the likelihood of local agreements. Furthermore, the platform supports an accurate
estimation of the municipal demand for ﬂoor space and can support the solution of
development dilemmas.
Vertical and horizontal policy networks can hinder the eﬃciency of newly designed
market-based instruments, such as property rights systems. Recent studies have ana-
lyzed the design of property rights allocation to diﬀerent regions. The acceptance of
these new instruments is mainly inﬂuenced by whether the introduction is considered to
be fair for the participants. For instance, in a property rights scheme, the design of the
initial allocation of certiﬁcates to the municipalities is crucial for the acceptance of the
new policy instrument. An allocation rule implies requirements for the functioning of
the new instrument and can determine how far the result deviates from the optimum.
Depending on the criteria that are taken as the basis for the allocation, the property
rights scheme leads to considerable redistribution eﬀects between the municipalities and
inﬂuences the acceptance of the new instrument.
The ﬁndings have implications for a variety of issues in land development. The frame-
work points out that the understanding of the regional and municipal structure is a
necessary condition but, in order to gain more detailed insights into land development
and urban sprawl, a more transdisciplinary analysis of the decision making of local ac-
tors is necessary. Furthermore, the analysis shows that the structure of a region has a
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crucial impact on the decision situation of a municipality in land development. Based
on the speciﬁc decision situation, however, other factors can play an important role.
Timing of decisions, personal interests, or cognitive abilities of decision makers can have
a greater impact on the land use decision than the characteristics of the underlying
collective action framework. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the decision making
and the behavior of the local actors in more detail than currently done in theory. A
theoretical analysis of all complex decision making processes is almost impossible.
6.4 Design of a TDC Scheme (Chapter 2)
A TDC system can be described as an instrument intended to eﬀectively reduce the
development of new settlement and commercial areas. In the ﬁeld experiment, this
ecological target was met. Due to the chosen experimental design (borrowing was not
allowed but eﬀectively possible by paying sanctions), the quantity restriction was sur-
passed in the second simulation run in the control group. As the simulation ended after
the ﬁfth planning period, the obligation of handing in certiﬁcates in the last round,
in case of expansive area development, was outside the planning horizon. In case of
continued trading, the sanctioning regulations and the obligation to hand in missing
certiﬁcates later on guarantees that the global reduction goal will be achieved. Hence,
exceeding the reduction goal is partially a simulation artifact and a TDC system can be
seen as an eﬀective instrument for quantitative control.
Independent from these results, it is important to point out that a TDC system
alone does not guarantee compliance with qualitative goals. The reduction goal was
even undercut in the simulation runs of the ﬁeld experiment. It is necessary to consider
economic and ecological aspects along with the institutional and legal requirements when
choosing a market design for tradable development certiﬁcates in Germany. The new
instrument rather complements existing spatial planning, ecological, and landscaping
instruments. It is, thus, a challenge for policy makers to identify the crucial design
elements that facilitate the trading system and lead to desirable outcomes in social,
ecological, and economic terms. Therefore, diﬀerent aspects of the market design for the
new environmental instrument were presented, that were also the basis for the design of
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the ﬁeld experiment and the implementation of decision support tools in the ﬁrst part
of this book.
By means of the ﬁeld experiment, the applicability of the settlement and traﬃc areas,
as the central indicator for measuring the land consumption and as the reference value
of the TDCs, is proven to be suitable within a ﬁrst application scenario. Therefore,
tradable development certiﬁcates are goods that legitimate municipalities to develop
new residential and traﬃc areas in the outer area of a city. In contrast, the central
reference value to deﬁne a municipal development target, which has to be ensured in
each scenario, was the demand for ﬂoor space. In the simulation, it was distinguished
between two diﬀerent targets, the required ﬂoor space for commercial purposes and the
required ﬂoor space for residential purposes. In order to reduce the complexity of the
task to coordinate the land development in two diﬀerent dimensions, the modeling of
diﬀerent development goals for separated settlement and traﬃc areas seems to be more
favorable. Due to the fact that many studies show diﬀerences between the costs and
incomes of areas for commercial and residential purpose, high abatement costs in one
dimension can inﬂuence the price in the other dimension if universal certiﬁcates exist.
Hence, a market diﬀerentiation by land-use criteria and two speciﬁc submarkets for
commercial and residential TDCs should be analyzed in further experiments.
An allocation model was proposed in this book that implements a market at the fed-
eral states level with municipalities as the market participants. The reduction goal is
set by the federal states to the administrative district, and the supervisory planning
authority allocates the certiﬁcates to the municipalities afterwards and coordinates the
regional land development. Such a model, which is compatible with the interests of
the involved institutions, includes a high number of market participants and is most
compatible with the German law. The federal states can set binding reduction goals
in subordinated local authorities in the interest of a sustainable federal land develop-
ment and planning. Studies have shown that the federal states are able to limit the
development of new settlement and traﬃc areas and consider quantitative restrictions
on new land development as feasible. However, the German Federation has to negotiate
the reduction goals with the federal states to prevent a deviation by concurrent compe-
tences. The proposed model should guarantee a high acceptance of the new instrument
and seems to be appropriate to solve the described regulatory choice problem.
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In a TDC scheme, the task of the supervisory planning authority is to coordinate land
development plans, to allocate the certiﬁcates to the municipalities and to monitor the
land development plan. As mentioned above, a regional database can facilitate all these
tasks and allows the calculation of the primary allocation of the certiﬁcates. Due to the
fact that the initial allocation should have little inﬂuence on the eﬃciency of the system,
the allocation should aim at solving the acceptance problems potentially arising from
the diﬀerent interest groups within the vertical policy framework. Thus, the criteria
population, settlement and traﬃc areas, nature protection area and historical population
growth were identiﬁed as appropriate, because they combine economical, ecological and
social aspects. Furthermore, the platform can provide diﬀerent access rights to the
supervisory authorities and to the municipalities. Regional planning authorities can get
restricted access to the data and only request information about the structure of the
municipal areas for allocating the certiﬁcates, while municipalities get full access to the
entire data such as sensible costs and incomes. Thus, the database can support the cost
calculation of the municipalities, facilitates the calculation of the initial allocation of the
certiﬁcates and enables the monitoring of the land development plans.
6.5 Outlook
In order to provide more empirical results in diﬀerent regions, further experiments and
ﬁeld studies should be conducted with focus on a cap-and-trade mechanism for land
usage. The participation in such experiments can lead to an augmented acceptance
of the real world actors towards the new instrument. For this reason, additional sur-
veys and ﬁeld studies should be conducted, which focus on the mentioned observations,
and investigate and test tradable development certiﬁcates in other planning simulations.
Alternative scenarios with municipalities that are in a regional association could give
further insights into how to design an appropriate TDC scheme. Consequently, issues
of rivalry and allocation between municipalities could also be reﬂected. Future research
projects should especially examine possibilities of combining regional planning and TDC
systems, or should analyze various aspects of intercommunal competition between munic-
ipalities for households and ﬁrms. This would mainly inﬂuence the costs of development
options, because, for example, commercial tax or personal income tax revenues, ﬁnancial
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subsidies from the federal states, or costs for infrastructure developments and municipal
facilities would be aﬀected.
The observed strategies in the ﬁeld experiment and the discussed market design for
TDCs also have diﬀerent implications for the design of future planning and decision
support tools. First, in future decision support tools, diﬀerent actor groups should have
access to the data. A prerequisite is that municipalities should get unlimited access
to the planning tools and should be able to decide which data is passed on to other
actors, like brokers and economic experts, who support the trading of certiﬁcates, or the
supervisory authority. However, further legal aspects in terms of privacy arise with the
implementation of these regional decision support tools. Secondly, due to the regional
consequences of local land development decisions, the implementation of regional plan-
ning tools is favorable. Small municipalities have only limited resources to implement
and manage local information systems and decision support tools. Thirdly, the results
of the ﬁeld experiments have shown that the design of the tools has to be carefully
elaborated with municipal decision makers. A user friendly interface that reﬂects the
decision situation accurately and shows economic, ecological and social consequences is
indispensable. Fourthly, the decision support tool has to reﬂect the municipal decision
making processes. This includes the setting up of alternative development plans, the
realization of a land development plan as well as land use decisions of households and
ﬁrms as outlined in the proposed framework for land use decisions.
National studies suggest that a holistic consideration of all decision processes in land
usage is very unlikely. Therefore, future research should focus on speciﬁc facets of the
proposed framework. Context choice modeling might predict how actors (e.g. households
and municipalities) behave within the land use decision chain. This will help to further
analyze decision processes of local representatives in a particular context. By conduct-
ing choice experiments and conjoint analyses, probabilistic predictions about human
decision making behavior in a particular situation are possible. In this context, the con-
sideration of psychological factors, which inﬂuence the cooperative behavior of the local
decision makers, also plays an important role. Studies emphasize that the risk aversion
of the participants has an impact on negotiation processes and inﬂuences the success of
intercommunal cooperation concepts. Trust, candor, altruism, and goodwill of the rep-
resentatives are further factors that determine the probability of achieving a cooperative
170
6 Conclusion and Outlook
solution in the second decision step, and the structure of the policy networks. A more
interdisciplinary view on the collective action problem in land development will help to
understand the way diﬀerent local representatives in diverse types of municipalities and
regions make decisions.
Recent studies have shown that, apart from the spatial structure and the community
context, the policy network and the restrictions of spatial planning should also be taken
into account when allocating property rights. Non-economic criteria, such as the struc-
ture of the described horizontal and vertical policy network, are diﬃcult to quantify and,
therefore, can hardly be considered during the primary allocation. The number of non-
economic criteria, which will be taken into account in the initial allocation, inﬂuences
the distance of the created allocation from the optimal economic allocation. The design
of market-based instruments in land use depends on restrictions from other instruments,
which have binding land goals as well. This enhances the necessity for a diﬀerentiated
consideration of the goals and instruments within the scope of scientiﬁc and political
discussions. Future research projects should especially examine the interaction with
policy restrictions, for instance constraints from a superior regional planning, and the
design of economic instruments. The proposed framework for land development deci-
sions can also be used to discuss important aspects and interdependencies of the actors
when introducing new policy instruments to achieve a sustainable land development.
Furthermore, the framework outlines that cooperation concepts are necessary to avoid
the cost paradox and the development dilemma. Without considering all these aspects,
even a market-based instrument that is rooted in economic values will not be able to
eﬃciently solve the main environmental problem.
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